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Abstract 
The marketisation of higher education has transformed academic labour markets and challenges 
comparative political economy theory. This thesis explores the tensions between predicted and 
actual developments of academic labour markets in the liberal Australian and the German 
corporatist welfare state. It compares the emergence of marketisation policies and their impact on 
academic labour market developments between 1980-2012 in the two contrasting national higher 
education systems. The central argument of this thesis is that states develop similar marketisation 
policies despite clearly different institutional configurations. While these policies are tailored to 
nationally specific regimes, nevertheless in each case they have triggered the segmentation of 
academic labour markets into a secure primary and a precarious secondary market. The quantitative 
evidence shows a growing gap between secure and precarious employment and demonstrates that 
academic labour markets are more secure in the Australian liberal than in the German coordinated 
welfare state. This contradicts the premises of comparative political economy and shows that similar 
marketisation policies, converging processes and outcomes emerge beyond institutional 
particularities. In accordance with scholars from the new political economy of higher education, this 
thesis suggests that a combined analysis of macro and micro approaches from the comparative 
political economy and the sociology of higher education disciplines provide useful means of 
theorising the changing structures of higher education and academic labour markets.  
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 1 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Marketisation and employment insecurity in higher education  
Welfare states have established and strengthened policies of marketisation in higher education 
during the past three decades. At the same time the sector has grown substantially in the number of 
student enrolments, graduations, and employees. Higher education systems have also become 
paramount for socio-economic success in global knowledge economies. The progressive expansion 
of the publicly funded higher education sector has not only produced policy challenges but also 
disrupted traditional academic labour market structures. In many advanced economies, including 
Australia and Germany, there is a growing gap between the employment conditions of the 
permanent and non-permanent academic workforce.  
This seemingly uniform trend towards precarious labour market conditions even in the highly skilled 
higher education sector is particularly interesting for comparative political economy because it 
contradicts premises of its foundational frameworks. Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Esping-Andersen 
1990) and Varieties of Capitalism (Hall and Soskice 2001) approaches have not yet captured the role 
of the ever more important higher education sector. Furthermore, these approaches predict that 
labour market policies and outcomes between corporatist and liberal states differ considerably. This 
predictions seem to be at odds with the developments in the higher education sector. The 
frameworks cannot explain why the liberal Australian and the corporatist German welfare states 
have developed similar marketisation policies with regards to higher education systems since the 
1980s. Furthermore, employment insecurity is even higher in the German than in the Australian 
academic labour markets (Höhle and Teichler 2016, 267).  
This thesis aims to solve these theoretical inconsistencies by answering two questions: Do liberal and 
corporatist welfare states develop similar marketisation policies in higher education and what are 
the implications for the comparative political economy frameworks; and are the academic labour 
market outcomes similar? The central argument of this thesis is that states indeed have developed 
similar marketisation policies across political systems and parties despite clearly different 
institutional configurations. Marktisation has triggered the increasing segmentation of academic 
labour markets into two markets: a secure primary market and an insecure secondary academic 
labour market (Musselin 2009). Academic labour market segmentation can be observed in both 
countries although the higher education systems differ. This thesis examines the problems that 
marketisation policies pose for academic labour and explains the significance of labour market 
segmentation in the changing higher education environment. It suggests that a combined analysis 
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using macro and micro approaches from the comparative political economy and the sociology of 
higher education disciplines provides a useful means of theorising the changing structures of higher 
education and academic labour markets.  
Higher education has become one of the most important sectors in modern societies. Knowledge-
based societies rely heavily on higher education institutions, theoretical knowledge, academic 
training and technological innovations (Bell 1973, Böhme and Stehr 1986, Drucker 1969, OECD 1996, 
Stehr 1994). University, staff and student numbers, as well as interactions between higher 
education, industries and governments, have increased worldwide since World War II (Etzkowitz and 
Leydesdorff 1997, Frank and Meyer 2007). Consequently, the higher education sector has developed 
from a small elite system to a large and increasingly globally organised mass enterprise (Gumport at 
al. 1997, Marginson 1997b, 2000, Trow 1974).  
The growing societal importance of knowledge, science and the higher education sector has moved 
higher education policy making from the periphery to the centre of government agendas. 
Governments increasingly act as mediators between publicly funded higher education and the 
demands of other industry sectors. This development is reflected in governments' statements, which 
focus on the economic, alongside the societal importance of the higher education system, and 
regularly confirm that governments are committed to publicly fund, regulate and control the system 
(Marginson 2010, Olssen and Peters 2010, OECD 2017).  
The strong role of the state in higher education policy making also means that the sector is viewed 
as socially embedded1 (Eklund 2013, 119) leading to the emergence of a new interdisciplinary 
research field known as the political economy and sociology of higher education (Frickel and Moore 
2006, Gläser and Laudel 2016, Robertson 1998, Maesse 2015, Schulze-Cleven et al. 2017, Sum and 
Jessop 2013). This field observes effects of state regulations on higher education systems, combines 
political economy and higher education literature and assesses “whether classical notions of political 
economy can be applied to the current academic transformation” (Schulze-Cleven et al. 2017, 797). 
This field is therefore very important for the objective of this thesis to bridge the gap between the 
growing importance of the higher education sector and the still marginal engagement of political 
economy scholars in this area. The present comparative study of marketisation policies in higher 
education and academic labour market outcomes in liberal Australian and corporatist German 
welfare states contributes to the political economy of higher education in four ways.  
                                                          
1 This means that the higher education system does not act in isolation but is a main driver of the economy and thus strongly related 
to the socio-economic policy development. 
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First, the thesis applies and develops a series of classical political economy frameworks to the field of 
higher education. Typologies of capitalist welfare states (Esping-Andersen 1990, Hall and Soskice 
2001) are used to distinguish Australian liberal and German corporatist states.  Approaches to skill 
formation within socio-economic systems (Estevez-Abe et al. 2001, Iversen 2005) have hitherto 
tended to focus on vocational education, rather than higher education. The formation system is 
utilised in this paper to integrate the higher education sector into comparative welfare state 
frameworks. In addition, Pierson identifies that states expand during neoliberalism ( 1996, 1998) and 
conceptualise marketization as a state driven-process of establishing quasi-markets (Le Grand 1991) 
in higher education. Furthermore, theories of incremental institutional change (Streeck and Thelen 
2005a) are particularly useful to show that similarities in marketization policies and labour market 
outcomes are possible although institutional differences remain.    
Second, this dissertation explicates limitations of the classical political economy frameworkof labour 
segmentation theory in analysing the high-skilled higher education sector.. The classical political 
economy literature only marginally engages with the high-skilled sector due to a traditional focus on 
production and trade as well as the distribution of national income and wealth, an emphasis on the 
traditional role of welfare state economies and catchall terms such as neoliberalism. As a result, 
distinct features of high-skilled academic labour markets are rarly investigated by the classical 
economists. Comparative higher education literature fills this gap with detailed analyses of national 
academic systems (Clark 1983), labour markets (Musselin 2009) and career structures (Enders and 
de Weert 2009, Galaz-Fontes et al. 2016). 
Third, the thesis develops a conceptual framework to overcome the limitations of comparative 
political economy theory and to guide detailed empirical research. It builds a theory by combining 
elements drawn from three different disciplinary fields. This will enable toaccount for the specific 
features of high-skilled academic work and academic labour markets across states. This dissertation 
presents an argument for the synthesis between comparative political economy, labour 
segmentation and higher education theory. This framework integrates the higher education sector in 
different welfare state economies and enables the empirical assessment of the development of 
higher education policies and their outcomes in different welfare states. The main insight from this 
novel framework is that it draws attention to the relationship between marketisation policies and 
labour market segmentation in higher education, which has been missing in other analyses. 
Finally, the new theoretical framework will be applied to a paradoxical development in higher 
education that concerns academics, the higher education sector and policy makers alike. Unlike 
other industries, the expansion, growth and increasing societal importance of the higher education 
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sector has diminished rather than enhanced the career and job prospects of the academic 
workforce.  Precarious work and employment conditions particularly of non-tenured adjuncts, casual 
teaching or temporary research project staff is growing. Precarious employment is not new; it has 
always been common in the low skilled and the informal sectors (Hatton 2011, Standing 2010, Vosko 
2006). What is new is the extent of precarious employment covering an increasing number of high-
skilled sectors and occupations including media, health and higher education.  
The empirical chapters investigate the conditions and causes that enforce precarious labour markets 
in the high-skill higher education sector across historically different welfare states, economies and 
higher education systems. This dissertationalso tests the validity and generalisability of    precarious 
academic work and inequality in academic employment conditions. Thus, the research design must 
account for differences and similarities between national political, economic and higher education 
systems, academic labour market structures and types of precarious academic work. The study 
compares the developments in higher education policies and academic labour markets in Australia 
and Germany from 1980 to 2012, marking the beginning of strengthening small state and free 
market policies. Australia and Germany, a liberal and a corporatist welfare state, have been selected 
as representative of different worlds of welfare states and higher education systems (cf. Ansell 2008, 
Clark 1983, Esping-Andersen 1990). According to comparative higher education theory (Clark 1983, 
Dobbins et al. 2011), liberal welfare states have higher education institutions with loose links to the 
state as well as close relations to markets and market demands for teaching and research (a 
"market-oriented" model). Corporatist or conservative welfare states have systems with structured 
public provision and much autonomy for academic self-governance focusing on scientific 
advancement (the "oligarchy or Humboldt" model). A systematic comparison of the two models 
helps to determine whether higher education policies and their labour market outcomes can be 
described in terms of institutional convergence or path-dependency. 
This thesis argues in agreement with the conclusions of scholars from the new political economy of 
higher education that precarious academic labour markets are “not the result of anonymous, 
unstoppable market forces but rather of political decisions” (Schulze-Cleven et al. 2017, 809). It 
conceptualises marketisation as a state-driven process that affects academic labour market 
structures. Marketisation refers to the state-driven construction of quasi-markets, defined by Le-
Grand (1991), for positions and activities that are traditionally not structured by market logics. The 
state creates, constructs and underpins markets as well as quasi-markets. As Jessop (2002) argues, 
the state is crucial for providing the framework, within which markets can exist, including 
infrastructure, market regulation, maintainence of social cohesion (21) as well as market failure (41).  
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In consequence, any growth in the inequality in academic employment conditions is thus a political 
issue, not the outcome of autonomous market forces or the evolution of the higher education 
sector. 
The higher education sector is traditionally publicly funded and academic work has been considered 
a common good (Marginson 2016). To enforce competition and market-like behaviour, governments 
authorise and establish market-based mechanisms to deliver public services (Cahill 2012). In recent 
years marketisation policies have substantially transformed the provision of core educational 
services, the mode of accountability and the approach to public funding of higher education 
research and teaching (Dill 1997, Ferlie et al. 2008, Marginson 2013, Slaughter and Leslie 1997). 
Marketisation policies have an important role in driving the segmentation of academic labour 
markets into mutually-dependant primary and secondary segments of academic work. This means 
that governments’ decisions around funding, and the subsequent economic models used to govern 
higher education and respond to changing environments, are worthy of investigating.   
Theoretically, the comparison between marketisation policies and academic labour market 
outcomes in liberal and corporatist welfare states challenges two seemingly conflicting hypotheses 
within the literature. The question of whether under change insititutions convergence or whether 
they remain on a particular path due to a tendency towards inertia. Graf as well as Schulz-Cleven 
and Olson predict ongoing path dependencies across academic labour markets (Graf 2009, Schulz-
Cleven and Olson 2017). Path-dependeny refers to Piersons’ (2000a/c) concept of the tendency of 
insitutions to continue in established practices because of their structural properties. Austin and 
Jones (2015) as well as Sporn (2003) identify that historically distinct national higher education 
systems converge either as a whole or in some areas only. Insitutions converge if they become more 
similar to each other (Hall 2003). Convergence is well illustrated by the integrative Bologna process 
of different European higher education systems (Guri-Rosenblit, Šebková & Teichler 2007).  
In contrast, this thesis argues that both perspectives are compatible with academic labour market 
outcomes. It will be arhued here that marketisation policies indeed take different forms and are 
transmitted through different pathways given by nationally different higher education systems, but 
they affect academic labour market structures similarly. While the German higher education system 
for example increases the research market and number of temporary project staff, the Australian 
lecture system increases the teaching market and number of casual tutors and lecturers. If 
institutional path dependencies remain and produce a similar structural segmentation into primary 
secure and secondary insecure labour markets, the question arises as to how institutional 
differences matter. 
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The following sections elaborate the main pillars of the thesis. Section 1.2 explains why the 
development of a political economy of higher education is important, specifies the main conceptual 
problems and suggests an analytical framework. Section 1.3 outlines the case of precarious 
academic employment, reviews the relevant literature and justifies the focus on marketisation 
policies and academic labour market developments. Section 1.4 explains the comparative research 
design of the study and Section 1.5 outlines the structure of the thesis.  
1.2 Towards a comparative political economy of higher education 
Comparative political economy theories rarly enges with the higher education sector. To better 
incorporate the field of higher education in comparative political economy frameworks this thesis 
synthesises three distinct and rarely integrated disciplinary fields or areas of research:  higher 
education, the comparative political economy frameworks and labour market segmentation 
theories. 
Higher education has evolved relatively late from a small elitist system to a more inclusive system, 
which has become key to national socio-economic success. The advent of mass higher education can 
be traced back to the 1960s and is linked to norms of social equality as well as democratic and 
economic demands for well-educated citizens and workers in the post-World War II era. At the same 
time higher education began to flourish as a policy field and a growing market. Since the 1980s 
public expenditure cuts in many countries have led to a chronic underfunding of the still expanding 
higher education sector and a shift towards neoliberal higher education policies, known as New 
Public Management (Olssen and Peters 2005, Slaughter and Rhoades 2004). These policies 
introduced market principles to the traditionally publicly funded and professionally organised higher 
education sector and can thus be described as marketisation policies. The concept of marketisation 
implies that higher education systems have a distinct logic, which cannot be reduced to market 
logics (Clark 1983) and that states, rather than unbound market forces, deliberately create higher 
education markets (Polanyi 1944, Schulze-Cleven et al. 2017).  
The development of marketisation policies is mostly discussed in the field of higher education 
research, rarely in the comparative political economy literature. The absence of engagement with 
higher education within the comparative and political economy discipline is partly due to the Marxist 
tradition, which focuses on industrial rather than knowledge production and on low-skill vocational 
education and schooling, rather than high-skill higher education. Labour market segmentation 
theories and higher education research provide a useful link to fill this gap. Higher education 
researchers reveal specific structures of academic labour markets in different countries (Musselin 
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2009) and labour market segmentation scholars theorise the differentiation in primary and 
secondary labour markets. This differentiation in different market logics and segments elaborates 
established welfare state typologies. Comparative political economy usually refers to rather 
monolithic, inclusive and static types such as liberal, corporatist and social democratic welfare states 
(Esping-Andersen 1990) or liberal and coordinated market economies (Hall and Soskice 2001).2 Each 
welfare state type is characterised by distinct social policy and labour market protection regimes but 
the framework does not engage with differences across and within labour markets. The most 
important differences acrosswelfare states can be found in employment security between market-
centred liberal and state-centred corporatist welfare state economies. The latter with comparatively 
high and the former with relatively low employment security (Esping-Andersen 1990). But in the 
case of academic labour markets the relationship between welfare state type and employment 
security is different. 
 Streeck and Thelen (2005a) conceptualise institutional change under state-driven marketisation and 
liberalisation policies across different welfare states. One of the main questions in comparative 
analysis of change is whether institutional features converge or remain distinct. Some argue that 
under common challenges, institutional differences between welfare states remain, indicating 
regime stability and path-dependency (Ferrera 2000, Hall and Soskice 2001, Kuhnle 2000, Pierson 
1996). Others argue that social policy, practices and public funding allocation practices converge 
across welfare states (Clayton and Pontusson 1998, Clasen 2005, Fehmel 2012, Hermann 2014, Kiess 
et al. 2017). The case of academic labour markets suggests that these seemingly contradicting 
perspectives are compatible because different institutional environments may produce the same 
labour market effect of increasing segmentation.   
Scholars Institutional change impcats on welfare state support services, such as unemployment 
benefits, age pension and retirement and the health system. So far, the institutional change 
framework, developed by Streeck and Thelen (2005a) has rarly been applied to thethe 
developments in the higher education sector. Comparative theories state that specific labour market 
protection regimes excisit in differentwelfare state regimes. However, coparative theories cannot be 
used to explain distinct academic labour market regimes. Academic labour markets are 
characterised by a relatively high independence of the academic profession from political and 
economic influences, often guaranteed by constitutional rights. Independent academic inquiry is 
protected through tenure or permanent, lifetime employment contracts. But this employment status 
                                                          
2 Despite conceptual differences between welfare states and varieties of capitalism approaches, these two 
frameworks share common features and can be integrated (Schröder 2009). For this reason the notion of 
welfare state types refers to both approaches.    
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within the academic profession varies considerably between and within national higher education 
systems. High labour market protection policies and regulations, provided bythe corporatist German 
welfare state, for example, only apply to very few tenured professors. Academic staff are employed 
on temporary contracts enacted by a law known as the ‘Act of Academic Fixed-Term Contract’ that is 
specific to the German academic labour market.  
Furthermore, the pathways to influence higher education systems and academic labour markets 
vary across countries. Burton R. Clark (1986), one of the founding scholars of international 
comparative higher education research, argues that higher education systems sit within a triangle of 
governance coordination between states, markets and academic oligarchies. In corporatist welfare 
states, the academic oligarchy and states govern the higher education system, while liberal welfare 
states are characterised by a governance mix that lies between loose links to the state and close 
relations to the market. The three worlds of welfare state typology and its underlying assumptions 
can therefore be applied to and tested in the field of higher education. A crucial assumption is that 
liberal and corporatist welfare states develop different employment protection policies. This means 
that liberal welfare state economies have less social and employment security than in corporatist 
welfare state economies (Esping-Andersen 1990, Hall and Soskice 2001). The analysis that will be 
developed in the following chapters questions the validity of this concept when applied to academic 
labour markets by showing that insecure academic work is more common in the corporatist German 
state than the liberal Australian welfare state. In both states, academic labour markets are divided 
into a secure primary and an insecure secondary labour market segment as theorised by Reich, 
Gordon and Edwards (1973). The appeal to labour segmentation theories enables to organise the 
evidence showing the relationship between both different labour markets within states and across 
states. Labour segementation theories are are used to analysethe causes of growing segmentation 
(Peck 1996). Segmentation theory enables a specification of the contradictions of some central 
arguments in the welfare state typologies when applied to higher education.    
The typologies of welfare state economies are important to emphasise the crucial role of states in 
higher education policy making, to account for national differences of welfare state economies 
surrounding higher education systems and to guide the case selection of comparative higher 
education (Graf 2009, McBrier 2003, Schulze-Cleven and Olson 2017) and academic labour market 
research (Rosenblum and Rosenblum 1990, 1996). Although national boundaries and differences 
may dissolve in the increasing globalisation of higher education (Altbach and Knight 2007, Marginson 
2011, Marginson and Rhoades 2002, Scott 2000, Slaughter and Leslie 1999), Kosmützky (2015, 360)  
argues that the state remains the most important actor and thus an important unit of analysis. This 
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means that states have continuing significance and that there is a crucial role of the national level in 
comparative higher education analysis. This dissertation argues that existing comparative higher 
education frameworks need to be enriched with concepts from the political economy that are more 
sensitive, to capture specific structures and dynamics of higher education systems and academic 
labour markets. 
A synthesis of comparative political economy typologies with higher education literature and labour 
market segmentation theory enhances the understanding of specific national traditions and 
structures of academic work as well as labour markets. While higher education literature can be 
used to gain in-depth knowledge about the inner world and functioning of academic labour markets, 
labour market segmentation theory systematically links these insights to comparative political 
economy frameworks. Both comparative political economy theory and labour market segmentation 
theory have several things in common, yet they have rarely been linked. The common themes are 
the varieties of labour market protection regimes, the role of employee representation and the 
impact of policies on various institutions. Comparatists tend to focus on macro-level institutions, 
while labour segmentation scholars focus on how labour market relations and conditions are shaped 
by the national socio-economic environment. Both the micro and macro levels are needed to 
capture the specific structures and dynamics in contemporary higher education. However, in 
combination, each theory’s strength addresses the weakness of the other, creating a useful 
explanatory framework for higher education policy and labour market developments. 
1.3 Marketisation and the rise of precarious academic labour markets 
The conceptual framework of this thesis has been developed based on the theoretical challenges 
towards a comparative political economy of higher education and two interrelated developments in 
higher education. Neoliberal higher education policies and precarious academic work have been 
increasing around the globe since the 1980s. The empirical case study of this thesis claims a causal 
relationship between both developments. It shows the causal effects of marketisation policies for 
academic labour markets across different types of welfare state economies and higher education 
systems. Causal mechanisms are examined through a qualitative comparison of higher education 
policies and a quantitative comparison of academic labour market developments in the liberal 
Australian and corporatist German higher education systems. The central hypothesis is that 
marketisation policies, established in liberal and corporatist welfare states, trigger the segmentation 
of academic labour markets into two markets: a secure primary market and an insecure secondary 
academic labour market. The thesis highlights the central role and responsibility of states in the 
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creation of markets and implementation of market principles in a high-skilled professional field that 
is not commonly structured by market forces.  
The developments in the higher education sector are embedded in a general trend towards 
neoliberal politics and the rise of precarious labour markets in contemporary market economies. 
Historically, precarious employment such as seasonal, migrant, contingent or domestic work has 
been associated with low status, low-skill, informal and private sectors (Hatton 2011, Standing 2011, 
101ff, Vosko 2006). Quinlan (2012) as well as Vocko (2006) argue that precarious employment was a 
pervasive feature of labour markets in developed countries prior to World War 2, declined with the 
growth of organised labour, collective bargaining and the advent of the standard employment 
relationship and re-emerged in the time of global neoliberalism. Since the late 1970s classic 
neoliberal policies are premised on arguments privileging free markets over state or professional 
self-regulation. However, there is no agreement as to what impact policy changes have on both the 
state and the academic profession. Scholars argue that states (Castles et al. 2012, Esping-Andersen 
2009, Korpi and Palme 2003, Powell and Hewitt 2002) and the academic profession (Altbach 1997, 
2003, Altbach and Finkelstein 2003, Bousquet 2008, Donoghue 2008, Enders 1999, Schimank 2005) 
are either in crisis, in transition, under threat, reshaped, restructured, disappearing or in 
retrenchment.  
The concept and the realities of precarious work have spread to high-skilled occupations including 
the public sector, professionals and management (Bousquet 2008, Kalleberg 2009, Standing 2011). 
Global labour markets have become more flexible, with labour protection laws being loosened, 
enabling organisations to more easily adjust to changing demands for teaching and research by 
adapting employee numbers for functional as well as wage flexibility and occupational mobility 
(Atkinson 1984, Standing 2011).  The dynamic growth in precarious work links to neoliberalism and 
marketisation, particularly the influence of corporate governance and finance that requires 
prioritising the profit interest of shareholders (Cappelli et al. 1997, Dore 1997, 2008), the 
globalisation of labour markets, the outsourcing of work to outside suppliers (Standing 1997, 1999) 
or to deregulation strategies of public authorities (Prosser 2016). This suggests that the investigation 
of the impact of marketisation policies on the distinct highly skilled academic labour market is 
valuable. 
Labour market flexibility as a concept also means that different employment policies can be applied 
to different groups of employees (Atkinson 1984) or segments of dual labour markets (Kalleberg 
2009, Kalleberg and Sorensen 1979, Prosser 2016). As a result, different employment conditions, 
such as short-term, zero hour contracts or permanent employment relationships, occur between 
 11 
and within labour markets. Since the 1980s, the nature of employment relations is increasingly 
deviating from the secure standard employment relationship towards a growing group of employees 
with an insecure attachment to the workforce (Bourdieu 2000, Campbell 1997, Campbell and 
Burgess 1997, 2001, Peck 1996, Standing 1999, Vosko 2006). The insecure attachment to the 
workforce is often referred to as precarious, which describes a multi-dimensional concept of work 
arrangements, covering job insecurity, the uncertainty of tenure, a lack of employment rights, and a 
lack of control over working conditions including hours and relatively low wages (Campbell and 
Burgess 1997, 2007, Standing 2011, Vosko 2000, 2010 Vosko et al. 2003).  Insecure, precarious or 
casual employment is a general and continuous trend in practice, it still lacks academic and public 
recognition partly due to the “invisibility and reification of casual work” (Tweedie 2013, 304). Casual 
workers are often invisible at the workplace, in meetings or networks, lack representation in 
organisational regulations (Ryan et al. 2013, 2017) or political discourses and are treated differently 
because they belong to a different natural category or even to a new emerging class (Standing 2011).  
Until recently, comparative political economy has largely focused on precarious work in the private 
low-skilled sectors, rather than exploring high-skilled public sectors such as higher education. By 
investigating academic labour markets, this thesis contributes to the understanding of increasing 
temporary employment in a high-skilled sector and the implications this has for political economy 
frameworks.  
In the higher education research field the rise of temporary and casual employment in academia, 
including the extent, character, causes and consequences of temporary work is topical.  Altbach 
(1997) and others argue that themassification and globalisation of higher education as well as the 
introduction of marketisation policies and practices correlate with increasing temporary work 
(Bryson 2004, Marginson and Considine 2000, Miller 1995, Stromquist 2007b, Tirelli 1997). Yet, the 
literature on temporary employment in academia largely investigates its occurrence in national 
higher education systems, rather than in a comparative political economy analysis, often excluding 
the structures of particular welfare state regimes. Comparative studies focus on the description of 
similarities and differences of the changing nature of the academic profession, academic careers and 
labour markets in different countries. The international survey 'Changing Academic Profession 
Survey' (CAP), conducted by the US Carnegie Foundation, compares developments of the academic 
profession between 1992 and 2007 across 18 countries from all over the world, which also includes 
the subtheme of precarious academic employment (Teichler et al. 2013b, 2). The study finds a 
substantial proportion of precarious employment in academia compared to other professions and an 
increase in short-term employment in the majority of countries, particularly among junior career 
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academics. This gap also leads to a significant gap in job satisfaction between insecure junior and 
more secure senior staff, patterns of work and career prospects. However, this gap is explained and 
justified through the inherent structures of higher education systems, such as long probationary 
periods and the highly selective nature of academic careers, rather than marketisation policies. The 
study concludes that hardly any consistent and convergent trend towards precarious employment 
can be found across countries due to contradictory developments, and different job and staff 
categories within national higher education systems (Teichler et al. 2013a). This thesis seeks to build 
on such studies of higher education by shedding light on the role of marketisation policies in the 
growing inequality within and across academic labour markets. 
Other comparative studies confirm the relative differences of precarious employment conditions 
across countries (Kreckel 2008, 2010) and emphasise distinct national academic career patterns and 
labour market structures that contradict attempts towards the harmonisation of higher education in 
the European Union (Musselin 2004, 2005). Musselin (2009b, 118-120) argues that the academic 
labour markets in France, Germany and the US are segmented into a permanent primary market 
(“titulaires” in France, “Beamter auf Dauer” in Germany and the tenure-track positions that convert 
into tenure positions in the United States) and a temporary secondary labour market. Although the 
secondary labour market tends to expand across countries, the size of the segments and the time 
periods to access the primary labour markets vary across countries.  
As a consequence of significant differences between national higher education systems, academic 
labour markets and career patterns, most studies of precarious academic employment draw on 
single country case studies rather than comparative approaches. In the United States of America and 
Canada, research focuses on the growing number of non-tenured adjuncts and the use of graduate 
students as temporary teaching or research assistants (American Association of University Professors 
2014, Berry 2005, Johnson and McCarthy 2000). Gappa and Leslie (1993) focus on part-time 
employment in the United States examining poor working conditions, such as low rates of pay, job 
insecurity and little integration into academic communities. They find that tenured academics are 
complicit, because their working conditions depend on experienced part-time academic employees. 
Finkelstein et al. (2009) suggest that the distinction between fixed term adjuncts and permanent 
positions is correlated with a role differentiation between ‘teaching-only’ and ‘research-only’ staff.  
Research on the academic sector in the United Kingdom highlights the consequences of neoliberal 
higher education reforms, particularly for casual teaching staff. In a study of policy change in the 
United Kingdom lecturer system, Parker and Jary (1995) show how the introduction of choice for 
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students and the modularisation of education courses are correlated with increasing casualisation of 
academic staff.  
In continental Europe, higher education scholars are largely engaging with the changing conditions 
of the academic profession as a whole and the consequences for early career academics. De Weert 
(2009, 143) argues that massification is “pulling the research and teaching nexus apart”. According 
to Enders and De Weert (2009, 266-267) this may lead to a specialisation of academic work roles in 
teaching and research, the emergence of alternative career paths and career prospects due to the 
higher value of research outputs and thus to a further division of both segments through social 
closure, where research academics become an exclusive group. Musselin (2005) distinguishes 
between two distinct promotion systems, noting that access to a first permanent academic position 
is relatively early in France at an average age of 32 years and rather late in Germany at 42 years. 
These differences indicate that the career stage-specific composition of the precarious academic 
workforce varies.  
Enders (1996) provided the first empirical study of the changing conditions, the problems and 
realities of German junior academics (termed “Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiter”), a group who are 
consistently in limited-term employment. The German system is characterised by a pyramidal 
employment structure of a few tenured professors and many subordinated insecure assistants, an 
intensified ‘up-or-out logic’ and ‘winner takes it all market’ (Rogge 2015) as well as a project-based 
structure (Torka 2009) that has led to an increase of temporary research-only project staff (Norkus 
et al. 2016). Not surprisingly, the literature and public discourse largely focuses on diminishing 
career prospects of secure employment for junior academics in Germany (Hüther and Krücken 
2012).  
In contrast, the discourse in Australia focuses on the rise, causes and consequences of the practice 
of engaging casual teaching only staff3 (Coates et al. 2009, May et al. 2013, May et al. 2014). 
Casualisation in academia is much higher compared to the average Australian workforce (Campbell 
and Burgess 2001). Kimber (2003) linked the managerial agenda of universities in Australia to the 
emergence of a two-tiered academic workforce with a ‘tenured core’ and a ‘tenuous periphery’ and 
argues that policies should address the needs of the tenuous periphery. Junor (2004) argued that the 
high rate of casualisation is the outcome of political regulation, rather than market freedom and 
individual choice. Marginson (1997a/b) has shown a shift in Australian higher education policies 
towards marketisation since the 1980s. He argues that the “growing reliance on part-time/casual 
                                                          
3 irregular employment paid by the hour with no access to paid leave 
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labour is a fundamental challenge to the academic profession’s notion of itself as a full-time career 
profession with secure control over the educational personality of programs” (2000, 24).  
More recent research in Australia focuses on the lived experiences of academic casuals. Brown et al. 
(2010) show the divide of the academic workforce into a permanent and a subordinated casual/non-
permanent employment class by examining the relatively poor working conditions for casuals in 
terms of job satisfaction, income insecurity and workplace identity. May et al. (2013) used 
superannuation fund data to determine the accurate projection of the extent of casual employment 
by headcount, rather than full-time equivalent employee data, and found over 50 percent of 
undergraduate teaching is conducted by casuals with limited career prospects. The casual labour 
market is segmented from the principal labour market. Casual academic employment is not the 
entry level to more secure or permanent employment. Similarly, in a survey and interview study 
based on 196 casual employees at a regional Australian University, Gottschalk and McEachern (2010) 
found that casual work functions on the whole as unsuccessful career strategy.  
Giroux (2002), Saunders (2010) and Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) have investigated the impact on 
university structures and operation, including the impact of neoliberal policy change on higher 
education changes emerging from changes to national higher education policies. Across the 
literature, the transformations on academic labour markets are often linked to higher education 
governance, rather than higher education policy.  In addition, the majority of studies into the causes 
and consequences of the rise of temporary employment are taking a national, rather than a 
comparative approach. To date, little research compares and contrasts changing academic labour 
markets in the context of different welfare states and the role of policy change.  
By bringing the Australian and German higher education systems into a comparative study, this 
thesis offers a fresh perspective on the causes of growing academic labour market segmentation.  
1.4 Research design 
The research design has been derived to test the central hypothesis of the thesis, that liberal and 
corporatist welfare state economies develop similar marketisation policies, which support the 
segmentation of the academic labour market into two markets: a secure primary academic labour 
market and an insecure secondary market. This hypothesis challenges concepts and recent empirical 
studies of institutional path dependency as a function of the stickiness of institutional practices 
(Pierson 2000a/c) in higher education, because it claims convergence of policy objectives and 
academic labour market outcomes. As the overview of recent comparative studies in higher 
education has shown, most scholars overemphasise the relevance of national differences between 
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higher education systems, academic labour markets and career patterns (Enders, De Weert and 
Palgrave 2009, Graf 2013, Schulze-Cleven and Olson 2017, Teichler et al. 2013a).  
This study compares academic labour market policies and outcomes in two seemingly contrasting 
welfare states: Australia as a liberal welfare state and Germany as a corporatist welfare state. Using 
two different cases, it finds that the structural academic labour market outcomes of change 
processes are similar, even if institutional structures at large differ. The empirical study examines the 
evidence for the convergence thesis and suggests an explanation: that marketisation policies simply 
use and bypass already established structures. This form of “incremental change with transformative 
results” (Streeck and Thelen 2005b, 9) is important, because established institutional structures, 
including organisational frameworks, norms and common practices, serve as a vehicle of change.  
To test the hypothesis and answer the research questions, a specific research design is required. 
Claims of similarity and convergence have to be based on a comparative approach that allows for 
interrogation of a maximum of differences. For this reason, the study compares two very different 
welfare state economies and higher education systems. Taking a comparative approach of "most 
different", rather than "most similar" systems (Collier 1993, 112) enables the researcher to identify 
the most common set of explanations for the changing nature of employment.  According to 
typologies of welfare state economies (Esping-Andersen 1990, Hall and Soskice 2001) and higher 
education systems (Clark 1983), Australia can be conceptualised as a liberal welfare state with a 
teaching-oriented lecturer system, while Germany is a corporatist welfare state with a research-
oriented chair system. These differences have implications for policy, employment and labour 
market types. The case study of Australia primarily addresses the teaching market and casual 
teaching staff. In contrast, the case study of Germany focuses on the research market and temporary 
research project staff.  
The cases are analysed at three levels, first on a case-by-case basis and then in comparison. The 
comparative case study uses a mixed methods and data approach. The first level investigates the 
historical emergence and structures of each higher education system as well as the academic labour 
market in the context of the particular welfare state model. This analysis draws largely on existing 
literature and situates the following two main analytical steps in specific historical contexts. The 
second level examines the development of major higher education policies. Due to the availability of 
quantitative academic labour market data, the analysis focuses on the period from 1980, when 
neoliberal policies emerged in higher education, to 2012. Political discourses accompanying the 
process of policy formation and the content of policies on the academic labour market are 
examined, drawing on official government documents. The third level investigates quantitative 
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academic labour market developments in the same period and draws on available administrative 
data.  
The analysis reflects data availability and constraints. The study uses administrative data because it 
is not possible to construct longitudinal data ex post. The main challenge of the analysis is ensuring 
the comparability of the data, as not all data can be adjusted to full-time equivalent employees, and 
where possible data has been annualised. The additional challenge was to ascribe academic labour 
market developments to policy change. For this reason, the analysis investigates whether the 
occurrence of policies correlates in timing with quantitative developments in the academic labour 
market. 
While the case-by-case analysis reveals case-specific policy and labour market developments, the 
comparison focuses on similarities in order to allow for generalisations relevant to the main 
hypothesis.  
1.5 Structure and outline of the thesis chapters 
The thesis is structured in three parts, with nine chapters.  
Part One, containing Chapters 2 to 3, develops the conceptual framework of the thesis. It reviews 
the political economy and higher education literature and identifies two questions: How is the 
central role of higher education within welfare state economies best conceptualised? How is 
institutional change to be best understood, particularly in higher education and academic labour 
markets? It develops an understanding of the relationship between welfare state economies and 
higher education and it establishes that institutional change can be broadly seen as path dependent. 
Thus, Part One develops and presents a framework that incorporates higher education as well as 
academic labour markets and allows for the empirical investigation of similarities and differences as 
well as convergence and divergence.        
Chapter 2 reviews the advantages and limits of comparative political economy frameworks in 
assessing the outcomes of change for particular labour markets and groups in society. The chapter 
uses Streeck and Thelen’s (2005a) typology of different institutional change processes and outcomes 
and applies it to the higher education sector. This typology provides an understanding that 
seemingly contradicting concepts of divergence and convergence are compatible. Institutional 
structures which appear different may lead to similar outcomes. 
Chapter 3 reviews labour segmentation theory and applies it to academic labour markets to 
understand and conceptualise the causes and consequences of policy change on different labour 
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market systems. It argues for the application of labour segmentation theory to high-skilled academic 
labour markets and outlines the characteristics of segmented academic labour markets, creating a 
framework for comparison. The chapter integrates higher education literature to outline distinctive 
features of the academic labour process and employment relations. 
Part Two, containing Chapters 4 to 7, provides analysis of changes in the higher education sector and 
academic labour markets in Australia and Germany. Both country studies are divided into a policy 
and academic labour market chapter in order to compare these two main levels of analysis 
systematically. The evidence shows substantial changes and developments in higher education 
policy regulation between 1980 and 2012, yet also similar challenges within academic labour 
markets.  
Chapters 4 and 5 focus on Australia. Chapter 4 provides evidence for the continuing policy changes 
under marketisation in the liberal Australian welfare state since 1950, focusing on the years between 
1980 and 2012. It demonstrates the continuity in the Australian state’s implementation of 
marketisation policies in higher education and shows the relationship between public provision and 
private funding, particularly between funding from fee-paying students and research expenditure. 
Chapter 5 outlines the characteristics of the Australian academic labour market and changes in this 
labour market between 1980 and 2012, using quantitative data. A detailed quantitative data analysis 
of academic labour markets reveals an increase in temporary employment. It demonstrates the 
increasing gap between the primary and the secondary academic labour markets as both markets 
grow rapidly.  
Chapters 6 and 7 examine policy and labour market developments in Germany. Chapter 6 provides 
evidence for the expansion of marketisation policies in the corporatist German welfare state from 
the 1950s with a focus on 1980 to 2012. It demonstrates that marketisation in higher education also 
thrives in the conservative welfare state, despite a more implicit approach and slower pace of 
implementation. Chapter 7 outlines the characteristics of the academic labour market in Germany 
and the changes between 1980 and 2012. The evidence reveals a substantial and increasing gap 
between the primary and secondary academic labour market.  
Part Three, containing Chapters 8 and 9, concludes the thesis, focusing on the comparative analysis 
and outlining the implications for theory and policy. It focuses on similarities rather than differences, 
to account for generalisations and to determine the causal link between marketisation and academic 
labour market segmentation in different welfare states. 
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In Chapter 8 the comparative analysis focuses on four key findings across liberal and corporatist 
welfare states: the predominance of marketisation, the active role of states in advancing 
marketisation, diverging academic labour segments and the role of states as key drivers of 
segmentation. Chapter 9 reconsiders the findings and outlines the implications for comparative 
political economy theory. Emerging from the evidence, the chapter argues for a synthesis between 
comparative political economy, labour segmentation and higher education theory. Chapter 9 
concludes with implications for future research priorities and policy. As marketisation is a state-
driven process with direct impacts on precarious academic work conditions, governments can be 
ascribed agency, choice and responsibility for a better balance between different social needs and 
demands to meet the needs of a modern knowledge economy. 
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Part I Conceptual frameworks 
The following Chapters 2 and 3, develop the conceptual framework of this thesis. Chapter 2 reviews 
the political economy and higher education literature and identifies two questions: How is the 
central role of higher education within welfare state economies best conceptualised? How is 
institutional change to be best understood, particularly in higher education and academic labour 
markets? The review develops an understanding of the relationship between welfare states and 
higher education and establishes the parameters of institutional change. The Chapter argues for a 
stronger integration of the higher education systems in the comparative political economy 
frameworks.  
Chapter 3 develops and presents a framework based on labour segmentation theory that 
incorporates higher education as well as academic labour markets into the comparative political 
economy literature.  The conceptual framework allows for the empirical investigation of similarities 
and differences as well as convergence and divergence of higher education.        
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2 Contextualising institutional change of academic labour markets  
2.1 Introduction  
Comparative political economy literature demonstrates the existence of diverse socio-economic 
systems based on diverse actors with specific interests across culturally specific spaces. National 
higher education systems are central institutions of capitalist regimes. They are central for 
knowledge production and the education of the future workforce and are embedded in the political 
and economic environment of advanced economies. This raises the questions of how comparative 
political economists explain and assess the central role of national higher education systems, 
including academic labour markets, within diverse capitalist regimes, how theory explains the 
changes within and between national systems and whether particular modes and practices of higher 
education serve a particular type of capitalism.  
 
This chapter provides the context of comparative political economy and varieties of capitalism for 
the thesis as a whole, and seeks to contribute to the literature that theorises institutional change. 
Following the work of Ferragina et al. (2015) Streeck and Thelen (2005a) Thelen (2014) this chapter 
argues that traditional typologies of capitalist regimes that are characteristic of comparative political 
economy frameworks cannot predict the trajectory of institutional change in national higher 
education systems under liberalisation. The chapter theorises institutional change, with particular 
attention to how various theorisations of institutional changecompare with shifting institutional 
configurations of Australia and Germany. This, in turn, provides the basis for why studying the 
segmentation of academic labour markets is important: because for a more complete picture the 
analysis of how to theorise institutional change in higher education should intersect with the distinct 
changes to academic labour. 
 
Advanced political economies are constantly transforming under the complex relationship between 
diverse actors, which constrains the explanatory nature of comparative theories. Since the 1980s the 
advancement of markets into areas of political and social significance has been widely analysed and 
this process can be broadly summarised as liberalisation. Liberalisation is both “an inevitable 
economic adjustment in organized political economies to growing internal and external market 
pressures, and  a political strategy of either governments overwhelmed by unsatisfiable political 
demands or of business extricating itself through internationalization from the profit squeeze 
imposed on it by labor at the height of its post-war power in the early 1970s” (Streeck and Thelen 
2005b, 4). While institutional change under liberalisation affects all areas of advanced capitalist 
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economies, the pace and scope of change may vary across different institutions within countries as 
well as in similar institutions across countries. The question emerges as to how institutional change 
occurs, whether it is an abrupt process or a gradual transformative process and how it affects 
national higher education systems, particularly academic labour markets in different capitalist 
regimes. 
 
This literature review focuses on approaches of comparative political economy, institutional change 
theory and employment relations. Section 2.2 examines the comparative political economy 
literature and argues for a stronger integration of higher education systems. Section 2.3 outlines the 
institutional change process in advanced economies and advocates for a gradual transformation 
under liberalisation rather than abrupt or path depended change. Section 2.4 focuses on types of 
employment relations and types of academic employment relations and argues that the latter is at 
odds with the comparative political economy framework. This means that traditional typologies of 
capitalist regimes that characterise comparative political economy frameworks cannot predict the 
trajectory of institutional change in national higher education systems under liberalisation.  
2.2 Comparative political economy and the place of higher education systems 
This section outlines that the comparative political economy literatures argue that states have 
developed different institutional configurations for regulating the capitalist economy. In the late 
1970s the focus has been on national institutional variation and responding politics to regulate 
advanced capitalist economies. This section examines the three worlds of welfare state capitalism as 
well as the varieties of capitalism literature and their conceptualisation of higher education systems. 
This section conceptualises different national states at a point in time requiring parameters to 
account for institutional change and finds that modes of higher education systems are not 
represented.  
 
There is a substantial scholarly literature demonstrating the existence of different varieties of 
capitalism and welfare states and providing order to the diversity of welfare provision and the 
relationship between the institutions and the state. Peck and Theodore (2007) embrace contingency 
while rejecting classifications while Benedict (1935 [1961]) argues that generalisations and 
classifications of society are meaningless.  Schmeser (2003) argues that societies should be analysed 
through detailed case analysis. Esping-Andersen (1990, 49) and Hall and Soskice (2001, 8-35) classify 
model types of welfare capitalisms focusing on institutional configurations, but both do 
acknowledge that the frameworks might not captureg the whole institutional reality “in reality, 
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however, there are no one-dimensional nations in the sense of a pure case” . If there is no ideal type 
of welfare or variety of capitalism, why are these concepts helpful to analyse the trajectories of 
change in higher education systems? The persistence of ideal typologies in the comparative welfare 
state research community is one indication of its research benefits (Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser 
2011). Twenty-five years after publication, Esping-Andersen’s (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism is one of the most cited works in comparative social policy (with over 29,600 Google 
citations at January 2018). For the comparative analysis of academic labour markets in this thesis, 
the worlds of welfare state capitalism as well as the varieties of capitalism literature provide the 
foundational order for the diversity of national higher education systems including employment 
relations. 
 
In the Three Worlds, Esping-Andersen (1990) analyses the historical trajectories of the emergence of 
welfare states and suggests the significant influence of both workers’ unions as well as employers in 
the creation and governance of institutions in different welfare states, including employment 
markets. Initially, the three worlds of welfare states classified 21 advanced economies, all members 
of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Esping-Andersen 1990). 
This typology develops a threefold categorisation of welfare state regimes as liberal, a conservative 
and a social democratic. Each institutional configuration provides a substantial degree of order in the 
allocation of, and eligibility conditions for, the provision of welfare.  The conceptualisation of the 
three welfare state types emerges from different degrees of decommodification, levels of 
stratification and the main provider of welfare. Degrees of decommodification express the level to 
which an individual can sustain a livelihood without relying on the market, types of stratification 
refers to social status, and main provider of welfare refers to state, family and/or market (Esping-
Andersen 1990).  
 
The liberal regime is conceptualised through a low decommodification level, and a moderate level of 
stratification, and a residual model of welfare with means tested and modest benefits where the 
main welfare state provider is the market. The conservative regime is conceptualised with modest 
dependency on the market and high level of stratification, preserving status and class, the influence 
of the church is high and the traditional role of the family still strong. The family is the main provider 
of welfare, but official welfare benefits are linked to working status. The social democratic regime is 
conceptualised with universal applicability of social rights and a constant pursuit of equality at the 
highest level, a high level of decommodification and low level of stratification, the state is the main 
provider of welfare, and universal benefits are financed through taxes (Esping-Andersen 1990, 35-
 23 
78). Esping-Andersen’s analysis is based on the analysis of the evolution of welfare such as social 
transfer programs and pension systems as well as the institutions of labour markets. The 
decommodification and stratification indexes within different institutional provisions of welfare 
determine the type of welfare state. The interplay between civil society, institutions and the state in 
the creation of national institutional variations strengthens the argument that the economy is 
embedded in the rules and norms established by the state and validated by civil society (Polanyi 
2001 [1944]).  
 
This generalisation of different capitalist economies into three categories has sparked criticisms 
including: the tight boundaries of the typologies, the limited focus on selected issues in welfare 
states (for instance health and education are missing) and an inability to account for change. 
Criticisms have been made that the number and characteristics of welfare state types is either 
insufficient or pays insufficient attention to specific issues of welfare states (for example, Arts and 
Gelissen 2002, 2010, Bonoli 1997, Castles 1994, Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser 2011, Pierson 2000b). 
More substantive criticism is the limited attention the typology pays to gender and family (Bambra 
2004, 2007a, 2007b, Orloff 1993, 2009). Another criticism is the welfare state typology is static and 
cannot appropriately account for change (Esping-Andersen 1999, Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser 2011, 
Ferragina et al. 2013, 2015). Esping-Andersen (1999) has accepted several criticisms especially on 
gender and family and acknowledged a fourth welfare state type, the ‘workfare-welfare state’ in 
Australia, stressing the relatively strong employment protection regime in this liberal welfare state 
(Castles and Mitchell 1991). The welfare state typology continues to inspire researchers especially in 
the area of institutional change (Ferragina et al. 2015, Streeck and Thelen 2005a, Thelen 2014). 
Indeed, in developing this thesis, the concept of institutional change emerged as crucial component, 
requiring a more general level of analysis. This chapter theorises institutional change after 
addressing the role of higher education in the varieties of capitalism literature. 
2.2.1 The welfare state typology and higher education 
Higher education policies are not a component of Esping-Andersen's construction of the welfare 
state typology. In his later work Esping-Andersen (1999, 184) acknowledges the need for a skilling 
system accompanying the welfare regime types. More recently, several studies have linked the 
higher education to the welfare regime typology, agreeing that Esping-Andersen’s classifications are 
also applicable for the sector. Willemse and De Beer (2012) were the first to analyse 19 higher 
education systems, using Esping-Andersen’s methodological tools of measuring decommodification 
and stratification indexes to asses whether higher education insitutions can be categorized along the 
welfare state types. Decommodification refers to government spending and access to higher 
 24 
education and stratification or differenciation refers to internal structures, different levels or 
educational paths across and within higher education (Willemse and De Beer 2012, 107 – 110). 
Esping-Andersen characterises liberal regimes by low decommondification and moderate 
stratification and conservate regimes by moderate decommodicication and high stratification (1990, 
26). Willemse and De Beer argue that the concepts of decommodification and stratification can be 
applied to higher education but the classification of systems only partially correspond with the 
worlds of welfare state typology  (Willemse and De Beer 2012). The research tests the hypothesis 
using qualitiative and quantitative data.  Qualitative data is derived from comparative studies and 
reports on higher education systems and the quantitative data, including government spending, 
tutition fees and private spending is sourced from statistical databases (Willemse and De Beer 2012, 
110). The study finds that it is “possible to incude higher education in the theoretical and empirical 
classification of welfare state regimes by Esping-Andersen”, yet higher education systems in some 
conservative regime types, namly France, Italy and Poertugal appear to belong to the liberal cluster 
due to low stratification index (Willemse and De Beer 2012, 116). The authors find that Germany’s 
higher education system corresponds to a conservative regime and Australia’s system classifys as 
liberal system.  Hega and Hokenmaier (2002) argue that educational policies correlate with the 
welfare state typology. Pechar and Andres (2011, 49) focus on the effects of changing welfare state 
policies on participation in higher education concluding that the scope of change is situated within 
institutional welfare state matrix.  
 
In contrast, the varieties of capitalism approach not only identifies patterns of similarity and 
differences across states, it also clarifies processes of change in political economies (Hall and Soskice 
2001, 65-66). According to Hall and Soskice (2001, 51), liberal market economies are linked to liberal 
welfare states, and coordinated market economies are linked to the conservative type of welfare 
state. The varieties of capitalism approach uses a rational choice approach focusing on employers 
and firms and how the social policy contributes to its production and organisation. Hall and Soskice 
(2001), but also others such as Crouch and Streeck (1997), classify two varieties of capitalism: the 
liberal market economies (Anglo-Saxon) and the coordinated market economies (Continental and 
Scandinavian countries and Japan). This approach argues that companies encounter specific 
coordination problems within a type of capitalism.  
 
Liberal market economies (Anglo-Saxon) are characterised by hierarchies and competitive 
behaviour, and equilibrium through supply and demand price signalling in labour, capital and 
product markets (Hall and Soskice 2001, 8, Hancke et al. 2007, 5). Coordinated market economies 
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(Continental Europe, Scandinavia and Japan) are characterised by non-market relationships of 
collaboration, communication and commitments, and an equilibrium outcome is a result of 
coordination and strategic interaction among the actors (Hall and Soskice 2001, 8, Hancke et al. 
2007, 5). The established ways of coordination and institutional configurations of political economies 
provide a comparative advantage in international markets. According to the concept of comparative 
advantage, a company’s efficiency depends on the coordination of the specific relationships with the 
labour market, the vocational training and education system, corporate governance (to access 
finance for instance), inter-firm relations and their own employees (Hall and Soskice 2001, 6-8).  
The varieties of capitalism approach also conceptualises a training and education system as one of 
the five vital pillars of a capitalist production regime, demonstrating that different institutional 
formations in the training and education system are serving different types of economies in 
particular ways. Differences in the education system are traced back to the required skill system, 
with a general skill system in liberal market economies and a specific skill system in coordinated 
market economies (Hall and Soskice 2001). While the varieties of capitalism approach assesses the 
education system through a neo-corporatist view of the company and argues that employers are 
dependent on workers’ willingness to invest in firm-specific skills (Estevez-Abe et al. 2001a), both 
systems are characterised by a solid relationship between mode of coordination and the preference 
for the skill formation schema (Estevez-Abe et al. 2001, 181–182). According to Estevez-Abe et al. 
(2001), social employment protection is designed to support workers’ investment in their skill 
formation in order to improve their independence from one particular employer, rather than 
decommodifying as Esping-Andersen argues. As a result, employees in liberal market economies 
protect themselves from the volatilities of the labour market by investing highly in general skills 
adaptable to various jobs. Employees in coordinated market economies are able to invest in more 
specific skills, as employment protection regimes are strong and job loss is relatively low. The 
varieties of capitalism approach explains that specific education and training regimes serve the 
needs of the economy and are linked to specific types of capitalisms (Estevez-Abe et al. 2001).  
2.2.2 The varieties of capitalism and higher education   
A few studies have used the varieties of capitalism approach to investigate the institutional settings 
of the higher education sector and the vocational training sector (Bosch and Charest 2008, Crouch et 
al. 1999, Estevez-Abe 2005, Estevez-Abe et al. 2001, Korpi 2006). Graf (2009, 570) argues that 
despite similar pressures from the internationalisation of higher education and similar amendments  
to the provision of higher education in the UK (liberal market economy) and Germany (coordinated 
market economy), the national institutional environment, rather then international insitutions 
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determine the transformation processes. Powell et al. (2012) examine the impact of external policies 
on the education system using the varieties of capitalism typology. This study compares two higher 
education systems within one production type thereby stressing the variety within systems but also 
observing similar outcomes of change. Powell et al. (2012) argue that despite different pathways of 
change, policies have led to a similar outcome for tertiary education. Interestingly, the exogenous 
pressures of Europeanisation and endogenous reforms in the skill formation system (vocational and 
higher education) have led to a less state-centric higher education system in France and to a greater 
role of the state in Germany (Powell et al. 2012, 419). This finding suggests that while institutional 
change takes different forms even in similar institutional settings, change can lead to a convergence 
of outcomes in institutional regulation. The varieties of capitalism approach is useful in 
understanding the position of the skill formation system in relation to the labour market and the 
economy and it also suggests explanations for the different configurations of higher education 
systems.  
 
This section shows that the two different approaches in comparative political economy classify 
Germany as a coordinated welfare state or a coordinated market economy and Australia as a liberal 
welfare state or a liberal market economy. The difference of the two approaches for categorisation 
is their unit of analysis. While the welfare state typology is based on social policy research with the 
analysis of transfers at the centre, the varieties of capitalism literature is based on the company at 
the centre of analysis and how it navigates within the distinct capitalist environment. Both 
literatures have initially not conceptualised the higher education system, yet both have been used to 
understand national differences and similarities in higher education provision as well as in assessing 
institutional performance. While the welfare state typology enables scholars to theorise the 
redistribution and deregulation of financial transfers to the higher education system, the varieties of 
capitalism literature enables scholars to conceptualise the institutional environment as well as 
change of higher education systems. The literature has shown that higher education systems are an 
essential part of the institutional framework of the capitalist state and can thus be analysed through 
the comparative political economy literature. However, less clear is how institutional change affects 
higher education systems. This reveals a gap in the literature that engages with the 
conceptualisation of changing national higher education systems within the changing political and 
economic environment in which they are embedded. The next section conceptualises institutional 
change under liberalisation in advanced economies before conceptualising academic labour markets.  
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2.3 Institutional change under liberalisation  
The previous section established institutional variations across advanced economies. To account for 
change this section theorises institutional change under liberalisation as a gradual transformative 
process. The question of how institutions change, and in what direction, attracts much scholarly 
interest and scholars disagree on whether distinct institutional frameworks are resilient to change, 
are changing according to their path, are converging or whether the welfare state typology should 
be abandoned altogether. Scholars largely agree that the main causes of change are traced to ideas 
related broadly to market pressures in times of globalisation.  
 
The main point of contention in conflicting approaches to change is over the institutional 
consequences of global market pressures. Some scholars argue that competitive pressures under 
globalisation cause the destruction of institutional regimes giving rise to institutional convergence 
into one market model of socio-economic organisation (Keohane and Milner 1996, Robinson 1996). 
Several scholars in the comparative political economy tradition are arguing for path dependent 
institutional change, rather than an institutional convergence (Bonoli 2000, Clasen and Siegel 2007, 
Esping-Andersen and Sarasa 2002, Hall and Soskice 2001, Iversen 2005, Morel et al. 2012, Seeleib-
Kaiser 2008). The varieties of capitalism literature disputes the concept of converging institutions 
under market pressure because the historically evolved specific institutional structures for solving 
coordination problems are not easily overthrown. One of the most prominent advocates and 
scholars for the stability and path dependent change of different welfare state systems despite 
pressures to change in the ‘age of austerity’ is Paul Pierson (1996, 1998). He argues that path 
dependent change occurs because policies have beneficiaries with strong interests in institutional 
stability, particularly in European welfare states (Pierson 2000a/c). Iversen and Wren (1998) theorise 
a three-way trade-off among employment growth, low equality and low public spending and argue 
that institutional change link to distributional struggles in the area of service transition at the 
national level. Wren (2013) identifies three potential routes to a high-skilled service economy: the 
private route, the public route and the route with economies that are lagging behind. The former 
tends to correlate with liberal states, setting strong incentives for individual investments in skills, 
including tuition fees. The public or Scandinavian route, combines strong public investments and 
expansion of services and the latter links to the corporatist states which lag behind in terms of 
investments and expansions (Wren 2013). Wren’s analysis suggests path-dependency and provides 
an explanation as to why the Anglo-Saxon world has higher private financing of higher education 
than European countries. However, the implications of the analysis of academic labour markets 
shown in this thesis suggests that, as Hall and Soskice (2001, 54-60) argue, distinct variations are a 
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comparative advantage especially under global pressures. As a result, the varieties of capitalism 
literature suggest path dependent institutional change or “widespread deregulation in liberal market 
economies and limited movement in coordinated market economies” (Hall and Soskice 2001, 58). In 
addition, Pierson investigates welfare state retrenchment in the 1980s under Thatcher in the United 
Kingdom and under Reagan in the United States outlining that while “the welfare state has been 
battered its main components remain intact” (1994, 4-5).  
 
In general, rational choice theorists, rather than accounting for slow processes of change, provide 
accounts for abrupt change: “a variety of mechanisms that afford predictions of discontinuous 
change” (Weingast 2002, 692). However, the argument of path dependent change of welfare states, 
particularly coordinated market economies, in spite of ongoing social and economic pressures, is 
somewhat implausible. The variegated capitalism literature, for instance, argues that the typologies 
should be abandoned because capitalist economies do not have ‘multiple variations’. Rather 
capitalism is a process with ‘variegated’ development (Peck and Theodore 2007). The variegated 
capitalism literature ‘embraces contingency’ thereby ‘rejecting the necessity of either convergence 
or divergence’ (Peck and Theodore 2007, 76ff). The authors investigate the core problem, capitalism, 
rather than developing strategies for a ‘soft capitalism’. Rather than abandoning the welfare state 
typologies altogether, as it does add value to explaining institutional differences, this thesis argues 
that it is useful to add a more nuanced interpretation of the trajectories of change and their 
outcomes.  
 
Comparative welfare state research analyses trajectories of change and their outcomes in different 
sub-fields and industries and based on the analysis of empirical cases (e.g. Arts and Gelissen 2002, 
Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser 2011, Ferragina et al. 2015, Goodin 1999, Hemerijck 2013, Kim 2015, 
Streeck and Thelen 2005a, Thelen 2014). It is argued that welfare state institutions have different 
but distinct trajectories of change across the regime types, which may divert from path dependency 
(Hemerijck 2013, Streeck and Thelen 2005a, Thelen 2014). Streeck and Thelen reject the premises of 
the varieties of capitalism and rational choice literature and argue that the varieties of capitalism 
literature is unable to account for contemporary socio-economic changes and that the comparative 
political economy literature does “seem to be reproducing analyses that understate the magnitude 
and significance of current changes” (2005b, 5).  
 
Following Streeck and Thelen (2005b) path dependent change reduces the dimension of change to 
two extremes: minimal or major changes without dimensions in between the extremes. This is 
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because institutions can either stay on their path, which would imply minor institutional changes, or 
divert from the path, which would mean major institutional changes (Streeck and Thelen 2005b, 6). 
As such and by orthodox standards, resilience or inertness would be interpreted as securing the 
comparative advantage or as regime specific adjustment paths (Hancké et al. 2007, 10-14). The 
varieties of capitalism literature can only account for institutional change initiated by exogenous 
forces rather than endogenous (Greif and Laitin 2003, 633, Hall and Taylor 1996). This thesis’s 
analysis of academic labour markets is exemplary, because as the evidence will show, both 
exogenous and endogenous forces contribute to change. 
 
Streeck and Thelen provide a variegated conceptualisation of institutional change to analyse recent 
processes in advanced economies to “distinguish between processes of change, which may be 
incremental or abrupt, and results of the change, which may amount to either continuity or 
discontinuity” (Streeck and Thelen 2005b, 8-9). An abrupt process of change, as conceptualised by 
the varieties of capitalism literature and others may result in institutional rejection and therefore 
return and continuity of the pre-change institutional configuration. Alternatevly,   such a process can 
lead to acceptance and thus institutional discontinuity, which may be followed by institutional 
replacement (Table 2.1). While not opposing the notion of abrupt processes of institutional change, 
Streeck and Thelen and others nevertheless argue that change processes are foremost incremental 
and endogenous. Incremental change means a slow but steady movement towards a target 
objective rather than a sudden and unexpected abrupt change. The results of incremental change 
for institutions in the end be either institutional continuity or discontinuity. This means that 
incremental change may be reactive and preserve institutional continuity through adaption or 
alternatevely change may lead to a gradual transformation of institutions withslow and continuous 
changes may adding up to major institutional discontinuity (Streek and Thelen 2005b, 8).  
Table 2.1: Types of institutional change: processes and results 
  
Result of change 
Continuity Discontinuity 
Process of 
change 
Incremental Reproduction by 
adaption 
Gradual transformation 
Abrupt Survival and return Breakdown and 
replacement 
Source: Streeck and Thelen (2005b, 9) 
When change occurs as a gradual institutional transformation, rather than in an abrupt process, then 
change can “emanate from inherent ambiguities and ‘gaps’ that exist by design or emerge over time 
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between formal institutions or enforcement” (Streeck and Thelen 2005b, 19). The gradual change 
process relates to endogenous change, which is often “produced by the very behaviour an 
institution itself generates” (Streeck and Thelen 2005b, 19). This means that actors and structures 
within institutions advance a gradual change process jointly.  
 
Under this framework developed by Streeck and Thelen (2005b) five gradual and transformative 
change processes emerged from the evidence: displacement, layering, drift, conversion and 
exhaustion (Streeck and Thelen 2005b, 31). First, institutional displacement occurs when new forms 
of dominant institutions are gradually being built by shifts between arrangements, rather than the 
amendment or revision of existing arrangements. New arrangements are being established because 
they serve the interests of agents better than the old arrangements. Second, layering change occurs 
when new regulations and responsibilities are introduced alongside the established regulations, 
whereas the former receives gradually more support leading to the crowding out of the old system. 
This means new organisations are gradually imposed on institutions. Third, institutional drift occurs 
when rules and regulations do not change causing a deliberate neglect. This process is based on the 
premise that change is constant as institutions are embedded in a constantly changing political 
economic environment. Without maintenance and continuous care, institutions will ‘drift’ slowly 
away in an ever-changing environment. This process can happen through active or passive political 
neglect. Fourth, a conversion of institutions occurs when the purpose of institutions is gradually 
changed, where continuities on the surface mask changes while traditional rules and institutions are 
transformed. Last, institutional exhaustion means that purpose and structures are gradually, rather 
than abruptly, destroyed (Streeck and Thelen 2005b, 19-30). Streeck and Thelen (2005b, 2) specify 
that the evidence suggest that in liberal as well as coordinated states slow and gradual processes of 
change can result over time in quite fundamental institutional transformations. Thelen (2014) 
applies the conceptual framework of institutional change to the education and training sectors, 
specifically the vocational sector across welfare states and finds that the pressure for change is 
coming from the deregulation of markets and globalisation. Several key drivers of change, external 
and internal, might occur, however the dominant trend in advanced economies is the deregulation 
of markets, or liberalisation.  
 
Comparative political economistsare advancing the conceptual framework of welfare state change  
by investigating the impact of change on the material conditions of particular social groups. The 
analysis centers on the outcome of change for specific groups rather than the change input because 
the outcomes rather than the input are critical for the legitimacy of the welfare state (Ferragina et 
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al. 2015, Goodin 1999). In an analysis across 14 welfare states, Ferragina et al. (2015) demonstrate 
that policy outcomes for poverty and inequality reduction largely resemble the four-type welfare 
state categorisation except in the case of two countries, Germany and Ireland. The level of poverty 
among unemployed people in Germany resembles that of the UK (Ferragina et al. 2015), therefore 
the authors question the analytical validity of the welfare state typologies, particularly the 
coordinated type (Ferragina et al. 2015). This finding supports the Seeleib-Kaiser and Fleckenstein 
argument that since the 1990s “active and passive labour market policies in Germany increasingly 
reflect a clear liberal welfare state approach” (2007, 442) and suggests that the gradual institutional 
transformation under liberalisation might lead to the convergence of institutional forms into a liberal 
market model. 
 
This section has argued that change under liberalisation is incremental, rather than abrupt, and the 
change process can take many forms. In addition, the process of change may occur through either 
active involvement or active non-involvement in the change process. Actors, such as institutions as 
well as agents within institutions, may actively create a change process or they may advance a 
change process by non-engagement. The outcome of an incremental change process is gradual 
institutional transformation. Depending on the nature of the institutional transformation and 
different arrangements, some agents might lose and others might win. Consequently, a recent 
literature has emerged, focusing on the re-categorisation of the varieties of capitalism and welfare 
state typology after institutional transformation.  
 
In order to apply this analysis of institutional change to academic labour markets, the next step is to 
provide a conceptualisation of employment relation systems under various forms of capitalisms 
before arguing that academic labour markets are diverging from conformability with employment 
typologies adopted within the comparative political economy frameworks.   
2.4 Comparative political economy and academic employment relations 
This chapter has recognised different modes of capitalisms and welfare states and argued that 
institutional change occurs as a gradual process under liberalisation across different welfare states. 
This section examines different employment regimes across the two most common welfare states, 
the corporatist and liberal, and argues that academic labour markets are variegated within the 
established welfare state system types. To theorise academic labour markets this section firstly 
examines employment relations within welfare states before investigating academic labour markets 
through the higher education literature. 
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The welfare state literature emphasises the interaction between labour, employers and states in 
determining employment relations and argues that labour markets are shaped by the welfare state 
(Esping-Andersen 1990, 144). The welfare states as well as law, administration, collective bargaining 
and corporatist networks heavily regulate the labour markets in advanced economies (Regini 2000). 
The parameters of a regulatory framework are very different across advanced economies and 
according to Regini (2000) their existence and resilience can only be explained by social and political 
as well as economic factors. Liberal welfare state regimes have relatively low levels of employment 
protection, low levels of welfare benefits in the case of job loss and low levels of active labour 
market policies (Esping-Andersen 1990, 159-160, Nickell and Layard 1999). Conservative regimes are 
generally characterised by relatively high levels of employment protection, high benefits and active 
and passive labour market policies are strong (Eichhorst and Konle-Seidl 2006, Esping-Andersen 
1990, 159-160, Nickell and Layard 1999).  
 
Korpi (1983) argues that historically variegated institutional frameworks lead to the different ability 
of labour to shape economic and social relations. The emphasis on the embedded nature of the 
labour market is contradictory to the neoclassical and neoliberal ideas that claim labour markets are 
autonomous systems of supply and demand (Polanyi 2001 [1944]). To the contrary, Esping-Andersen 
(1990) argues that employment relations are the result of the power relationship between organised 
labour (unions and bargaining), employers and states. Arts and Gelissen (2002) as well as Esping-
Andersen (1990) have examined differences in employment protection regimes, such as the 
legislative framework for restrictions on dismissal and conditions for temporary contracts. 
 
Particular emphasis is placed on the involvement of agents, such as employees and employers, in 
creating labour market policies and state regulalrtory frameworks, such as wage bargaining 
structures (Arts and Gelissen 2002, Eichhorst and Seidl 2005, Esping-Andersen 1990, OECD 2004). 
State regulatory frameworks and labour market policies that govern for instance the bargaining 
process differ across welfare states. Esping-Andersen (1990, 107ff) found that the corporatist 
welfare state, including the strong employment protection regimes, was shaped by the trade unions, 
catholic parties and the legacy of an authoritarian state. Confirming the influence of left-party 
agents, such as unions in the creation of employment systems, the neo-corporatist literature also 
examined the role of unions in creating national institutions. Streeck (1992) demonstrates how 
industrial bargaining, together with work councils, employment protection and national training 
regimes, shaped and influenced working standards in Germany. In a study of union influence in 
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change processes, Turner (1993) confirms the relative weakness of unions in liberal welfare states 
because he found that union power was weaker in the United Kingdom and the United States than 
in Germany and Sweden. This means that unions and other agents have greater power in corporatist 
than in liberal welfare state regimes, which has consequences on how employment relations change.  
 
Esping-Andersen categorised Australia as a liberal welfare state, yet Castles (1994) found that 
Australia’s wage policy and wage-setting mechanisms at that time, which offset the shortcoming in 
social protection policy, were reason to classify the welfare state as a ‘wage earners welfare state’. 
Castles traces the wage earners welfare state type to Australia’s unique history as well as the 
establishment of a system of compulsory conciliation and arbitration of industrial disputes (Castles 
1994). The Australian collective bargaining system relied on ‘industrial tribunals’ and a compulsory 
federal arbitration system. The tribunals issued wage minima set in national industry ‘awards’ and 
the industry or firms level bargaining provided supplements to these ‘awards’ in terms of higher 
wages and additional employment conditions (Katz, 1993). In 2001, Castles (2001, 14) farewelled the 
Australian type of welfare state stating that: “after eight or more decades in which the arbitration 
system struggled to deliver ‘fair wages’, we now appear to be living in an era in which Australian 
governments – and judging by the pronouncements of the Opposition, Labor as well as Liberal – 
have abandoned both key components of welfare Australian-style”. The introduction of labour 
market liberalisation policies, such as the price and income accord in 1984 and its succeeding 
amendments that focus on individual contracts, implemented with the support of Labor, have lead 
to the abandonmentof the unique workfare welfare state features of the liberal Australian workfare 
welfare regime (Castles 2001). While employment relations in Australia have transformed towards 
what the theory would classify as a liberal welfare state, it is nevertheless essential to recognise that 
Australia’s unique trajectory of employment relations and collective bargaining tradition once 
deviated from other liberal welfare states. These historical trajectories enable to conceptualise 
gradual change in the sub-fields of the labour market. 
 
To advance an explanatory model for change on academic labour markets the following briefly 
outlines different explanatory ideas for labour market changes. Labour markets have always been 
subject to change and since the 1980s the significant trends in labour markets in advanced 
economies are conceptualised as the shift from industrial to service employment, and the 
diversification of employment forms, particularly growing temporary and part-time work (Sarfati and 
Bonoli 2002). Changes in the political economic environment affect employment protection regimes 
across advanced economies. However, since the late 1980s the causes of changes are largely 
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referred to as the consequences of the advancement of market oriented or liberalisation-process 
policies (Campbell 2004, Campbell and Pedersen 2001, Crouch 2005, Ellison 2006, Ferragina et al. 
2011, Streeck and Thelen 2005a, Thelen 2014).  
 
Regini (2000) observes that since the 1980s the policy debate and formation across welfare states 
are aboutlabour market deregulation and labour market flexibility. Labour market flexibility does not 
refer to employees seeking greater flexibility in their working time or work roles but refers to the 
demand of employers for flexibility of labour in terms of wages, hours, or security and skills (Regini 
2000, Standing 1999). Regini (2000) acknowledges that labour markets are unique but finds that the 
tendencies towards employment deregulation and flexibility are nevertheless similar across welfare 
states.  
 
 Changes to employment relations across different welfare states are well researched, mostly with 
the aim to determine whether institutional change leads to coverionor to in path dependend change 
as suggested by rational choice theorists. Ellison (2006) investigates labour market reforms and 
pensions systems across different welfare state types and finds that all welfare regimes have 
implemented some forms of market-oriented reforms. Ellison (2006, 178) argues that the impact of 
global economic pressures on different welfare state regimes is dependent on the institutional 
context, which points to an ongoing process that involves regime-specific institutional settings. 
Regime-specific changes are also discovered by Seeleib-Kaiser (2008, 211), policy transformations of 
welfare states are complex and cannot be classified as a withdrawal of the welfare state clearing the 
way for private welfare provision but as a redefinition of the state and institutional remits in the 
provision of welfare.  
This means that state institutions continue to play a decisive role in employment relations, through 
changes in the legislative structure that frames labour markets. Thelen (2014) argues that alterations 
at the legislative level of employment relations increasingly facilitate the employer’s use of non-
standard forms of employment across different welfare states. Thelen states: “the shared trajectory 
of change in labour market policy across all three cases (types of welfare regimes) […] is clearly 
liberalizing; the variation mostly concerns who is activated and on what terms” (2014, 151).  The 
partial erosion of employment protection through changing legislation is striking in coordinated 
welfare types as employment protection regimes have been transformed in favour of 
accommodating short-term employment, often masked to encourage workforce participation and to 
cater to the needs of employers.  
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As an example, Germany introduced employment-oriented family policy such as the extension of 
childcare as an incentive to work that facilitated employer’s use of non-standard forms of 
employment. This policy facilitated temporary and casual employment through the introduction of 
the so-called 400 Euro a month jobs (which do not require social benefit payments) and at the same 
time, unemployment benefits under the so-called Hartz concept from 2003 were reduced 
(Bundesgesetzblatt 2012). The main objective of this policy was to provide positive incentives for 
people with low earnings by subsidizing social security. The Harz reforms meant that greater 
emphasis was placed ontesting the willingness to work, to means tested benefits and abandonment 
of occupational status protection, all undermining the core elements of a social insurance model of 
the German coordinated welfare state (Fleckenstein and Seeleib-Kaiser 2011, Fleckenstein et al. 
2011, Seeleib-Kaiser 2002). In support of such claim, Ferragina et al. (2015) found that as a result of 
the unemployment reform in 2003, the level of poverty among unemployed people in Germany 
resembled the levels of the liberal welfare state of the United Kingdom. Thus Ferragina et al. (2015) 
argue that the theoretical premises of employment relations in the coordinated market regime are 
no longer sufficient to explain the German employment regime.  
 
The evidence suggests that labour market policies have been liberalised across welfare state types. 
This means that contrary to the assumptions in the varieties of capitalism literature, which suggests 
institutional resilience, labour market relations across different welfare states do seem to be  
converging to a liberal labour market structure under global pressures of markets. 
 
Accepting the premise of liberalising labour policies, scholars are investigating the effects for labour 
markets, arguing that liberalisation policies serve to increase the gap between a core workforce in 
standard employment and a peripheral workforce in non-standard employment (Amin 1994, Peck 
2001, Standing 1999, Thelen 2014, 112-152). Thelen argues that liberalisation policies are associated 
with increasing segmentation of labour markets, particularly the stabilisation of the core workforce 
and the flexibilisation of the peripheral workforce (2014, 151). This suggests that the partial erosion 
of employment protection regimes across welfare state regimes facilitates a greater divide between 
standard and non-standard forms of employment.  
This section presented a case for the existence of different forms of employment relations, yet it 
argued that liberalisation policies have altered these systems in all welfare state types, particularly 
through the diversification of employment forms. This implies the convergence of institutional forms 
of employment relations, rather than institutional stability as suggested by the varieties of capitalism 
literature. These theoretical concepts would not only suggest similar structures for regulating 
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academic employment but also similar tendencies to the convergence of institutional forms under 
liberalisation pressures.  
2.5 Comparative political economy and academic labour markets 
This section argues that academic labour markets do not confirm to  the  employment relations 
framework of different welfare states as outlined above, suggesting a gap in the comparative 
political economy literature. This gap is addressed by introducing concepts from the higher 
education literature providing insights into academic employment regimes.  
The study of different forms of national higher education systems, including academic labour 
organisation, has tradition in the higher education literature (Clark 1983, 1987, Enders 2001, 
Musselin 2009a, Perkin 1969, Teichler et al. 2013a, Weber 1919). In advanced economies, two forms 
of academic labour organisation are dominant: manifested in the chair faculty structure in European 
countries and the department-college structure in Anglo-Saxon countries. Generally, the academic 
profession enjoys similar rights and responsibilities across the three worlds and varieties of welfare 
capitalisms such as autonomy over work, academic freedom, and a loose mechanism of coercion and 
protected employment conditions (Clark 1987, Enders 2000, Enders and Teichler 1997, Teichler et al. 
2013a). The professoriate, those who are at the highest level of academic employment, benefits 
from the highest status and power in all academic systems (Clark 1987, Stromquist 2007b). However, 
the division of the academic profession is accentuated in the employment ranks below the 
professoriate level across different systems (Clark 1987, Enders 2000, Musselin 2005).  
The chair system of academic labour organisation is “inherently hierarchical, with potential divisions 
of interest among academics of different ranks” (Neave and Rhoades 1987, 211). The system is 
characterised by a deep division in employment status between a relatively small number in the 
professoriate employed in continuous civil service employment and a large number of employees in 
non-continuous employment, the assistant workforce (Enders 1996, Kreckel 2008). In many 
coordinated welfare states, university professors are chair holders and are state employees in 
privileged civil service status affording power over the direction of research, over a considerable 
budget, and over facilities and resources such as the allocation of junior staff and laboratories 
(Kreckel 2008, Musselin 2009a, Neave and Rhoades 1987).  
The chair systems differ across countries in their degree of independence from state. The 
professoriate is “the arm of state bureaucracy in most European countries, wholly supported by the 
government and protected in the western democracies by a well understood Humboldtian tradition 
of Lehrfreiheit and Lernfreiheit [freedom to teach and freedom to learn]” (Perkin in Clark 1987, 44). 
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In some countries the institution, rather than the state employ the professoriate. In general though, 
the academic organisation of the chair system assigns formal authority only to the professoriate 
through continuous employment. The academic community of professors has the authority to 
exercise power not only over the employment of assistants but also over new professorial 
appointments. This prestigious and powerful position of the professoriate is why some scholars 
argue that the academic chair system is rigid and resistant to change (Clark 1983, Neave and 
Rhoades 1987, 215f). Thus, the organisational employment form of the chair system, prevalent in 
coordinated welfare state regimes, historically embeds employment inequality between a 
continuously employed professoriate and the temporarily employed assistant workforce.  
In Germany, the academic labour market is constituted by chair system. The central state provides a 
strong employment protection for the professoriate but the labour market for academics below the 
professoriate is highly fluid. Academics below the professoriate are not in permanent employment. 
Traditionally, and contrary to other sectors in Germany, trade union representation in the higher 
education sector is almost non-existent because the professoriate has civil service status. Academic 
employees are represented through the German Association of University Professors and Lecturers 
(Deutscher Hochschulverband 2016a), which provides information and support but cannot engage in 
wage bargaining. The conceptualisation of German academic labour markets as fluid, with strong 
employment protection for the professoriate only, deviates from the theoretical premises of 
relatively high-protected employment relations for all employees in conservative welfare state 
regimes.  
In comparison, the Anglo-Saxon department-college or lecturing system, such as in Australia, is 
based on the group of academic colleagues in tenured positions and academic work is organised by 
the department as a whole (Clark 1983, Marginson and Considine 2000). The department-college 
system embraces collegiality and top down organisation, rather than individual power of the chair-
holder (Neave and Rhoades 1987). Historically, a relatively large proportion of the assistant 
workforce is in continuous employment (Enders 2000, Neave and Rhoades 1987). Anglo-Saxon 
departmental systems providecontinuing employment positions for academics in the ranks below 
the professoriate, spreading the power and responsibilities amongst the colleges and allowing for 
participation from lower rank academics (Neave and Rhoades 1987, 216). The high proportion of 
continuing employment in academia does not reflect the predictions of the three worlds and 
varieties of welfare states, arguing that Anglo-Saxon countries have comparatively low employment 
protection. The academic profession in one Anglo-Saxon lecturing system, the United States is seen 
as a profession and organised in the opposite way to the European system but according to Perkin as 
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“a private sector, a truly independent profession, selling its services of teaching and research on the 
open market to all students willing to be taught, all corporations and government agencies willing to 
contract for research and all donors willing to buy goodwill and prestige” (1987, 44).  
Employment security for academic professionals in Anglo-Saxon systems of all levels is a tool to 
encourage academic freedom and enquiry in unfashionable and critical or controversial topic areas 
(Adams 2006, American Association of University Professors 1940, 2014). Carmichael argues that 
continuous employment is important in academia “because without it incumbents would never be 
willing to hire people who might turn out to be better than themselves” (Carmichael 1988, 454). 
While the liberal employment regime suggests relatively low levels of employment protection, the 
Australian academic labour market is relatively well protected. This results from the departmental 
system but also from the legacy of the wage earners welfare state in which strong collective 
bargaining agreements protect employment conditions, dismissal and wages. 
The chair and department systems of academic labour organisation are both subject to continuous 
change as academic labour markets are embedded within the political economic environment of 
their respective welfare states. There is a substantial scholarly literature focusing on the changes in 
academic employment relations, particularly stressing the demand for greater efficiency and 
productivity as well as for employment flexibility (Coates et al. 2009a, Enders 2001, Enders and De 
Weert 2009, Musselin 2004, Stromquist 2007a, 2007b, Teichler et al. 2013a, Tight 2000). A majority 
of research focuses on national specific characteristics of temporary employment in academic labour 
markets and how it is modified over time (Enders 1996, 1997, Junor 2004, May 2012, May et al. 
2013b, and others). Altbach (1997) and Marginson (2000) trace changes to academic employment 
conditions to institutional changes under liberalisation.  
The comparative research of higher education often investigates the impact of higher education 
policy change on academic work itself rather than academic on employment conditions (Pritchard 
2011). Often academic employment regimes, their specific processes such as PhD education, and 
their emergence and endurance under policy change are investigated (Altbach 1980, 1996, 1997, 
Musselin 2005, 2009a/c). How institutional change in different national higher education systems is 
associated with academic employment relations and whether developments are converging is less 
clear.  
This section has hypothesisedthat academic labour markets have distinct structures, which are 
negatively correlated with the proposed labour market conditions of the welfare typology. Contrary 
to the theoretical assumptions, Australia’s academic employment relations are relatively secure for a 
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majority of its employees and well protected through collective bargaining while the German 
academic employment market is fluid and only the highest status employees are very well protected 
through the state. 
2.6 Conclusion 
The chapter put forward three distinct but interrelated propositions concerning the 
conceptualisation of changing national higher education systems.  
 
First, this chapter broadly argued for a stronger integration of the higher education system in the 
conceptual frameworks of the worlds of welfare states and varieties of capitalism literature. This is a 
means to integrate a micro level capitalist process by synergising the insights from the higher 
education research fieldinto the comparative political economy theories. Such synergy would 
combine the strength of each tradition while overcoming some of the weaknesses. The increasing 
importance of higher education systems in national socio-economic systems across advanced 
economies as exemplified by the so-called knowledge society is reason to investigate the changing 
higher education system in more depth.   
 
Second, this chapter argued that institutional change under liberalisation occurs as an incremental 
process leading to a gradual institutional transformation, rather than an entirely path dependent 
process. While the modes of change processes might differ in different varieties of capitalism and 
worlds of welfare states, a gradual transformative process is advanced by all involved actors and not 
by one particular agent. This means that it is possible that a gradual transformative process under 
liberalisation in two different advanced economies leads to institutional convergence, rather than 
divergence. 
 
Lastly, this chapter argued that the structures of higher education systems in Germany and Australia 
are similar but the academic employment relations are different from the conceptual predictions of 
the comparative political economy literature. This means that the comparative political economy 
literature is not well equipped to predict how academic labour markets are affected under processes 
of institutional change. Thelen and others argue that labour market changes under liberalisation 
advance the divergence between a core and a peripheral workforce. Less clear is how institutional 
change under liberalisation affects the atypical non-standard academic employment relations within 
the liberal and the coordinated welfare state. For the assessment of labour markets the comparative 
political economy literature has acknowledged segmentation and segmentation theories (Palier and 
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Thelen 2010), but how particular characteristics of academic labour markets can be analysed within 
these frameworks remains unclear.  
 
The aim of the next chapter is to discuss how labour market segmentation theories can fill the gap in 
analysing changing academic labour markets under liberalisation in two different advanced 
economies.  
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3 Conceptualising contemporary academic labour markets  
3.1 Introduction  
Welfare state and institutional change framework are not well equipped to understand the direction 
of change in academic labour markets across different systems. This chapter argues that this gap can 
be addressed by integrating the analytical foundations of segmented labour markets. The previous 
chapter conceptualised the higher education sector and change processes within two typical welfare 
states. The chapter also established that institutional change occurs as a gradual process under 
liberalisation across different advanced welfare states. In addition, Chapter 2 established that 
academic employment protection structures divert from the theoretical premise of the welfare state 
typology, conceptualising the academic labour protection in the corporatist case of Germany as 
rather fluid and in the liberal case of Australia as rather strong.  
Labour segmentation theory conceptualises the existence of multiple labour markets, which 
differentiate broadly between good and bad jobs. In addition, labour segmentation theory trace the 
causes of increasing segmentation to growing industries and regulatory changes advanced by the 
state (cf. Peck 1996, Reich, Gordon and Edwards 1973, Sengenberger 1981, Rubery 1994, Petit 2004, 
Hudson 2007). This chapter develops the analytical tools to analyse higher education policy and 
academic labour market changes across different welfare state typologies. 
 
To analyse the structures of academic labour markets as well as the drivers of diversification across 
the German and Australian higher education systems the chapter links labour market segmentation 
theory with insights from the higher education research. Section 3.2 uses labour segmentation 
theory to analyse the specific tasks of the academic labour process. This analytical framework leads 
to a definition of academic labour markets across diverse higher education systems as segmented 
and associated with permanent and non-permanent employment conditions. This conceptualisation 
is used to analyse employment data and establish the scope of segmented academic labour markets 
in Australia and Germany.  
Section 3.3 links the drivers of segmentation as conceptualised by scholars such as Peck, Reich, 
Gordon and Edwards to the principal push factors of change across national higher education 
systems. The main driver associated with the erosion of employment conditions is the state 
advancing marketisation policies in liberal as well as in coordinated welfare states. The restructuring 
process that enables state services to operate through markets or quasi-markets is defined as a 
marketisation process, rather than a liberalisation process. Yet the research literature has not 
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established whether the scope and extent of marketisation policies is similar across national higher 
education systems.  This chapter develops a framework to analyse marketisation policies across 
different higher education institutions. The labour market segmentation theory provides a 
framework for understanding how and why policy processes in different institutional regimes affect 
the nature of employment relationships. This framework provides the micro foundation for 
understanding the impact of institutional change in higher education across different welfare states. 
3.2 Segmented labour markets  
Labour segmentation theory evolved in the United States and became generally known from the 
1970s. The theory conceptualises various labour markets across occupations, industries and 
geographies rather than one labour market as proposed by classical and neoclassical economic 
theory. 
 
In neoclassical theory the market for labour follows the same principles as the market for 
commodities (Ehrenberg and Smith 2016), which means that its dynamics are based on labour 
demand (employers offering jobs) and labour supply (households offering labour). While neoclassical 
theory recognises that workers differ in their individual preferences for work, it conceptualises 
labour as homogenous in productivity and therefore exchangeable. From the 1980s neoclassical 
economists focused on endogenous growth models, particularly looking at education and knowledge 
of workers as advanced by Becker (1964). Becker’s (1964) ‘human capital’ theory argued that skills 
and knowledge contribute to increasing productivity and economic growth. Labour supply is a 
function of an individual’s time preference for work or leisure and an individual will choose a time 
combination with the highest utility. Labour is conceptualised as a production factor, similar to 
capital and thus labour demand follows the principles of profit maximisation. This means that every 
increase in the supply of labour needs to lead to an increase in output. The labour supply and 
demand is regulated through the price mechanism just as in the commodity market for coffee or 
cars (Ehrenberg and Smith 2016). Increasing or declining wages then impact on the relationship 
between working time and leisure time of an individual, leading for example to an increase in 
working time. From these theoretical assumptions, neoclassical theory suggests that at a 
macroeconomic level, high unemployment is a cause of high wages and consequently a reduction in 
the price of labour (wages) will lead to an increase in employment.   
 
In contrast to neoclassical labour theory, segmentation theories conceptualise different labour 
markets, resulting from differences in the demand side and compensation rather than from 
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individual supply side characteristics. Segmentation theories generally identify a primary and a 
secondary labour market across industries, which align with specific employment task 
characteristics, and employment conditions that are shaped by structures of industrial organisation, 
state regulations and technological conditions. In addition, labour markets are social constructs 
embedded in the diverse social and institutional regulations of organisational governance, rather 
than autonomous markets (Peck 1996, Polanyi 2001 [1944]). While segmentation scholars agree 
there are segmented labour markets, scholars disagree on the causes and mechanisms of 
segmentation. Tracing the origins of segmentation theory back to its origins in the 1960 and 1970s, 
the economic geographer Jamie Peck conceptualises three generations. The first generation 
comprises the dual labour market theory, advanced by Doeringer and Piore (1971). The second 
generation of segmentation scholarship advanced by Reich, Gordon and Edwards (1973) theorises 
multiple labour markets and the causes of such division, while the third generation advanced by 
Rubery (1994) examines the causes of labour segmentation further. Peck adds a geographic 
dimension to the segmentation concept, arguing that labour markets vary locally as the social and 
institutional processes and regulations in which they are embedded differ regionally (1996, 11).  
 
The first generation of labour segmentation scholars, Doeringer and Piore (1971), advanced the dual 
labour market theory, a division of the labour market into two distinct markets: the primary and a 
secondary labour market. The division occurs along ‘good jobs’ and ‘bad jobs’ with significant 
differences in the social composition of the workforce. The jobs in the secondary market are 
overwhelmingly short-term, low or unskilled, with low earnings and characterised by low prospects 
for career progression. Labour market dualism is traced to the technical development of industrial 
societies and the development of a dual structure of production, such as capital-intensive large firms 
and labour intensive small firms (Peck 1996, 51). Doeringer and Piore (1971) argue that internal 
career mobility is possible in primary labour markets, but highly unlikely between markets. The entry 
point to the primary labour market is restricted but career advancement occurs through seniority or 
performance promotions. Entry to the secondary labour market is open where work tasks are 
repetitive and skills can be easily acquired (Harrison and Sum 1979).  
 
The second generation of labour segmentation scholars, the Marxist economists Reich, Gordon and 
Edwards (1973), differ from the first generation by arguing that the cause of labour segmentation is 
due to the increasing need of monopoly capital to control the workforce. The division of labour 
markets occurs along the division on standardised labour process, which results in a general 
deskilling and homogenisation of the labour force particularly on the secondary labour market while 
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reducing the costs of production and increasing profit. According to labour market segmentation 
theory the labour market is historically divided into segments, between a ‘primary workforce’ in high 
paying positions with high social status and employment security.  In contrast, the ‘secondary 
workforce’ is in low paying positions with minimal social status and employment security and 
unstable working habits (Bauder 2006, Gordon et al. 1982, Peck 1996, Reich et al. 1973). Reich et al. 
(1973) argue that the employment relationships in the primary sector generally have employment 
security, however, the primary market is sub-divided into ‘subordinate workers’ and ‘independent 
workers’ (1973, 360). Subordinated workers have secure employment relationships and relatively 
high pay but conduct routine work and are dependent on instructions. In contrast, independent 
workers work creatively and are self-initiating and professionals with high voluntary mobility and 
high rewards for individual achievements.  
 
Employment in the secondary market is insecure and low paid and jobs are overwhelmingly filled by 
female workers, young workers or workers from minority groups (Reich at al. 1973, 360). The 
secondary labour market is comparatively large and has various entry points, while employment on 
the primary labour market is limited. Reich et al. state that race, gender, educational credentials and 
industry determine the secondary labour market were these groups “operate on different labour 
markets with different working conditions, promotional opportunities, different wages and different 
market institutions” (1973, 359).  
 
The causes of the labour market division are traced to a functional mechanism ensuring capitalist 
hegemony and power, rather than economic or technical division as argued by Doeringer and Piore 
(Gordon et al. 1982, Reich et al. 1973). Socially, labour market segments legitimise inequality 
amongst workers by enforcing the cross-segment division of workers, while establishing unity within 
segments. This segmentation is further entrenched as movement between segments is highly 
unlikely because it “establishes ‘fire trails’ across vertical job ladders and, to the extent that workers 
perceive separate segments with different criteria for access, workers limit their own aspirations for 
mobility” and lastly, “the division of workers into segments legitimizes inequalities in authority and 
control between superior and subordinates” (Reich et al. 1973, 360). Barriers between labour 
markets prevent solidarity across the whole workforce (Peck 1996, 53). Kerr argues that labour 
market segmentation echoes the “balkanization of labour markets”, describing the processes of 
labour market fragmentation through a geopolitical term used to describe the process of regional 
divisions amongst hostile nations or states ([1954] in 1977, 21).  
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The third generation segmentation theorists, such as the neo-Marxist Rubery (1994), differ from the 
two earlier generations in the causal explanation for labour market segmentation. The third 
generation approach links segmentation to multiple historical, institutional and regulatory causes 
that can be summarised in labour demand side causes4, labour supply and social production,5 and 
state and social regulation6 (Hudson 2007, Peck 1996, 59, Rubery and Wilkenson 1994). In addition 
to the causes stressed by scholars of the first and second generation, the third generation traces 
segmentation to social reproduction as well as to state and union struggles (Köhler et.al. 2006). The 
inclusion of the regulatory role of state as a causal factor in the extent of the division of labour is 
crucial because it indicates states’ influence. Causality materialises through states’ failure to 
intervene in markets, such as no reaction to skill shortages and persistent unemployment, as well as 
poor management of wage-labour mobilisation and poor protection of legislative enforcement of 
employment contracts (Peck 1996, 57). Peck argues that the state has a crucial role in the era of 
neoliberal restructuring in protecting and regulating labour markets (1996, 59). However, the 
existence of different regulatory systems for labour markets across advanced economies leads Peck 
to argue for adding a spatial dimension to the labour market segmentation theory (1996, 12). Taking 
into account local differences in labour market regulation enables examination of the role of the 
state across advanced economies, which may challenge some general assumptions and open new 
insights into the causes of segmentation.  
 
While the traditional segmentation theories largely describe hierarchical job structures across 
sectors, studies that are more recent conceptualise segmentation within sectors or even 
organisations and across professional occupations (Leicht and Fennell 1997, McBrier 2003, Petit 
2007, Rogers 2000, Rosenblum and Rosenblum 1990, 1996). This means that scholars challenge the 
traditional perception that the primary labour market or the profession is a united group with high 
pay, and good working conditions (Leicht and Fennell 1997, McBrier 2003). Petit (2007) concludes 
that labour segmentation theories remain useful in analysing contemporary labour markets albeit 
such markets now include new employment practices and weakening of collective representation of 
workers. The segmentation theories enable a solid framework for a comparative analysis of labour 
markets.  
 
                                                          
4 “For example, the technical requirements of different labour processes, stability of different product 
markets, labour control strategies used by employers, and effects of industrial structure" (Peck 1996, 61).  
5 “ For example, the role of the household division of labour in shaping labour market participation, 
stigmatisation of certain social groups as secondary workers, processes of occupational socialisation, and 
the influence of labour unions in restricting the labour supply to certain occupations" (Peck 1996, 61) 
6 “For example, the structure of welfare provision and its eligibility rules, industrial relations and labour 
contract regimes, the structure and emphasis of the educational and training system" (Peck 1996, 61) 
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This section examined labour segmentation theories, outlining the scholarly literature arguing that 
segmentation occurs across occupations and sectors as well as geographies. In general, scholars 
differentiate between labour market segments with good secure jobs and bad insecure jobs. The 
causes for such division are traced to capitalist production regimes where the regulatory role of 
states in employment impacts employment conditions of labour market segments and general scope 
of division. This thesis uses the conceptualisation of segmented labour markets by the second and 
the third generation theorists to examine the scope of labour market segmentation as well as the 
analysis of the role of states in labour market regulation across different advanced economies. The 
following section outlines how labour market segmentation theory applies to academic labour 
markets and outlines the preconditions for academic labour market segmentation. 
3.3 Segmented academic labour markets 
This section outlines the characteristics of segmented academic labour markets and how to 
conceptualise the relationship between the changing labour markets and the socio-economic forces 
that are not only shaping the segmentation of labour markets but the academic labour process itself. 
For the conceptualisation of segmented academic labour markets, this section theorises the 
academic labour process from which potential lines of labour process division emerge. The 
conceptualisation of both the role and the work tasks of academic labour are well developed in 
sociological theory of the sciences and the higher education literature. Together the concepts from 
the labour segmentation and the higher education literature provide the analytical background to 
compare and contrast academic employment relationships and institutional change across Germany 
and Australia. 
3.3.1 The academic labour process 
The higher education literature refers to the tasks and roles of the academic as a unique labour 
process because it combines research with teaching and administration or service work. The 
academic profession is a particular dual profession; as academics are scholars and teachers, they 
engage with research, instruction and monopolise the area of fundamental ideas and processes 
(Perkin 1969, Weber 1919). The role of academics in the twenty-first century encompasses multiple 
tasks. More recently, Clark examines the ‘entrepreneurial university’ and argues that academics are 
becoming entrepreneurial (1998). Etzkowitz argues that the academic role includes a “third mission” 
(next to the traditional teaching and research mission), which is the involvement in socio-economic 
development. This results from the new relationship between university-government and industry (a 
triple helix model), in which universities are entrepreneurial and their presence in the innovation 
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and knowledge production has increased in the knowledge society (Etzkowitz 1993, Etzkowitz and 
Leyesdorff 1997).  
 
In its customary form the academic labour process is artisanal. It is autonomous knowledge work 
conducted in self-direction while it combines cutting edge research with teaching (Dearlove 1997, 
Kreckel 2008, Parsons 1939, Perkin 1969, Wilson 1991). From a study of academics in American 
universities, Parson and Platt ascribe four functions to the academic: research and graduate training, 
general education, training for applied professions and contributions to society, as in the obligation 
to stimulate public debate (1973). In a more recent account from the sociology of science, Kalleberg 
conceptualises academic activity into five categories by focusing on the end-product of the labour 
task: “research resulting in scientific publications; teaching and study programmes resulting in 
educated students, dissemination and public discourse resulting in scientific literacy and democratic 
discourse, professional or expert services resulting in advice or improvement for users and self-
governance of basic units resulting in functioning institutions” (2005, 388). Kalleberg notes that 
academics might specialise in some of the five categories and different individuals have different 
roles within their institution or faculty (2005, 388). 
 
The distinct characteristics of the academic labour process once materialised from the Humboldtian 
tradition and the American functionalist sociology of the professions have led to the conception that 
the quality or costs of academic work cannot be controlled or assessed by public authorities (Ferlie 
et al. 2009, 4). When contrasted to other sectors of production and service in the economy, the 
academic profession is a ‘key profession’ as members possess a complex skill set and provide an 
essential service to other professions and society (Perkin 1969). The unique role of the academic 
profession is traditionally acknowledged by society but also the state, through privileges and status 
such as secure employment. Such privileges granted by the state ensure autonomy over the labour 
process, academic freedom and protect the profession from potential external influences and 
threats (Enders and Teichler 1997, Ferlie et al. 2009). In that way, the university institution acts as 
the institutional harbour for the academic profession; self-determined by the profession, institutions 
provide the resources, such as a library, laboratories and additional personnel. This environment 
provides academics with control and the freedom to choose the research area, as they are working 
under a loose mechanism of coercion embedded in the employment contract (e.g. has duty to teach 
but may conduct work from out of the office at any time). Academics have autonomy to determine 
the research focus of an institute, and are directive in university governance (Clark 1987, Enders 
2000, Enders and Teichler 1997, Teichler et al. 2013). However, analysing each part of the academic 
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labour process separately reveals how teaching and research processes have characteristics of 
temporary employment.  
 
The teaching process in higher education in general is the process of communicating knowledge 
through research. University teaching process has also always meant the communication and 
dissemination of existing knowledge (Newman 1992). While the teaching-research nexus was never 
fully and universally accepted as pedagogical praxis it is widely accepted that these parts are the 
core tasks of the academic labour process (De Weert 2009). Some scholars argue that teaching is 
increasingly delinked from research, is of lower quality, and is largely moving to a standardisation of 
units, resulting in lowering of degree standards, and a decline in the quantity of teaching hours 
required to obtain a degree and where the increasing use of technology impacts negatively on 
teaching quality.  In addition, the semester or trimester structure in higher education as well as 
online courses enables temporary employment. This means that the teaching process in higher 
education, particularly in a bachelor degree, resembles a routine teaching labour process, which 
entails communicating standardised knowledge parcels distributed across university semesters.  
 
The research process in higher education traditionally aims to advance knowledge rather than apply 
knowledge. Research paths and outcomes that cannot be controlled determine the labour process. 
In contrast to routine manufacturing work, research work is temporary, uncertain, unpredictable 
and problem solving and resembles ‘knowledge-work’ (Drucker 1969, 1999). The academic research 
process requires in-depth specialisation, continuous innovation and learning as well as autonomous 
thinking but foremost it is progressing thought (Perkin 1969). The difference between a knowledge 
worker and the academic research task is therefore that the academic advances knowledge whereas 
the knowledge worker applies knowledge. Research labour is inherently uncertain, there is no 
security that the research process will achieve an outcome, and might at any stage collapse for 
unforeseen reasons (Torka 2009). The predominant organisational form of the academic research 
task is the project-form, because of the inherent temporary nature and it usually ends with an 
outcome, be it failure or success (Torka 2009). A research project starts with a new problem and a 
proposed outcome. Every problem is different which means that each research project involves new 
uncertainty, rather than a routine task. In addition, each academic research process depends on self-
governance. This means that the academic research labour process has two distinct characteristics: 
it is fixed term in nature because a research task has a beginning and an end, and the actual research 
outcome is uncertain.  
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The de-coupling of the teaching and research processes reveals distinct characteristics relating to 
temporality and insecurity. According to the principles and practices of scientific management 
(Taylorism) and market mechanisms, an increase in profits is achieved through increasing economic 
efficiency and labour productivity (Littler 1978). Braverman (1998) shows that under industrialisation 
the manufacturing labour process separated into planning (management) and implementation 
(workers), where management controls the overall production process. A division of the labour 
process implies that workers undertake particular fragments of the complet labour process and 
workers lose the connection to the overall product and meaning of the labour processes. In 
consequence, the labour time and the product of labour are commodified, defined by their capacity 
to generate profit (Winter 1995, 133ff). The fragmentation of the labour process strengthens the 
division and sub-division of labour markets further and thus, according to the segmentation scholars, 
increases the capacity to generate profit (Peck 1996). Applying the Taylorist concept to the academic 
labour process means that the teaching and research nexus in the academic labour process is 
divided into several stages in which the academic exercises control over assigned parts of the 
formally holistic academic labour process. While the de-coupling of the research and teaching nexus 
has always occurred to an extent, recent developments widely document the separation of the 
teaching and research nexus in national higher education systems in advanced economies. 
 
Research from across advanced economies provides evidence of the de-coupling of teaching and 
research within universities and across higher education systems that once formed the basis of the 
Humboldtian ideal of the academic labour process (Altbach 2003, De Weert 2009, Enders 2001, 
Marginson 1995, Stromquist 2007, Tirelli 1997). De Weert shows the advancement of the division of 
the academic labour process is reflected in the emerging organisational forms of tertiary education 
institutions, such as separate research and teaching institutions, separate organisation of teaching 
and research within universities and the integrated system (2009, 140f). The majority of institutions 
offer particular and separate educational/teaching or research services. In consequence, it is likely 
that employees are teaching-only or research-only. 
 
This section conceptualised the characteristics of the academic labour processes and establishes that 
the division of the academic labour process is evident in the de-coupling of the teaching and 
research nexus over the last decades. The potential of a labour process division is, according to 
labour market segmentation theory, a necessary condition for labour market segmentation.  
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3.3.2 Characteristics of segmented academic labour markets  
Researchstudies conceptualise academic labour markets as divided between permanent and non-
permanent academic employees (McBrier 2003, Enders and De Weert 2009, Gappa and Leslie 1993, 
Neave and Rhoades 1987, Rosenblum and Rosenblum 1990, 1994, Stromquist 2007, Tirelli 1997). 
This means that permanent jobs are defined as ‘good academic jobs’ whereas non-permanent jobs 
are defined as ‘bad academic jobs’. 
 
Thefocus on conceptualising the changing employment relations in the primary labour market, 
identifying its cause in the changing regulatory framework and predicting a future of increasing 
division of academic labour is common (Altbach 1996, Boyer et al. 1994, Clark 1987, Stromquist 
2007). For instance, the most recent comparative study of the changing academic profession, the 
CAP (Carnegie Academic Profession) study, surveys academics and compares the working life of 
academics across 25 countries (Teichler, Arimoto and Cummings 2013). According to the surveyed 
academics, workloads are intensifying, the diversification of the academic labour process is growing, 
managerial power is increasing and research activity is emerging as the core activity of academics 
(Teichler, Arimoto and Cummings 2013). The study also confirms increasing short-term and part-
time employment particularly amongst junior academics, but also amongst senior academics 
(Teichler, Arimoto and Cummings 2013, 89). The findings are indicative of the academic labour 
process division. Other scholars concentrate on the increasing academic workforce in temporary 
employment, including the characteristics of the workforce, such as the shift from doctoral students 
to academics (May 2012, Tirelli 1997). Research from Canada, the United States and Germany 
demonstrates employment in temporary and casual academic positions is increasing (Doellgast 
2012, McBrier 2003, Rosenblum and Rosenblum 1997). According to McBrier, the increasing division 
of the workforce reflects the growing diversity of service and professional work and many 
professions are “advancing towards a stratified two-tier system of elites and practitioners and 
challenging the traditional perception of professions as invariably high status, well paid and 
associated with stable and secure work settings” (2003, 1202).  
  
The secondary academic labour market is defined as consisting of various entry points as well as 
substantial mobility between the academic labour markets. Rosenblum and Rosenblum found an 
increase of precarious, non-tenured teaching jobs in Canadian colleges and argued that the 
secondary labour market is used as a teaching pool and recruitment pool for the primary labour 
market (1990, 1996). The availability of a teaching pool indicates that the secondary academic 
labour market absorbs labour demand fluctuations, as theorised by Bauder (Bauder 2006, 231). The 
representative organisation of the professoriate in Germany, the Allianz der 
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Wissenschaftorganisationen, argues that the main aim of temporary employment is the acquisition 
of qualifications (2015). In the German system, six years of temporary employment are common and 
this time is used to produce additional academic work, or to fulfill the conditions for the 
‘Habilitation’ after completing a doctoral degree. The ‘Habilitation’, meaning permission to read 
(lecture), is the highest academic qualification in many European and Asian countries. It is a second 
major academic work (after the doctoral dissertation), is independent (without supervision) and of 
considerably higher standard. It is reviewed and defended before an academic committee but only 
awarded after a public lecture where the lecture topic must be different from the habilitation topic. 
This means that temporary academic employment resembles academic probation.  
 
Contrary to the assumption that there is minimal mobility between the primary and secondary 
labour markets, research shows significant movement between labour markets. Rosenblum and 
Rosenblum found that the secondary labour market is in fact a port of entry into the primary 
academic labour market (1996). Using empirical data evidence from labour market statistics 
Rosenblum and Rosenblum (1996) found that about 20 percent of one cohort in the Canadian 
secondary academic labour market entered the primary labour market in the same university, which 
is similar to the percentage that entered the primary labour market from outside the university. 
McBrier also found significant upward mobility in law academic labour markets in the United States: 
from 224 law teachers, one third moved into the primary labour market (2003, 1207). Overall, 
research suggests that the secondary academic labour market has two different functions for the 
organization and the sector: it is a recruitment pool for the primary labour market and it acts as a 
buffer for labour demand fluctuations. 
 
The secondary academic labour market has distinct characteristics and functions. Employees on the 
secondary academic labour market are high skilled, are undertaking or have a doctoral degree and at 
the same time jobs are ‘good’ teaching jobs and are fairly well rewarded. In contrast, labour 
segmentation theory characterises work on the secondary labour market as ‘bad’ and employees are 
low or unskilled and attract low earnings. Rather, jobs in the higher education secondary labour 
market are associated with poor employment conditions, particularly the temporary nature of 
employment. In addition, while segmentation scholars predict very little mobility between labour 
markets, the above research suggests some mobility between academic labour markets.  
 
The distinct conceptualisation of academic labour markets according to the employment status is 
important because it establishes a determining factor for group affiliation of employees into the 
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primary or secondary labour market. This grouping of employees reduces the complexities of 
employment conditions to focus on the essentials. In addition, it allows for a straightforward 
comparison of different academic labour markets not only within a national system but also across 
systems. The categorisation of academic employees is the basis for the data analysis of academic 
labour markets in chapter five and seven and the comparison of academic labour markets between 
Australia and Germany in chapter eight. 
 
Having established the spheres of the labour process division as well as the functions of segmented 
academic labour markets, the next section theorises the drivers of academic labour market 
segmentation. 
3.4 Theorising the drivers of academic labour market segmentation  
This section theorises the accelerators of academic labour market segmentation and develops a 
framework to analyse regulatory changes in national higher education systems between 1980 and 
2012. Segmentation is traced to the economic or technical division of production, to ensuring 
capitalist hegemony and power as well as to institutional and regulatory causes. The higher 
education literature traces the labour market division to the expansion of the higher education 
system and to institutional and regulatory changes under marketisation. In case of academic labour 
markets, this thesis focuses on the analysis of how and why regulatory changes affects academic 
employment conditions. 
3.4.1 Growing national higher education systems  
Since the 1960s, the expansion of the higher education sector has manifest primarily in the growth 
of student enrolments and employment. Labour market scholars argue that growing industries tend 
to offer insecure employment (Peck 1996). This means that a growing sector is associated with the 
increasing division of the labour market. The phenomenon of a growing higher education sector is 
referred to as ‘expansion’ and ‘massification’ (Blanden and Machin 2004, Bousquet 2008, Donoghue 
2008, Hermanowicz 2011, Marginson 2007, Schofer and Meyer 2005, Slaughter and Leslie 1997).  
 
The expansion of national higher education systems has been associated with the introduction of 
modular and standardised courses which leads to the strengthening of the labour process division. 
On average between 1995 and 2010 the proportion of 20-29 year olds completing tertiary education 
in advanced economies rose from 18 to 27 percent, 9 percentage points in more than a decade 
(OECD 2013, 270). This means that on average every second person between 17 and 25 years enters 
a higher education institution (Enders and Musselin 2008, 128). Australia’s participation rate exceeds 
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75 percent of the 17 to 25 years age group attending higher education and can accordingly be 
classified as a universal system (OECD 2014, 339). Trow (1973) conceptualised higher education 
systems as elite, mass or universal systems. According to Trow a mass system means that 16-50% of 
the population of a relevant age group participate in higher education.A universal system means 
thathalf or more of the relevant age group participate (1973).  The United States system is the 
pioneer of mass higher education, since policy change in the 1960s led to the expansion of higher 
education (Kleinman et al. 2011, 280, Scott 1995). In contrast, in many European countries the era of 
massification started closer to the 1990s (Scott 1995). This explains why scholars from Germany and 
other European countries argue that the transformation of the higher education system, from the 
elite to a mass system, drives all the changes in the sector (Altbach and Knight 2007, Teichler 1998).  
 
Altbach (2007, xvi) argues that the consequences of the massification of higher education can be 
summarised in four main changes: a differentiated higher education system; the privatisation of 
higher education; and a decline in overall academic standards but also greater diversity of gender, 
social class, and ethnicity among students and staff. Teichler (1998, 22) notes that experts agreed 
that the decline of the academic standard is a result of the increasing cohort of ‘non-traditional 
students’, who “arrive less well prepared, were less motivated towards academic  ‘pursuit of 
knowledge for its own sake’ and more technologically orientated ...and many of them had to be 
helped to prepare themselves for sectors of employment [...]”. In addition, Altbach (2007, xvii) 
argues that higher education standards declined because of a “more diverse student body, poorer 
facilities in universities as well as less highly trained professors”. To accommodate the needs of a 
more diverse student body, university institutions are adapting course structures and contents, as 
well as teaching compositions. Teichler (1998) provides evidence for declining standards at 
universities through a comparative study (China, Germany, Japan, Singapore, Switzerland and US) 
investigating the relationship between massification and teaching standards. He finds that all 
countries introduced modular courses, had new mixes between general and specialised education, 
had practice oriented study, offered an increasing variety of courses, and put the emphasis on 
personality development, flexibility, social skills and individuality (Teichler 1998, 23). De Weert 
argues that the higher education system is changing from a ‘scientific’ to a ‘vocational’ system, 
which is driving the division of the academic labour process, because it is “pulling the research and 
teaching nexus apart” (2009, 143). Teichler argues that the growing division of labour reflects 
universities’ need to “cater for their respective student body” (1998, 22). Thus the expansion of 
higher education required the amendment and standardisation of degrees and courses while 
advancing the division of the academic labour process. This refers to the nature of standardisation, 
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which is the establishment of course content standards with little room for amendments. Higher 
education scholars argue that standardised degree programs reinforce a tendency to employ a non-
permanent academic workforce (Enders and Musselin 2008, Willmott 1995).  
 
From a political economy perspective, the phenomenon that growing industries are engaging 
temporary employees is not a unique observation (Peck 1996, 2001, Peck and Theodore 2011) and 
as such the employment of temporary academic labour fills a potential gap in academic teaching 
staff. 
3.4.2 Changing regulation of national higher education systems 
Labour market segmentation theory states regulation practices cause labour market segmentation, 
both through non-intervention and intervention in employment protection regimes during 
neoliberal restructuring (Peck 1996). Yet so far there is not a comprehensive understanding of how 
and what regulatory changes alter employment conditions, nor have they incorporated institutional 
distinctiveness across different welfare state typologies. According to the higher education research, 
the advancement of marketisation in higher education services provision triggers the division of 
academic labour markets. This section reviews the literature and establishes four dimensions to 
analyse the scope of marketisation in diverse national higher education regulation: the role of the 
state, the diversification of funding, competition and institutional autonomy. These dimensions build 
the framework to assess how and why regulatory changes in higher education impact on academic 
employment conditions. 
 
Before outlining the process of higher education services under marketised systems this section 
outlines the theoretical concept. Marketisation describes restructuring procedures that support, 
enable, authorise or enforce markets and market mechanisms into the public sector, such as 
strengthening relationships between buyers and sellers, allocation of funding via markets as well as 
the introduction of competition practices and performance control mechanisms (Le Grand and 
Robinson 1984, Whitty and Power 2000). The process of marketisation includes liberalisation of 
economic activity through the reduction of government control, such as the reduction of trade 
barriers. For the higher education system marketisation processes cover the introduction of market-
mechanisms in the allocation of funding, rather than withdrawal from funding (Bok 2009, Dill 2003, 
Williams 1997). The commencement of marketisation practices in the delivery of higher education 
services can be traced to the late 1970s in Britain and the US, when government control over higher 
education funding was loosened which enabled the introduction of student fees (Brown and Carosso 
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2013). In the following years marketisation policies proliferated in other countries, primarily in 
Anglo-Saxon countries such as Australia and New Zealand.  
 
Slaughter and Leslie describe the college and university integration into the new economy in the 
United States as ‘academic capitalism’ in which colleges, faculty staff and institutions are actively 
involved in market-like behaviours (1997, 1-3). It is argued that since the expansion of marketisation 
in higher education institutions and academics have become ‘entrepreneurial’ (Slaughter and Leslie 
1997, Slaughter and Rhoades 1993, Marginson and Considine 2000). These processes in higher 
education are best theorised as quasi-marketisation.  
 
Markets and quasi-markets allocate resources in the form of products and services and facilitate the 
exchange of commodities or services via the mechanism of a ‘price’ and in quasi-markets via the 
mechanism of ‘choice’ (Le Grand 1991). This means that the structure of quasi-markets was 
designed to ensure both equity in public service provision and efficiency.  
 
According to Le Grand (1991, 1257), the state interests are as follows:  
In each case, the intention is for the state to stop being both the funder and the provider of 
services. Instead it is to become primarily a funder, purchasing services from a variety of private, 
voluntary and public providers, all operating in competition with one another. The method of 
funding is also to change. Resources are no longer to be allocated directly to providers through a 
bureaucratic machinery. In some cases the state continues to act as the principal purchaser, but 
resources are allocated through a bidding process. In other cases, an earmarked budget or 
'voucher' is given directly to potential users, or to agents acting on their behalf, who can then 
allocate the budget as they choose between the competing providers.  
The use of ‘quasi-markets’, rather than markets, in the provision of higher education means 
sustaining a level of equity while achieving maximum efficiency. Higher education funding for 
teaching links to the individual student and provides each individual with equal access to an 
institution. Funding resources for research link to a project and provide each academic with the 
opportunity to apply for a grant, yet not guaranteeing success. Rather than funding being linked to 
the institutions directly, funding is linked to an individual student or academic.  
 
In analysing decision-making processes and actors, it is argued that since the 1990s marketisation 
has gradually led to a multi-level actor governing system in higher education (De Boer et al. 2007b, 
Pusser 2008, Slaughter and Leslie 1997). The actors are research councils, quality assurance agencies 
but also ministries of education with links to other consultation agencies in industry, each 
influencing the agenda setting, policy development, policy implementation and evaluation in higher 
education (De Boer et al. 2007, De Boer and File 2009). The multi-level actor system is indicative of 
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the changing role of the state. Dobbins et al. argue that in the governance process the amount of 
influence is not the decisive factor but the nature of influence and thus “marketization is not 
necessarily synonymous with the retreat of the state” (2011, 679).  
 
Research from Australia and the United States found that the state is the core steering entity in 
higher education governance, determining and delegating power to other actors (Marginson and 
Considine 2000, Teixeira et al. 2004). Marginson emphasises the role of the state as steering the 
higher education system in Australia towards the market (1997). Neave describes the role of the 
state, particularly in European countries, in higher education as “evaluative”, which means the state 
developed the ‘steering system’, a retreat from a controlling role (2012).  
 
To enable comparison of policy changes, rather than politics or ideology, this thesis conceptualises 
marketisation according to Pierre as: “the ‘marketisation of the state’, namely, to employ market 
criteria for allocating public resources and also to measure the efficiency of public service 
procedures and suppliers according to market criteria” (1995, 56). Pierre also includes New Public 
Management, the business-style, result-oriented, public sector management model (Hood 1995, 95) 
as well as the ability for individuals to choose their service from different providers in ‘marketisation 
of the state’ (1995, 55).  
For higher education policy and the changing relationship between state and service, this thesis 
conceptualises three analytical categories that enable analysis and comparison of the complexities 
of marketisation policies and their impact on academic labour markets. First, marketisation in higher 
education means all processes in which market criteria, such as competition, are employed to the 
allocation of public higher education funding. The introduction of competition into higher education 
service provision, through the ability to choose educational providers and degrees regardless of 
admission ranks, reflects market-mechanisms of efficiency and thus marketisation in higher 
education (Marginson 1995). This means that the responsibility and ownership as well as the 
provision and regulation of funding shifts from the public to a non-public or public-private sector 
entity, such as research councils and competitive research funds allocation. Second, marketisation in 
higher education means that processes, practices, mechanisms and disciplines of the private sector, 
or New Public Management, are applied to higher education research and teaching services. 
Itincludes the decentralisation of budgets and university entrepreneurship especially on governance 
and diversification of funding (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, 2). Third, marketisation in higher education 
covers quality control measures and external evaluation procedures by the state, rather than peer 
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reviewed and a self-monitoring system, to higher education research and teaching (Craft 1994). The 
following sections outline these categories further. 
3.4.2.1 The critical role of the state  
A variety of different mechanisms, including policy and budgets are used to explain the changing role 
of the state, such as the evaluation of productivity, academic performance and output as well as the 
evaluation of public resources (Neave 1998). In addition, several scholars conceptualise the 
procedure of marketisation in higher education as an evolutionary process that differs substantially 
in its scope and pace across different national higher education systems (Marginson 1997a/b, Neave 
1998, 2012). The research from across different systems suggests that the state has a critical role in 
facilitating, steering, evaluating and controlling the higher education sector under marketisation. 
Overall, the state has a dualrole, on one side statesestablish marketisation in higher education 
systems because each system is embedded in the regulatory framework of individual welfare states 
as outlined in Chapter 2 and on the other side states are steering and facilitating services under 
marketisation.  
3.4.2.2 Intra-institutional change and New Public Management  
The decision-making power of management over degrees emerged as a result from the shift of 
higher education providers from institutions to organisations (Whitley and Gläser 2007). The central 
features of organisations are planning and coordinating functions, rather than social (Meier 2007, 
Musselin 2007, Whitley and Gläser 2007). The introduction of New Public Management (NPM) in 
internal governance introduces efficiency by using private sector management models, competition 
to the provision of educational services and thus the theory outlines the reason for   less state 
regulation and more market (Schimank 2005).  
 
Comparative studies show that internal governance change occurs at different rates but across all 
higher education systems, the change is towards greater authority at the managerial level (Ferlie 
1996, Ferlie et al. 2009, Schimank 2005). Berdahl (1990), De Boer and File (2009) and Dobbins et al. 
(2011) conceptualise increasing substantial and procedural autonomy in higher education. Berdahl 
conceptualises substantive autonomy as: “the power of the university or college in its corporate 
form to determine its own goals and programs – if you will, the what of academe” and procedural 
autonomy is “the power of the university or college in its corporate form to determine the means by 
which its goals and programs will be pursued – the how of academe” (1990, 172). Despite diverse 
higher education systems, there is a general trend towards greater organisational autonomy across 
all states (De Boer and File 2009, Dobbins et al. 2011, Enders and De Weert 2009). Substantive 
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autonomy may enable the organisation and management to stimulate the attractiveness of degrees 
and courses and to determine core teaching and research direction, via curriculum design (De Boer 
and File 2009, Dobbins et al. 2011). As such, organisational and substantial autonomy supports the 
marketisation of higher education and may support the segmentation of academic labour markets.  
3.4.2.3 The role of funding 
Dill argues that the higher education system consists of multiple interconnected markets, such as for 
research and for academic degrees, as well as academic labour markets (1997, 168). Each of these 
quasi-markets is structurally different and has potentially diverse effects on the academic labour 
market. Allocation of university funding through market-like systems of competitive bidding 
contributes to the segmenentation of academic labour markets. The allocation of research funding 
generally occurs through base funding for the university institution but also through competitive 
state research councils and is time limited. While this practice has a long history, the scope of 
markets and the breadth of competition is expanding (De Boer et al. 2009, Le Grand 1991). The 
expansion of competitive research funding parallels the increasing perception of the state that 
science and technology are major factors for economic growth.  
 
Since the late 1980s governments across the OECD countries have strengthened market mechanisms 
in the form of performance based research funding systems in which success depends on peer-
reviews and ex-post evaluation (Geuna and Martin 2003, Hicks 2012). Research councils have a 
strategic planning role and Henkel argues that they “provide strong framing for individual academic 
agendas and [..] push applicants to make connections between their work and its applicability to 
non-scientific problems and to make promises accordingly” (Henkel 2005, 161). While research 
funds expand, the allocation is embedded within a competitive regulatory framework. In the United 
Kingdom quasi-markets are allocating public funding to universities and research as a means to 
increase efficiency (Williams 1997). In Germany research funding allocation takes place in quasi-
markets in a competitive peer reviewed process (De Boer et al. 2007). Research funding parcels are 
linked to a specific project and time, and vary in size, which reflects in many ways the uncertainties 
of the research process (Torka 2009).  
 
The introduction of market mechanisms into the regulatory framework for education shifts the 
allocation of funding from ‘base’ to ‘student-led’ and strengthens managerial autonomy. Student-led 
funding or education tuition means that the state provides students with a voucher, to be used at 
any student-chosen higher education institution. Similar to the United Kingdom, Australia allocates 
public funding in quasi-markets through a student voucher system or income contingent loans 
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(Baldwin and James 2000, Chapman and Ryan 2005, Marginson 1997b). The higher education system 
in most Anglo-Saxon countries is increasingly ‘student funded’ rather than ‘institution funded’ 
(Williams 1996). This means that student enrolment determines the funding level, rather than the 
intuition receiving a fixed budget. Dill argues that policy is “increasingly driven by the belief that 
freeing, facilitating, and stimulating markets in higher education will provide academic institutions 
with incentives to improve the quality of teaching and research, to enhance academic productivity, 
and to stimulate innovations in academic programs, research, and services of benefit to the larger 
society” (1997, 169). This means quasi-markets for education have a relatively high degree of 
elasticity, meaning they are responsive to change. For instance, the Australian higher education 
system implemented educational quasi-markets (Marginson 1997b, 2006). Degree elasticity means 
the creation of attractive degrees for students and often programs are designed with significant 
influence from institutional management. New degrees could have the potential to reduce standards 
while also increasing the attractively for potential students and the funding for organisations. The 
economic conditions potentially lead to labour market fluctuations and volatile labour demand, 
increasing labour market segmentation.  
 
Marketisation practices and mechanisms outlined above are common in higher education provision 
and that these are advanced by the state. This is particularly evident in the allocation of public 
resources. This section has established key aspects from the literature that allow to structure how 
marketisation impacts on the segmentation of academic labour markets: first the role of the state as 
steering and facilitating marketisation; second, the extent of competitive funding diversification in 
research and teaching; and third, the level of intra-institutional change.  
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter developed a conceptual framework to analyse how and why policy diversification under 
marketization in different institutional settings affects academic labour markets. Introducing labour 
market segmentation theory, higher education research as well the modes of marketisation fills the 
gap in the comparative political economy literature established in Chapter 2 and permits the analysis 
of changing labour markets in academia.  
The first part of this chapter established the framework to explain the developments on academic 
labour markets. Linking views from the higher education literature to the labour market 
segmentation literature reveals firstly that academic labour markets are divided according to 
employment conditions rather than job properties. Employees are clustered according to their 
employment conditions into the permanent primary and non-permanent secondary labour market. 
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This categorisation is important because it allows for the comparison of academic labour markets 
across welfare states, which is the basis for the analysis in Chapter 5 and 7. 
The second part of this chapter conceptualised the types of regulative changes under marketisation 
that impact on academic labour markets. In order to analyse how higher education regulation 
shapes academic employment this chapter established three dimensions: the critical role of the 
state as steering and facilitating, the extent of competitive funding diversification in research and 
teaching and the level of intra-institutional change. This three dimensional policy framework guides 
the analysis of higher education policy developments across different welfare states in Chapter 4 
and 6 and provides further context for specific institutional changes and the impact on academic 
labour markets in Chapter 8.  
 
To assess how and why policy processes in distinct institutional regimes affect the nature of 
employment relationships differently, this chapter developed a framework based on labour market 
segmentation theories. In the following empirical chapters, the framework will be applied to analyse 
policy and labour market developments in Australia and Germany. 
Part II Evidence  
The following chapters provide evidence of the transformation of higher education policy and 
academic labour markets in the Australian liberal and the German corporatist welfare state. The 
previous chapters have established the theoretical basis for the comparative analysis of policy 
change in higher education and its effects on segmented academic labour markets in Germany and 
Australia. As established in Chapter 2, institutional change under liberalisation started to occur from 
the 1980s onwards, which is reason to investigate developments in higher education from 1980s to 
2012.The evidence shows substantial policy changes between 1980 and 2012 in both countries, and 
similar challenges to academic labour markets. 
The primary data for policies are sourced from official government reports and documentation and 
the primary data for academic labour markets, higher education funding and student numbers are 
from national statistical bureaus in Germany and Australia. Available data was analysed in multiple 
ways, particularly deconstructing different employment levels or funding sources. In addition, this 
thesis uses proportional or relative data, rather than absolute data, to enable better comparison of 
labour market and funding data.  
Chapters 4 and 5 outline the Australian case. Chapter 4 provides evidence of policy changes in higher 
education under marketisation between 1980 and 2012 in the liberal welfare state. It demonstrates 
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the stability of marketisation in higher education. Chapter 5 reveals that the secondary labour 
market has been growing stronger than the primary labour market.  
Chapters 6 and 7 examine the German case. Chapter 6 provides evidence of marketisation policies 
from 1980 to 2012 in higher education in a corporatist welfare state. It demonstrates that 
marketisation in this sector thrives in the conservative welfare state. Chapter 7 reveals a substantial 
and increasing gap between the size of the primary and secondary academic labour market.
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4 Australia - The marketisation of higher education policy        
(1980–2012) 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters established that institutional change in welfare states occurs as a gradual and 
variegated process leading to a gradual transformation. It also showed that increasing labour market 
segmentation in academia has been associated with three developments: the critical role of the 
state in steering and facilitating higher education policy, the extent of competitive funding 
diversification, and intra-institutional changes based on NPM. This chapter explores the policy 
developments in higher education in Australia. It analyses policy changes using the three key 
dimensions and describes characteristics of new policies between 1980 and 2012. This chapter 
addresses the question of how policy diversification affects the higher education sector in the liberal 
welfare state, with a particular focus on the funding structures.  
 
Data sets for the years 1962 to 1990 are from the Department of Employment, Education and 
Training’s (DEET) National Report on Australia’s Higher Education Sector (1993). The main datasets 
on higher education student enrolment and staff are retrieved from the former Department of 
Industry, Innovation, Science, Research and Tertiary Education (DIISTRE), since 2014 the Department 
of Education and Training (DET). The Australian federal departments collect data from the Annual 
Financial Statements which higher education institutions are required to prepare in accordance with 
the Financial Statements Guidelines for Australian Higher Education Providers. Data has been 
adjusted by the department to the specific requirements and was rounded to the nearest thousand. 
The data used in this chapter gives an overview about national university revenues and expenses 
from 1962 until 1990 and a more detailed overview from 1995 to 2011. Furthermore, the datasets 
have been combined with regards to changing accounting requirements.    
 
Throughout the chapter the policy developments between 1980 and 2012 are analysed according to 
key periods that align with specific prime ministers in power. Each period is presented in terms of 
the socio-economic drivers of policy reform before engaging with the major policy changes in higher 
education and their structural effects. The following section 4.2 briefly explores the period after 
World War II before engaging in depth with the ascendance of marketisation between 1983 and 
1996 under a federal Labor government. Section 4.3 analyses developments under the Liberal 
government between 1996 and 2007 as marketisation policies peaked before demonstrating that 
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the Labor government between 2007 and 2013 did re-establish greater share of public funding to 
higher education. In conclusion the evidence of policy changes in Australia demonstrates that 
marketisation policies and mechanisms in the provision of higher education teaching and research 
have been strengthened between 1980 and 2012, a finding that is in line with the theoretical 
premises of the welfare state theory articulated in chapter 2. 
4.2 Post World War II (1950–1972): Expansion 
Post World War II, higher education was elitist and only accessible for parts of society. The post-war 
boom, economically and demographically, led to increasing demand for and importance of higher 
education. The federal government under Menzies endorsed the growth of the higher education 
sector and introduced the Commonwealth scholarship scheme in 1951, covering tuition fees as well 
as a means tested living allowance for students from a low socio-economic background. After the 
Murray report of 1956, the federal government also accepted greater responsibility for universities 
and increased funding as a means to promote economic growth (Committee on Australian 
Universities and Murray 1957). The promotion of the tertiary sector reflected the general Keynesian 
socio-economic logic of social and economic policy that characterised this period. The federal 
commitment to increase university funding meant that the state governments were not the sole 
public providers of higher education but provision was a joint endeavour during this time.  
In 1964, the Martin report (Committee on the Future of Tertiary Education in Australia 1964) 
explicitly linked higher education to the national economic interest. The report recognised 
“professional development as a national resource to be developed and exploited like any other” 
(Marginson and Considine 2000, 23). Federal control over the higher education budget and 
regulation increased to ensure universities provided graduates with the skills needed for the labour 
market demands. Following the Martin report, the higher education system became accessible to a 
broader population, evident in the rapid growth in student numbers, with the introduction of more 
flexible study arrangements, entry requirements and the expansion of courses. Under the binary 
tertiary education system of universities and colleges, new institutions were established across 
Australia to encourage the study in tertiary education. About 80 percent of university funding was 
provided relatively equally to all institutions and as base funding or principal support for research 
and teaching rather than as competitive project grants (Marginson 2004a, 2). This reflects the view 
that universities were seen as equal, responsible for education, research and doctoral training. 
Marginson notes that this meant that “universities competed with each other for academic prestige, 
as universities do; there was little economic competition as such” (Marginson 2004a, 2). In addition, 
this base-funding scheme provided universities with the means to increase salaries for academics 
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but also to accumulate academic credentials, national as well as international. The expert 
committees under Murray and Martin provided inquiry reports with substantial recommendations 
and consequently the university expansion was based on policies that focused on building a 
competent and homogenous university system, through general and sufficient base funding for all 
universities. At the same time, access to higher education was based on merit, yet institutions had 
limited capacity for students.  
4.3 Pre-marketisation or public higher education (1972–1982)  
Prime Minister Gough Whitlam focused on education policy and policy development around 
principles of distributive justice. Whitlam abolished tuition fees, effective from 1 January 1974, 
advancing free university education. The federal government took full responsibility for funding 
(Karmel 1989, 3) and established itself as the major actor in the decision-making process for higher 
education regulation.  
The policy changes included equity and growth. In addition to free higher education, student 
scholarships covered living expenses (Marginson and Considine 2000, 24). The student population 
increased substantially within five years, from 160,000 in 1970 to 280,000 in 1975 (representing 
approximately 15 percent of people finishing school). Academic university staff increased from 7,371 
full-time staff in 1973 to 11,502 in 1976 (Australian Bureau of Statistics 1971, 1997-78). 
Whitlam’s policies undoubtedly transformed the provision of higher education, making higher 
education public, non-market and therefore accessible to all people. The policy changes also paved 
the way for a conceptual change in the role of the welfare state in higher education in Australia; 
degrees were not a commodity but a social right.  
Following the world recession and economic crises in 1973-74 austerity policies were established in 
Australia, yet the new government under Liberal Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser in 1975 did not 
abolish free higher education. University funding under Fraser stagnated. Karmel notes “the brakes 
were applied sharply to higher education spending in 1977” (Karmel 1989, 4).  
In 1976 Prime Minister Fraser established a committee to enquire into ‘education and training’ 
under the direction of Professor Bruce Williams. The committee was asked to investigate the 
situation of the sector itself but also the “relationship between the educational system and the 
labour market” (Committee of Inquiry into Education, & Training 1979, 2). Williams’ report strongly 
engages with the intersection of tertiary education and skill shortages in the labour market. It 
focuses on the intersection between economic growth and ‘quality and efficiency’ of tertiary 
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education. This rhetoric reflects some key notions of marketisation ideals, particularly the link to 
economic goals, rather than upholding democratic values and culture.   
While scholarships for living expenses were phased out under Prime Minster Fraser, proposals to re-
introduce tuition fees were unsuccessful. The government also facilitated enquiries into academic 
employment conditions, aiming to abolish tenure. It was argued by the government that 
employment security leads to low levels of academic efficiency (Marginson 1992). These reform 
proposals faced considerable opposition, not only from within the parliament but from education 
and student unions (Forsyth 2014, 98-101).  
For the length of the Fraser government, the public provision of higher education was under attack. 
Thus, this period marks the start of the discourse concerning economic liberalism in higher 
education.   
4.4 The ascendance of marketisation (1983–1996)  
The Labor government under Prime Minister Bob Hawke from 1983 to 1991 and then Paul Keating 
from 1991 to 1996 marks the end of free higher education. Under Hawke marketisation was 
established into the provision of higher education, particularly through the re-introduction of tuition 
fees but also through competitive research funding for academics. The commonwealth government 
has been responsible for this major shift in higher education policy.  
The economic recession at the beginning of the 1980s, with high inflation and high unemployment 
rates, put pressure on federal budgets. Education spending (including spending on schools) 
constituted the third largest outlay of government spending, after defence and social security (Ryan 
1999, 252). Successive Labor governments between 1983 and 1996 transformed Australia’s 
economy, following the policies of privatisation and deregulation in the United Kingdom under 
Thatcher and responding to the global changes in trade and finance relations. The aim was to 
increase productivity, in order to lower inflation and unemployment and to increase 
competitiveness in the area of globalisation. Major economic policy reforms included the 
introduction of a floating exchange rate, taxation reform, such as introduction of tax on capital gains 
and lowering company and individual tax rates, deregulation of markets and freer trade (Schwartz 
1994). Higher education became a target for liberal reform policies as well, particularly the re-
introduction of tuition fees (Marginson 1997b, 2004). Student fees were justified as a means to 
cover the high outlay, on the equity argument and to fund the expansion of the higher education 
system.  
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Tuition fees also reflect the general emphasis of liberal reforms focusing on the individual rather 
than the common benefits of education. From the mid-1980s student fees were re-introduced in a 
gradual change process. 
A first ‘user-pay’ fee or the Higher Education Administration Charge (HEAC) of $250 per full-time 
student, designed to cover some of the administration costs and paid directly to the university, was 
introduced in 1985 (Department of Employment, Education and Training 1993). From the mid-1980s 
with increasing intensity, the introduction of student fees was recommended by several entities as a 
means to fund the expansion of student numbers. In 1986, the Commonwealth Tertiary Education 
Commission published a report on the state of the higher education system and stated that the 
situation of stagnating funding in real terms and increasing student numbers had put the system 
under pressure (Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission 1986). The Department of 
Employment, Education and Training (DEET) (1993) states that market oriented policies were 
designed to avoid the increase of state spending and provide opportunities for funding from private 
sources especially for research activities of universities. Ryan (1999, 252) notes “with relentless 
intensity from 1985”, the solution to fiscal problems was the “reintroduction of tuition fees and 
building private universities”. This means that in line with Pierson’s (2002) concept of permanent 
austerity, by which real or perceived fiscal constraints on the state restrict the growth of social 
expenditure, fiscal austerity was one factor for re-introducing tuition fees. Stebbing and Spiess-
Butcher (2010) argue that the growth of social tax expenditures from the 1990s, particularly social 
spending as tax breaks, was a result of fiscal austerity. This has contributed to the transformation of 
the Australian wage earners’ model towards a typical liberal welfare state regime.  
The next step in the incremental change process towards marketization in higher education was the 
re-introduction of tuition fees, targeted at international students and mapped on to foreign aid 
provision. Following several reviews into Australia’s approach to overseas students, the government 
allowed universities and other higher education institutions to charge full fees for overseas students 
in 1986 (Industry Commission 1991). Initially most overseas students received scholarships from the 
Australian International Development Assistance Bureau (AIDAB), which meant that 5 percent of all 
students were paying fees in 1987. However, in 1993 about 80 percent of overseas students were 
paying full fees, while 20 percent received scholarships. Economic growth in Asian economies and 
increasing demand for higher education were reasons that several policy reviews indicated higher 
education as an industry with enormous export potential (Department of Employment, Education 
and Training 1993). As a result, the federal government encouraged universities to market their 
programs at full cost to potential overseas students (Department of Employment, Education and 
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Training 1993). The proportion of private funding as overall funding higher education funding, from 
overseas students increased consistently from 1987 and concurrently the share of public funding 
declined.  
The next phase in the institutional change process in Australia is the transformation of the higher 
education system, known as the Dawkins reforms, after the Labor Minister for Education. The 
Dawkins reforms changed the higher education landscape; it was an abrupt change process and 
resulted in the breakdown of the binary higher education system and its replacement with a unified 
system.  
Dawkins reforms include a series of policy changes under the then Labor Education Minister John 
Dawkins (1987–1992) that changed the role of state regulation, funding and competition as well as 
the institutional status of higher education. The proposed policies are outlined in the discussion 
paper ‘the green paper’ (Dawkins 1987), announced in the Higher education: a policy statement ‘the 
white paper’ in 1988 (Dawkins 1988) and the implemented in the same year. The three major 
changes were first, the introduction of a unified national system of tertiary education; second, the 
withdrawal of government funds; and third, policy decision-making structures were transferred to 
the state level and the individual vice-chancellor level (Dawkins 1988). 
The first structural change under the Dawkins reform was the abolition of the binary division of 
higher education in Australia, leading to one unified national higher education system (Marginson 
1993). The binary division describes the system of 19 universities and 46 colleges (such as teaching 
colleges) which was abolished and replaced with a unified system of 38 universities. Several new 
university institutions were created, and colleges were merged and elevated to university status 
(Department of Employment, Education and Training 1993, 29). The justification for the creation of a 
unified system was that it would improve efficiency and reduce costs but it would also mean that 
qualifications such as teaching and nursing degrees were professionalised, as they would require a 
university degree. Under the reforms, 40,000 new university places were created to accommodate 
increasing demand (Department of Employment, Education and Training and Dawkins 1988). The 
unified higher education system was a substantial reorientation of the institutional structure and 
paved the way for the further development of higher education as an export industry.  
Second, the Dawkins reforms fundamentally transformed higher education funding by introducing 
the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS) system and by encouraging contributions from 
the private business sector. Funding for higher education was regulated in the Funding Act from 
1988, which stated the objectives of the new tertiary system. The objectives of the Act are: “to 
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support a system that is appropriate to meet Australia’s social and economic needs for a more highly 
educated and skilled population; and to strengthen Australia’s knowledge base and enhance the 
contribution of Australia’s research capabilities to national economic development and international 
competitiveness and the attainment of social goals” (Commonwealth Consolidated Acts 1988). The 
explicit link to the national socio-economic goals demonstrates the role of tertiary education as an 
industry. 
The introduction of the student fee (HECS) meant that from 1988 students had to pay a set sum of 
around 20 percent of the average cost of educational degrees, payable to the government. HECS is a 
user-fee that pays the difference “between government subsidy per place and the price the 
government sets per place” (Nelson 2002, 7). All degrees were set at the same price. Postgraduate 
research students were exempt from paying fees and awarded a scholarship for the duration of their 
studies. All students are eligible for a HECS loan, structured as a loan rather than an upfront 
payment. Repayment of the loan commences through the taxation system once the student earns 
above the income threshold and only when the taxable income exceeds a certain threshold ($22,000 
in 1988). This threshold was not set but subject to annual revision. The argument for introducing this 
user-charge was that graduates receive substantial future financial benefits. At the same time, HECS 
was designed to ensure continuous expansion of the higher education system because the universal 
access to the student loans meant equality of access to higher education. Nevertheless, the 
introduction of tuition in form of a loan was the start of a quasi-market in higher education. 
In addition, public funding for university research changed under the Dawkins reforms from research 
base funding to competitive performance-based research and innovation grants. Before the Dawkins 
reforms research, funding was granted through a grant scheme to the 19 universities only. After the 
reforms, the research grants were allocated to all 38 universities within the unified national system 
but without overall budget increases. The Commonwealth research grants for universities replaced 
state block funding to universities from the early 1990s (Department of Employment, Education and 
Training, 1993). In addition, all tertiary institutions within the unified system, rather than across the 
19 universities before reform, were encouraged to apply for research funding and the government 
also encouraged industry linkage projects to enhance national scientific output (Larkins 2011, 35). 
This means that the Dawkins reforms established not only quasi-markets in education provision but 
also in research creating multiple spheres of inter-university competition (Bessant 1996, 114, 
Marginson 2004a, 3).  
Thirdly, the Dawkins reforms transformed the governance structures of higher education and 
reshaped the relationship between the state and the university institutions. The Dawkins policy 
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papers were written by a selected core group of seven advisers (also referred to as the purple cycle), 
which later formed the Australian Research Council (ARC). The seven advisors appointed by Dawkins 
were largely professors and vice-chancellors but advocates of marketisation policies (Forsyth 2014, 
114). This process of selection overrode a long tradition of higher education expert committees, 
such as the Murray and Martin reports. In addition, under the reform package the newly created 
Ministry of Education was emerging as a powerful actor, to lead crucial changes to the decision-
making processes in higher education. As a result, the state apparatus exercised a ‘top-down’ policy 
implementation approach. On one side, the Commonwealth held full responsibility over resource 
allocation while requesting detailed annual financial reports (Bessant 1996, 113-114, Gallagher 2000, 
7, Marginson and Considine 2000, 29). These accountability and transparency instruments reflect 
the steering power of the state.  In addition, Karmel (1989, 8) argues that the restructuring of 
funding meant that university research was closely aligned to respond to Australia’s economic and 
social needs. The allocation of research funding through quasi-markets and via the Australian 
Research Council was a mechanism to ensure that public funding was allocated in line with the 
Higher Education Funding Act, which means the linkage of funding to national priorities (Forsyth 
2014, 116). On the other side, the Dawkins reforms also meant that universities vice-chancellors 
gained control over research funding budgets (Bessant 1996, 113, Gallagher 2000, 7, Marginson and 
Considine 2000, 14-67).  Marginson and Considine (2000, 36) argue that university vice-chancellors 
have also used this period to push for further internal restructuring, away from a largely democratic 
decision-making structure towards a managerial governance structure. In sum, universities remained 
financially dependent on the federal government, yet they gained institutional autonomy over the 
use of funding.  
Another aspect of the Dawkins policy was that it strengthened the use of various metrics to assess 
university research and teaching performance. Under the new policies, universities were required to 
create their own educational profiles, outline their educational and research mission as well as their 
course structure. In addition, universities were to report on their teaching and research operations, 
implement corporate management structures, encouraged to reduce the size of their governing 
councils, and review their management structures (Larkins 2011, 28f). Marginson and Considine 
(2000) argue that the Dawkins reforms forced universities to change from independent, autonomous 
institutions of public service to corporate institutions with strong executive control, creating the 
foundation for a new kind of university, the “Enterprise University”. 
Since the Dawkins reforms, a primary objective of federal policies has been to transform university 
institutions into business-like and tightly managed organisations. Strong management is defined as 
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vital to ensure effective operations of resources proposed in the higher education policy 
announcement, the white paper (Dawkins 1988, 101f):  
Many institutions are extremely large and their budgets are equivalent to those of large business 
organisations. Their managers are required to exhibit high-level management skills and to show 
strong leadership in meeting the institution’s corporate goals. Institutions are accountable to 
governments, to their students, to employers and to the community they serve.  
This statement suggests that managerialism in higher education organisations became an important 
concept with the implementation of the Dawkins reforms. Managerialism involves the primacy of 
management, the abundance of bureaucratic procedures in measuring and monitoring performance, 
the attainment of financial and other targets, constant auditing for quality purposes, and the 
introduction of market forces especially quasi-markets for social services (Le Grand and Bartlett 
1993). In addition, efficiency, such as aiming to reduce the use of resources while maximising return 
and effectiveness, measured through the achievement of goals as in outputs is an important concept 
in service delivery (Farrell and Morris 2003). Managerialism also refers to labour market 
restructuring processes, such as workplace flexibility (Deem and Brehony 2005).  
The rise of managerialism in universities after the Dawkins reforms is further exemplified by the 
report prepared by David Hoare for Simon Crean, then Minister for Employment, Education and 
Training. The Hoare report (Higher Education Management Review Committee and Hoare 1995, 1) 
refers to ‘the changing nature of the academic enterprise’ focuses on implementing small 
governance bodies and recognises key areas that reflect the concept of managerialism:  
The evolving pressures on the higher education sector and the changing nature of the academic 
enterprise, the Committee identified five key areas of higher education management: 
accountability; governance; strategic management; workplace reform; and finance and asset 
management (1995, 1). 
The report concludes that shortfalls in higher education management exist and recommends that 
higher education institutions invest in management education. Higher Education Management 
Review Committee and Hoare (1995) state:  
to move to the forefront of contemporary management practice and to adapt principles of 
sound strategic management to the higher education environment, a systematic and strategic 
approach to management skills development is needed (1995, 8). 
Universities were required to reorganise their operations to accommodate the recommendations 
and the growth of executive positions, evident in the additional appointments of deputy vice-
chancellors and pro vice-chancellors. Between 1987 and 1998 the number of executive positions 
more than doubled (Marginson and Considine 2000, 63).  
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Overall, from the Dawkins reforms onwards the provision of higher education shifted from the public 
sphere towards the market. The period established marketisation policies and quasi-markets, 
thereby inaugurating the discourse and the path for further marketisation policies. The growth and 
change of the higher education system was coupled with increasing steering control of the state, 
established through accounting metrics and performance measuring tools. Marginson and Considine 
argue that the Dawkins reforms are synonymous with the policy changes Thatcher implemented in 
Britain: “the model of neo-liberal executive, forcing through a single-minded reform crusade with a 
mix of system planning, market rhetoric and the determination to crush all political opposition” 
(2000, 35).  
University institutions conformed to the new regulations, despite strong criticism within the 
academic community. Marginson and Considine (2000, 31) suggest that this was largely due to the 
prompt top-down approach. University institutions were given a carrot and stick policy as Dudley 
and Vidovich (1995) argue: the ‘carrot’ of more student enrolment and thus funding, and ‘the stick’ 
of suspension of funding per student for not sufficiently restructuring. 
The analysis of policy developments showed that the Australian government retained strong control 
and competition over public resource allocation while implementing quality control instruments that 
required universities to conform to the market approach. As shown in this section the 
Commonwealth has made substantial changes to policy and has steered the sector towards the 
implementation of quasi markets. Higher education became to be seen as utilitarian, “treating 
education as a revenue-raising exercise rather than a process of exchange” (Marginson and 
Considine 2000, 54). The mix of individualised metrics impelled universities towards conformity to 
the state sanctioned definitions of performance that were all couched in positive terms such as 
performance and accountability. 
4.5 Marketisation at its peak (1996–2007) 
From 1996, the Liberal government with John Howard as Prime Minister steered the higher 
education system further towards the market. The Howard years are characterised by tight 
economic and fiscal control exemplified by the privatisation of public assets, characteristics of a 
liberal welfare state type. The economic rationalist approach to university education and 
marketisation peaked when the public share of total higher education revenue reached the lowest 
level with 40 percent from 2001 to 2004.  
During this period student numbers increased drastically, partially because of government policies 
that encouraged universities to attract full fee paying international students. Universities were 
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required to be increasingly self-reliant in sourcing funds for their operations. This section is 
subdivided by topic to demonstrate how the continuation and strengthening of marketisation 
policies led to a substantial shift in the provision of higher education within the Australian welfare 
state.   
In only 12 years, between 1997 and 2009, the number of university students doubled, from 600,000 
to 1.2 million, due largely to an increase in international fee-paying students (Figure 4.1). During the 
1990s, the annual growth rate of international students was 15 percent on average compared with 
an annual average growth of 3 percent for domestic students (Considine et al. 2001, 16). This growth 
in student numbers was unprecedented and greater than during the 1970s when higher education 
was free (Figure 4.1).  
Figure 4.1: Australia: Number of university students per year, 1970–2010 
 
Source: Department of Industry, Innovation, Science, Research and Tertiary Education (2013), own graph. 
The growing student cohort put pressure on the capacity of the higher education system but also 
opened up possibilities in times of public funding stagnation. By 2002, on average 15 percent of 
university revenues were sourced from international student fees (Marginson 2005, 3). International 
education had become a commercial success alongside a rather weak domestic education market. 
This growth of the teaching system on the one side and Australia’s comparatively weak performance 
in research on the other side became the drivers of the so-called Nelson reforms (Marginson 2005, 
3). The review of the higher education system in 2002 under then Minister for Education, Science 
and Training, Brendan Nelson, led to the report Our Universities: Backing Australia’s Future which 
states that “the present framework for funding and policy [of higher education] has become 
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unwieldy, complex and inequitable” (Nelson 2003, 9). The report also stressed the strategic 
regulatory structure aiming to implement more market structures but avoiding full privatisation: 
“Higher education is not now, nor should it become an unfettered free market. Similarly, there will 
not be a return to fully funded, government regulation of the sector” (Nelson 2003, 4). This suggests 
that Nelson envisaged neither a public nor a private higher education system but a hybridised 
structure or a regulated free market (Pick 2006, 271). 
The Nelson reform package increased marketisation by strengthening markets and competition 
across research and teaching. It was about the individual rather than the collective good of higher 
education and it was about employment conditions. From 2005, universities were able to offer 
individual contracts to employees, rather than contracts under collective bargaining.  
A major policy objective was the stratification of higher education institutions, encouraging 
universities to “differentiate their missions through developing a strategic portfolio of research 
activities and training programmes” (Nelson 2003, 31). This strategy is almost a return to pre 
Dawkins reform. While the Dawkins reforms focused on a unified university system, the Nelson 
reform planned a return to a three-tier university system. Higher education institutions were divided 
into ‘research intensive’, ‘teaching intensive’ and ‘aspirant research universities’ feeding into the 
natural competitive nature of higher education institutions in which the old, elite and prestigious 
universities were seen as specialist universities (Marginson 2005).  
Minister Nelson steered universities towards managerialism because, despite some changes in 
university governance since the Dawkins reforms, the West report in 1998 stated that the regulatory 
framework for higher education does not facilitate good management in universities and has: 
“outdated governance arrangements, which emphasise representation rather than experience and 
skills in the management of large enterprises, hinder many institutions in pursuing their objectives” 
(West 1998, 20). Four years later the Nelson report also stated: “Universities need to recognise that 
they too are businesses and that they should be subject to similar accountability and productivity 
measures as other organisations” (Nelson 2002, 30). The push to the segmentation of universities 
coupled with managerialism and competition meant that university institutions were increasingly 
operating like businesses. 
The HECS fee system was changed as well. Rather than charging the same tuition fees students 
regardless of location and degree, fees were based on demand and actual costs of the degree 
(Nelson 2003). This means higher education fees became individualised, rather than collective, as 
the choice of degree and completion success depends on individual financial and non-financial 
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resources. In addition to the HECS loan, the FEE HELP student support scheme was introduced for all 
students who are not enrolled in a subsidised place, with repayments due when annual income was 
above A$35,000 (Marginson 2005, 4). Although this FEE HELP loan system ensured that a first degree 
in higher education did not require upfront payment for all domestic students, it meant students 
would accumulate further debt (Marginson 2004a, Marks 2009). The FEE HELP system made the 
student places market “not only viable but central” (Marginson 2005, 4). 
Universities were given some autonomy over the costs of degrees while students were able to 
choose. The subsidisation of tuition costs, including HECS and FEE HELP, also meant that universities 
were able to increase (or decrease) fees by a maximum of 25 percent of the standard fees. 
Universities also received concession to over-enrol up to 35 percent (up from 25 percent) of 
domestic full fee-paying students (Nelson 2003). This differentiated price-model for undergraduate 
education is effectively a voucher system, because it provides students with the ability to choose 
between prestigious high fee universities and second-tier lower fee universities (Marginson 2004, 
12). Lastly, the reforms strengthened the links between funding and teaching and learning quality, 
equity and workplace productivity to “encourage universities to differentiate their missions” (Nelson 
2003, 13).  
The key mechanism of the Nelson reform was the establishment of competition amongst university 
institutions through providing autonomy over tuition fees and degrees. While the intension was to 
create diversity across universities, the reforms strengthened the stratification amongst universities 
based on income rather than solely on prestige. Marginson (2004, 14) noted: 
The driving force of the Nelson reform is the economisation of social privilege in education. First, 
the Sandstones are restructured as a high-cost segment dependent on private investment. 
Second, the price mechanism is installed to mediate access and dedifferentiate both 
consumption and production.  
Together these reforms boosted the position of the most prestigious universities within the 38 
institutions, fostering the stratification across university institutions. The marketisation policies 
changed the composition of university income as the next section demonstrates. 
4.5.1 The impact of marketisation policies on higher education income  
This section examines the funding of higher education. The Australian Commonwealth has the 
primary responsibility for public funding of higher education, set out in the Higher Education Support 
Act (Australian Government 2003). The higher education reforms significantly shape the composition 
of funding. Australian higher education income data demonstrates the shift from a largely publically 
to a largely privately funded system. The transformation of higher education regulation meant that 
universities were forced to diversify their income sources (Nelson 2002, 7).  
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Figure 4.2 shows the proportion of higher education income by source between 1939 and 2010. It 
covers the gradual shift from an elite system in 1939 to a publically funded system in 1981 and to a 
largely privately funded system in 2004.  
 The data show that between 1951 and 1971 the states and the commonwealth largely publically 
funded higher education. From 1974, the commonwealth, stated in section 4.3, fully publically 
funded higher education. The slow introduction of tuition from 1983 marks the start of the decline in 
the share of public government funding. The share of public funding declined significantly from 73 
percent in 1990 to 39.6 percent in 2004 and to 44.6 percent in 2010. In absolute values public 
funding stagnated between 1995 and 2004 on the level of around A$4.3 billion (DEET 1993, DIISTRE 
2013). At the same time, the share of individual student loan contributions increased 5.9 percent to 
37 percent in 2004. The introduction of , the ‘user charge’ system, including fees from international 
students and HECS student loans, effectively replaced direct public funding of higher education.7  
Figure 4.2: Australia: Proportion of higher education income by source, 1939–2010  
 
Source: Department of Education and Training (2018). Finance Publication, various years. Own calculations and graph. 
                                                          
7 Despite HECS being a loan to students, the government accounting system labels it as a form of government spending, the 
‘Australian Government Financial Assistance’ (Nelson 2002, 7). This often disguises the low public spending on higher education. 
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The shift from a public to a largely privately funded system between 1996 and 2000 was fostered by 
six policies. First, higher education operating grants were cut by 5 percent over three years. Second, 
a three-tier HECS fee system was established based on value and costs for the delivery of each 
course or degree. Particular degrees had different costs, enabling universities to charge the highest 
tuition for law and medicine and lower tuition for humanities. Third, the income threshold for the 
repayment of HECS loans was slightly reduced and a 25 percent discount for upfront fee payment 
was introduced. Fourth, the government abandoned supplementing costs for salary increases for 
academics for three budget trienniums. The Industrial Relations Commissions Safety Net 
Adjustments essentially replaced the governmental guarantee to meet negotiated wage increases 
with additional government funding (Nelson 2002, 8). This introduced a significant fiscal constraint 
to universities because universities had to use productivity increases or find other funding to pay for 
negotiated salary increases (Coaldrake and Stedman 1998, 159-163). Universities had to restructure 
operations to meet the costs of labour by discontinuing courses, by increasing postgraduate fees and 
by dismissing staff as well as by approaching industry for funding (Marginson 1997). Fifth, caps on 
postgraduate student places were removed or extended and university institutions could charge 
higher fees for these degrees. The withdrawal of government support for postgraduate students 
enabled major federal budget savings (Nelson 2002, 7). Sixth, the government allowed universities 
to ‘over-enrol’ undergraduate courses, which meant an increase in domestic fee-paying students. In 
addition, universities were able to charge full tuition fees for up to a maximum of 25 percent of 
enrolments per course, the majority of which were international students (Marginson and Considine 
2000, 58).  
The six policy changes within a four-year period, between 1996 and 2000, led to the drastic 
diversification of higher education income largely fostered through policies that increased 
competition over funding. The withdrawal of government base funding to higher education created 
a great level of uncertainty about the future sources of income for universities. They left universities 
exposed to the unpredictable risk-effects created by policy, such as the international student market 
and its fluctuations (Marginson and Considine 2000). The uncertainty of future funding mirrored the 
market environment and the character of businesses and making higher education institutions 
'entrepreneurial universities'. 
4.5.2 Marketisation in research funding governance  
This section examines how marketization affects the transformation of research funding governance. 
Marketisation in research governance is evident in the development of a multilayered competitive 
research policy framework and in the transition to a centralised and competition-based model for 
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research funding. To highlight the significant changes to research governance from 1995, this section 
starts by briefly outlining the basis of research governance established in the late 1980s.  
Since 1988, the Australian government has had a dual structure for research funding and research 
training: first, competitive grant programs which means funding is administered to researchers or 
research teams based on merit and though a peer review process, and second, performance-based 
block grants, which are allocated to university institutions (Department of Industry and Innovation 
2016). 
In line with the overall Dawkins framework, research funding was reorganised into a competitive 
research grant structure including performance monitoring and evaluation mechanisms (Neuman 
and Guthrie 2002, 726, Woelert and Millar, 2013). The Dawkins reform introduced the separation of 
the research and teaching funding nexus and encouraged targeted research funding (Australian 
Science and Technology Council 1987). This meant that major decision-making power over research 
funding was assigned to the newly formed Australian Research Council (ARC) responsible for the 
allocation of funding through specific fellowships, grants and scholarship schemas for individual 
academics, rather than universities (Larkins 2011, 36). The oversight of the ARC decisions officially 
remained with the Commonwealth, requesting the production of regular research management 
plans to account for the use of research funding (Department of Employment, Education and 
Training 1993, 270f). The new ARC structure meant that research funding was allocated for a specific 
time (generally three years) and distributed on a competitive basis, according to performance and 
overall alignment with broad economic research objectives. Under the ARC grant scheme policy, 
research funding was linked to defined research outcomes and defined timelines of three years. In 
addition to its role as administer of the research grants, the ARC is an advisory body to the 
government on matters concerning research (Australian Research Council 2018).  
The National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) was established in 1992 and funds 
medical and public health research with the aim to “foster medical research and training and public 
health research and training throughout Australia” (Commonwealth Consolidated Acts, 1992).   
The establishment of national research councils transformed the principles of research block grants 
to university institutions, administered by the Department of Education, Employment and Training 
into competitive short-term project funding for individual academics, administered by specific 
councils (Neuman and Guthrie 2002, 727).  
Institutional research block funding continued, yet a competitive allocation formula was introduced. 
The research block grant was replaced with the competitive operating grant scheme, the research 
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quantum. Funding allocation for universities was based on a one year cycle and standardised in that 
it applied to all fields, whether sciences or arts and based on research and research training activities 
(Australian Vice-Chancellors Committee & others, 1991). Implemented in 1995 under Labor Prime 
Minister Paul Keating, the new research grant scheme assigned research funding to universities by 
measuring their individual institutional ‘research activity’ (Crean & Department of Employment, 
Education, and Training 1994, 7). This meant the allocation depended on the quantum index, 
calculated from the research input and output, including the total university research income from 
public and private grants (82.5 percent), number of research publications (12.5 percent) and higher 
degree by research completions (5 percent) (Crean 1996, 62). This formula was heavily weighted 
towards research grants, further encouraging universities and academics to seek research funding. 
This formula signalled that the number of project funding grants, rather than the quality of research 
determines performance. The use of quantitative measurements further established market 
principles, including competition as well as “research evaluation mechanisms and increasing use of 
exogenous forms of authority over strategic decisions concerning the setting of research objectives” 
(Woelert and Millar 2013, 12). The funding schema also became a simple scale by which to measure 
successful and unsuccessful university research (Marginson and Considine 2000, 140), while creating 
competitive advantage for research active universities over teaching active universities.  
The Howard Government advanced this operating research funding schema further by introducing 
quantifiable and market-oriented tools especially for assessment, conduct and administration of 
research. A White Paper from 1999, Knowledge and innovation: A policy statement on research and 
research training outlined major reforms on the significance of university research for innovation 
and economic growth (Department of Education, Training and Youth Affairs and Kemp 1999). 
Reforms included increasing funding for performance based research funding and the introduction 
of research training management reports. University researchers were also encouraged to build 
partnerships with national and international industries “to contribute this knowledge to the 
internationally competitive industries that will ensure sustainable economic growth and provide 
secure jobs and rising living standards for all Australians” (Department of Education, Training and 
Youth Affairs and Kemp 1999, 4).  
Eventually, in 2002 under Minister Nelson, the research quantum formula was changed and 
renamed into the Institutional Grants Scheme (IGS), allocated and re-calculated annually. The 
changes to the formula for the allocation of research grants did not mean a deviation from the 
competitive market mechanisms but included a greater focus on the important role of higher degree 
research students (HDR). Consequently, the share of financial research input and publication output 
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declined. The new IGS funding was based on the formula of: 30 percent for completed HDR degrees 
(international and national), 60 percent for income from competitive grants, and the remaining 10 
percent for publication output (Larkins 2011, 70). It is important to note that the specific grant 
structure meant that universities had to apply by submitting a detailed application to the 
Commonwealth department, in fact acting as an instrument of external control. The funding 
mechanisms and outcomes are also highly transparent as most information is publically recoded. As 
such academics "knew how much a peer reviewed article contributed to university income and that 
a book contributed about five times as much" (Gläser and Laudel 2007, 128). 
While the IGS remained the biggest grant, other grants are also available from the Commonwealth 
Grant scheme, such as the Research Infrastructure Block Grants (RIBG), the Research Training 
Scheme (RTS), the Australian Postgraduate Awards (APSs) and the International Postgraduate 
Research Scholarships (IPRS) (Department of Innovation, Industry, Science and Research 2011).  
A sophisticated method of public research funding allocation for both individual academics and 
universities was established from the mid-1990s with the aim to increase research performance by 
rewarding performance. The allocation of public funding was based on business like external 
performance measurements. Mechanisms such as, competition over resources, rewards for 
quantitative performance, the ability to attract of funding from diverse sources and efficiency in 
progressing higher degree completions influence the research decisions of academics. Gläser and 
Laudel conclude from their research into the Australian research funding structure that academics 
adapted their research strategies towards less risky types of research and as a result the research is 
becoming “less diverse, less fundamental and less reliable” (2007, 147). Nevertheless, the schema 
contributed to the improvements of the overall Australian research output and as Marginson argues 
it strengthened the position of elite universities in the global market of higher education (2004a). 
The allocation of public research funding through competitive processes and the time characteristics 
of the funds (short-term or long term) are likely to be mechanisms that produce the changes in 
academic employment conditions. The following section shows the development of university 
research income. 
4.5.3 Higher education research income and research expenditure  
From the mid 1990s, the allocation of research funding has shifted from block funding to tailored 
competitive grant funding. At the same time, the amount of funding towards research increased and 
universities gained substantive autonomy over the allocation of certain funds.  This can be 
demonstrated through data showing the increasing research income for higher education research 
and the emerging gap between research expenditure and research income.  
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Universities Australia data8 in table 4.3 shows the steady increase in funds for higher education 
research. Between 1996 and 2007 the total national competitive research funding for universities 
increased to A$1 billion in 2000 and total income increased by over 250 percent to A$2.5 billion in 
2007 (Figure 4.3).  
Figure 4.3: Australia: University research income (A$) for all universities  
 
Source: Universities Australia (2015), own graph. 
University research funding composition has changed between 1992 and 2012 as figure 4.4 
demonstrates. It shows that the share of total national public research funding declined from over 
70 percent in 1992 to under 60 percent in 2002 while other public research funding increased from 
2002. From 2000, the share of industry research funding to overall research expenditure declined 
from 9.8 percent to 6.8 percent in 2012. The most significant trend is the increasing gap between 
total university research expenditure and the aggregated research funding from official public and 
private sources. This gap is about 20 percent since 2000. This imbalance emerged in the 1990s but 
increased to over 20 percent form 2000. In the year 2000, the share of public funding towards total 
university income (Figure 4.2) was with 41.9 percent low while student contributions had increased 
to 36.2 percent. 
                                                          
8 Universities Australia, a peak body representing all universities in Australia, maintains the Higher Education Research Data 
Collection provided to the Department of Education and Training by individual universities used as a bases for the research grant 
funding. 
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Figure 4.4: Australia: Total income (A$) from various sources as a percentage of total research 
expenditure for all universities 
 
 
Source: Universities Australia (2015b). 
Notes: Australian Competitive Grants: all grants listed on the 2009 Australian Competitive Grants register; Other Public 
Sector Research Income: any other research income received from the Australian government that is not eligible for the 
inclusion in Category one; CRC - Cooperative Research Centres - Research Income: universities must report the research 
income received for the financial year from a CRC in which they were a ‘core participant’ (Department of Education and 
training 2018).  
This development suggests that student contributions were redirected to research expenditure. 
Larkins confirms and argues that particularly fees from international students contribute 
substantially to university research income (2011, 96). This suggests that, in line with marketisation, 
university management has substantial autonomy over the allocation of funds from international 
students.   
 4.5.4 The decline for direct public provision of higher education services 
While Dawkins planted the seed for marketisation of higher education, the Howard government 
provided the essential water for marketisation to grow. Thus, the period between 1996 and 2007 
can be described as the ‘dark episode’ in the public provision of higher education. 
The analysis of policy changes between 1996 and 2007 in light of the three dimensions established in 
Chapter 3 shows that first, the federal government implemented fundamental policies that fostered 
markets in higher education, thereby retaining control over resource allocation through 
implementation of monitoring and evaluating systems. Second, while the state government 
remained the largest single provider of funding, public funding declined to under 50 percent of total 
Total national competitive grants income as percentage of total research income 
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university income. This significant step towards marketisation was due to the deregulation of 
student fees and the strengthening of the competitive process in the allocation of research funding. 
Third, institutional autonomy meant that universities could reallocate income from student fees.  
The decline of direct public funding and the reinforcement of competitive, targeted funding are 
structural changes that are indicative of a further retrenchment of the liberal welfare state. These 
structural changes correlate with the gradual change process as outlined in Chapter 2 and the 
changes are likely to affect the employment conditions of academic employees, and may contribute 
to the segmentation of academic labour markets. 
4.6 Persistent marketisation but reviving the public provision (2007–2012)  
From 2007 the Labor government with Prime Minister Kevin Rudd until 2010 and Prime Minister 
Julia Gillard until 2013 somewhat revived the public provision of higher education. The global 
financial crisis hit in 2007/2008 and provided a strong justification for the increase in public 
investments. The Labor party outlined the link between a decline in Australian productivity and the 
decline in public funding for higher education under the marketisation policies (Rudd and Smith 
2007). The election program included the call for an “Educational Revolution”, including substantially 
increasing public funding to higher education sector. The argument was based on the neoliberal 
human capital theory. Gary Becker (1964) and the Chicago School of Economics argue that 
investment in human capital through education and training will lead to an increase in economic 
output. In fact, Rudd and Smith (2007, 3) used neoliberal arguments to justify greater investment in 
higher education:  
Human capital investment is at the heart of a third wave of economic reform that will position 
Australia as a competitive, innovative, knowledge-based economy that can compete and win in 
global markets.  
Consequently, reforms for higher education was based on the theory that classifies people according 
to their economically relevant qualities, rather than on the bases of social values, such as equality.  
Under the Labor two different ministers, overseeing two departments, governed government higher 
education: the Department for Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (DEEWR) and the 
Department for Innovation, Industry, Science and Research (DIISR). Consequently, both departments 
conducted reviews into the higher education system: the Cutler review by DIISR and the Bradley 
review by DEEWR, both released in 2008.  
Following the Bradley and Cutler reviews, the government announced a “phased 10-year reform 
agenda for higher education and research to boost Australia’s national productivity and performance 
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as a knowledge based economy” (Commonwealth of Australia 2009,9). The reforms covered four 
areas: participation growth, funding increase, quality control and institutional autonomy.  
First, the government introduced the ‘demand driven system’ (DDS) under which the 
Commonwealth funded every student who wished to study in any course or degree (Department of 
Employment and Julia Gillard 2009), abolishing the principle that the Commonwealth funds a certain 
number of student places in each subject/university (Norton 2013, 4). The new student-centred 
funding system meant greater access to degrees for students but university institutions only 
received funding if places were actually filled. With the abolition of caps on student places (except 
for medicine), universities were given autonomy over student enrolment numbers because the 
government was following a student-centred or demand-driven approach to funding (Larkins 2011, 
108, Norton 2013, 4).  
Second, the reforms proposed substantial increases to public university funding, especially for 
infrastructure and quality of teaching and learning but also for research and innovation (Lomax-
Smith 2011). Income support for students increased and universities received financial incentives to 
expand the enrolment of people from low socio-economic background (Department of Employment 
2009). This concession reflected some commitment to equal opportunity but student HECS fees 
levels did not change (Lomax-Smith 2011). However, data in figure 4.2 shows that public funding 
towards higher education increased, to a share of 44.6 percent in 2010. 
Third, the government introduced a quality control instrument for research and teaching, the 
independent Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency (TEQSA). The remit of the agency was 
to oversee and support higher education quality. University institutions that agreed to quality 
targets under TEQSA received extra funding.  
Lastly, the reform program encouraged partnerships and relationships between universities and the 
government (Commonwealth of Australia 2009).  
Research funding and researchgovernance also changed. The Excellence in Research (ERA) scheme 
was introduced into the competitive research-funding portfolio (Larkins 2011, 116). The objectives 
of the ERA (Australian Research Council 2015) were: 
 to establish an evaluation framework that gives government, industry, business and the 
wider community assurance of the excellence of research conducted in Australian higher 
education institutions, 
 to provide a national stock take of discipline level areas of research strength and areas 
where there is opportunity for development in Australian higher education institutions, 
 to identify excellence across the full spectrum of research performance, 
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 to identify emerging research areas and opportunities for further development, and 
 to allow for comparisons of research in Australia, nationally and internationally, for all 
discipline areas. 
 
Under the ERA scheme, the ARC developed a metrics based rating scale that measures research 
activity and volume, quality, recognition and research applications within eight disciplinary fields.9 In 
order to position Australia in the competitive international market the Labor government 
significantly increased research funding from 2007, evident in Figure 4.5.  
While public funding towards higher education provision was somewhat restored during this period, 
marketisation policies in higher education expanded. The controlling and steering role of the state in 
regulating higher education was strengthened through the implementation of a quality control 
agency, TESQA. TESQA is thus an extension of state control in a regulatory sense as funding is 
awarded by a panel of scholars rather than determined by consumer outcomes. The state gains 
control over research priorities through setting the rules of accountabilities that shape managerial 
discretion and undermine academic discretion. This means the agency is in fact the link between the 
state and the market and the state uses the market mechanism of competition to exercise control. 
In addition, competitive public funding to research and teaching systems were strengthened, 
through the ERA and the introduction of a student-centred funding system. In addition, institutional 
autonomy was strengthened through the student-centred funding system and the abolishment of 
caps on student places.  
The increase of public funding towards higher education was based on economic rational and 
consequently the funding allocation was regulated by the principles of marketisation, including 
competition and individual choice.  
4.7 Conclusion: the marketisation of higher education in Australia and the 
changing mix of public and private provision 
The chronological presentation of major policy changes in Australia demonstrates that marketisation 
policies and mechanisms have been established and strengthened to govern higher education 
research and teaching. 
In Australia, higher education regulation and governance is shared amongst the Commonwealth 
Government and the state and territory governments as well as the institutions themselves. The 
                                                          
9 a) Physical, Chemical and Earth Science; b) Humanities and Creative Arts; c) Engineering and Environmental science; d) Social, 
Behavioural and Economic Science; e) Mathematics, Information and Communication Science; f) Biological Science and 
Biotechnology; g) Public and Allied Health and Health Services  
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evidence shows that consecutive governments between 1980 and 2012 implemented marketisation 
policies to the provision of higher education services, demonstrating the facilitating and steering role 
of the state. Starting with the introduction of student fees for higher education degrees 
marketisation policies were established in the allocation process of research funding from the mid-
1990s. The increase in private funding for higher education is a key characteristic of marketisation in 
the liberal welfare state. Gradually, the substantial autonomy of universities increased, particularly 
with regards to control over the income from international students and student places. Over the 
investigated period, marketisation policies were strengthened in both, the provision of research and 
teaching. While the welfare state remains the single largest contributor to higher education funding, 
marketisation policies led to a substantial increase in private funding and decline in the public 
provision of higher education. 
The evidence of marketisation in higher education in the liberal welfare state of Australia confirms 
the theoretical premises of the welfare state theory and the concept of path-dependent change 
outlined in Chapter 2 (Hall and Soskice 2001). The process of change in the Australian higher 
education system under marketisation has been both abrupt and continuous (Streeck and Thelen 
2005a). On the one side, the Dawkins reforms in the 1988 were abrupt and led to a discontinuation 
of the old system and to a new unified higher education system. On the other side, from the 1990s 
change has been continuous leading towards a gradual transformation from a public to a market-
oriented higher education system. Yet, the principle of 'the right to access' remains strong because 
every domestic student can access the HECS tuition loan. 
The expansion of marketisation policies in higher education teaching and in research regulation 
produces challenges for academic labour markets. While the Australian higher education sector has 
experienced significant growth in student numbers, policy changes have led to substantial structural 
alterations, particularly the requirements emerging from the linkage between performances, 
evaluation and funding allocation. To assess the structural effects of these policy changes, the next 
chapter chronically investigates the transformation of academic labour markets in Australia. 
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5 Australia’s academic labour market under marketisation 
5.1 Introduction 
Higher education provision in Australia has been substantially transformed between 1980 and 2012. 
The previous chapter established that this transformation was driven by marketisation policies that 
generated a decline in public funding for teaching and research, an increase in competitive short-
term research grant funding, a student demand driven funding system for teaching and increased 
substantial autonomy for higher education institutions. These regulatory policies and mechanisms 
shaped academic labour market structures as a whole. 
 
This chapter analyses the trends in employment on the academic labour markets in Australia using 
the analytical framework established in chapter 3. The framework categorises academic labour 
markets into a permanent primary and a non-permanent secondary labour market. Labour market 
segmentation theory was used to establish that regulatory policy developments impact on 
employment conditions. Indeed, the evidence shows a transformation of the traditionally well-
protected academic labour market in the Australian liberal welfare state. It argues that the 
increasing segmentation of academic labour markets correlates with the marketisation of higher 
education regulation. It will show how specific mechanisms under marketisation produce changes to 
the number of employees in the secondary labour market in the Australian liberal market regime. 
The evidence confirms the theoretical premises of the comparative political economy literature, 
which associates declining employment security with a drive towards market liberalization, including 
labour market liberalization, in liberal welfare states. 
 
The focus of this chapter is on an analysis of change, correlations and links between academic labour 
markets and higher education regulation. After a brief overview of the Australian academic labour 
market and its governance, section 5.3 and 5.4 analyse the trends and developments in academic 
employment and employment functions between 1980 and 2012. Section 5.5. and 5.6 shows 
substantial employment growth on the academic labour markets, but foremost on the secondary 
labour market. The analysis reveals that the secondary labour market has grown to almost the same 
size as the primary academic labour market. In addition, it shows that the secondary academic 
labour market is divided along the teaching and research nexus. This chapter demonstrates that the 
academic labour markets in Australia are contributing to common employment regime of a liberal 
welfare state. This tendency can be causally attributed to the mechanisms of higher education 
regulation under marketisation.  
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5.2 The Australian academic labour market  
In its organisational form the traditional academic labour market system in Australia is a 
departmental lecturer system, a career advancement system based on merit promotions.  
 
In addition to national industrial higher education awards, comprehensive enterprise agreements 
cover employment conditions for academic and non-academic employees and contain detailed 
provisions for ongoing and non-ongoing university staff. Industrial awards are legislations that grants 
all wage earners in an industry and/or occupation the same minimum wage rates and employment 
conditions (Fair Work Ombudsman 2010). From the 1990s, Australia’s unique labour regulation 
system of industrial conciliation, awards regulation and dispute resolutions through federal and 
state industrial tribunals came under pressure from deregulation (Cooper and Ellem 2007, Forsyth 
and Sutherland 2006). As part of this drive for choice and deregulation, the liberal government 
introduced the Workplace Relations Act in 1996 and consequential reforms in 2005, which 
undermined the traditional collective bargaining system, removed labour protection safeguards and 
emphasise individual agreements (Forsyth and Sutherland 2006). In 2003, the changes to the 
industrial system particularly focused on higher education with the introduction of the Higher 
Education Workplace Relations Requirements (HEWRR) (Howe 2006). The requirements are 
described as an example of governmental interference because university funding would be “made 
contingent on universities demonstrating a commitments to workplace reform, through the 
implementation of flexible working arrangements and focus on direct relationships with employees 
and improved productivity and performance” (Nelson in Howe 2006). This means that increases in 
government funding were made conditional on universities making ‘genuine’ Australian Workplace 
Agreements (AWA) offers to their staff and collective agreements were closely monitored (Forsyth 
and Sutherland 2006).  Howe (2006, 176) argues that the HEWRR’s effectively coerced universities 
into offering individual employment agreements to their staff, thereby undermining collective 
representation. 
 
Minimal standards for higher education employment in Australia are regulated by the Fair Work Act 
2009, which contains a set of national minimum standards, such as leave entitlements (Fair Work 
Ombudsman 2010). The act enables the Fair Work Commission to arbitrate modern awards with 
industry wide conditions and enables enterprise agreements specific to the employer, rather than 
individual employer agreements. Australian university staff is covered by the Higher Education 
awards, which set the minimum standard in combination with the National Employment Standards 
(NES) (National Tertiary Education Union 2016). However, universities have individual enterprise 
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agreements in place with above minimum standards employment conditions. These agreements are 
negotiated between employer and employees, in which the union acts as the bargaining agent, the 
National Tertiary Education Union (NTEU), which means that there are various similarities in the 
contents of the agreements (Andrews et al. 2016). The NTEU was formed in 1993 from the 
amalgamation of five organisations (O’Brien 1999) and at the time when the university sector itself 
underwent profound changes through the Dawkins reforms (Chapter 4). O’Brien (1999, 25) argues 
that “the creation of a unified sector, the expansion of student numbers, the growing marketization 
and the growth of managerial models of governance (Marginson 1993) contributed to the growth of 
a common and shared employee status across university and general staff”. The NTEU is thus a 
product of changes in state policy (O’Brien 2003). The union is established and has been successful in 
enterprise bargaining, in shaping wage and employment conditions of foremost permanent staff at 
Australian higher education institutions. However, since the introduction of the Workplace Relations 
Act, which is consistent with the characteristics of the liberal welfare state type, the NTEU and 
unions in general have been undermined, allowing for greater labour market deregulation and 
flexibility.   
 
The employment types in higher education for academic and non-academic staff are: permanent 
and non-permanent, including fixed term contract on a full-time or part-time basis or casual/hourly 
contract. In comparison to non-permanent employees, academic and non-academic employees in 
continuous employment have substantial safeguards in their enterprise agreements (Andrews et al. 
2016, 3). The agreements cover not only working conditions and probation period requirements but 
also disciplinary action and termination for unsatisfactory performance as well as misconduct and 
redundancy (Andrews et al. 2016, Fair Work Ombudsman 2010). Academic employees in Australia 
are not protected from dismissal, which means that, for instance departmental closure can lead to 
job loss. 
 
Non-permanent employment is defined in the Higher Education Industry award as: “employment for 
a specified term or ascertainable period, for which the instrument of engagement will specify the 
starting and finishing dates of that employment (or instead of a finishing date, will specify the 
circumstance(s) or contingency relating to a specific task or project, upon the occurrence of which 
the term of the employment will expire)” (Fair Work Ombudsman 2010). The provisions for fixed 
term and casual staff generally cover the usage and time frame for contracts and the usage of fixed 
term contracts is limited to a) a specific task or project (also work funded by external source), b) 
research, c) replacement of an employee, d) recent professional practice required, d) pre-retirement 
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contract (maximum 5 years) or e) subsidiary to studentship (Fair Work Ombudsman 2010 [12]). 
Many enterprise agreements have added employment protection safeguards for employees on fixed 
term contracts, including the right to contest the fairness of a dismissal, and people employed on 
such contracts are usually entitled to parental leave, paid sick leave and annual leave entitlements 
(Andrews et al. 2016, 2). Some enterprise agreements contain conversion clauses to enable 
conversion of a fixed term staff member to continuing employment status (Andrews et al. 2016, 2).  
 
The awards also define casual employment as “employment by the hour and paid a rate on an 
hourly basis that includes a loading related to award-based benefits for which a casual employee is 
not eligible. A casual employee will be paid per hour 1/38th of the weekly base rate derived from the 
relevant classification plus a loading of 25%” (Fair Work Ombudsman 2010 [13]). In general, casual 
employment does not attract employment benefits and is without safeguards in both the Higher 
Education Award as well as in enterprise agreements.  
The different definitions and the legal frameworks confirm that the employment conditions of the 
permanent workforce in the primary labour market are well protected, despite the fact that 
industrial instruments allow for dismissal of permanent academic employees. In contrast, 
employment conditions and protections for employees in the secondary labour market are very 
loose. Academic positions in Australia are not linked to lifelong secure employment prevalent in the 
chair-system, neither to regular promotions, as in the US American tenure system. Academic career 
progression is subject to professional promotions on merit (Andrews et al. 2016).  
The Australian academic labour market is organised in the lecturer system. The Anglo-Saxon lecturer 
system advances the departmental employment system at the lowest level of organisation, rather 
than to the professoriate only as in the ‘chair system’ of continental European universities (Clark 
1997, 109). Academic work is organised by the department as a whole, rotating heads of department 
are common and authority is distributed relatively evenly amongst academics, compared to the 
single authority in the chair system. In the departmental-college system prevalent in liberal welfare 
states the professoriate and the academic assistant workforce is historically employed in permanent 
employment relationships, yet in different salary ranges and with different responsibilities 
(American Association of University Professors 1940, Enders 2000, Neave and Rhoades 1987). The 
assistant workforce includes, assistant professor, associate professor or adjunct (US) lecturer, senior 
lecturer (Australia and UK), and reader (UK). The traditionally high employment security in the 
Anglo-Saxon departmental-college lecturer system contradicts with the premises of the welfare 
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state theory and the varieties of capitalism literature, which associates relatively low labour market 
employment security with liberal welfare states. 
5.3 Higher education labour market developments 1996-2012 
The higher education labour market includes non-academic and academic employees. Academic 
employment is defined as 'engaging in teaching, including supervision and research' while non-
academic is defined as 'working in student support, corporate services or governance roles' (Fair 
Work Ombudsman 2010). Detailed higher education staff data is available only from 1996 from the 
Department of Education and Training (DET). This timeframe correlates with the period of peak 
marketisation established in Chapter 4 enabling the use of this data set to investigate the causality 
between marketisation and rising non-permanent employment.    
 
Table 5.1 shows the employment growth in academic and non-academic roles between 1996 and 
2013. Employment in the sector has grown from 72,700 employees in 1996 to 100,868 full-time 
equivalent (FTE) employees in 2013 (Table 5.1).10 The sector employed an additional 10,185 FTE in 
casual positions in 1996 and 22,958 FTE in 2013.11 In 1990, academic FTE staff was 26,530 and Casual 
FTE was 3,259, this means that casual FTE have grown eight times within 23 years.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10 Staff with full-time and fractural full-time contracts are employed for continuous time periods, either permanent or on limited 
term contracts; they are eligible for paid sick leave and annual leave. 
11 Categories of staff: All tables and graphs are based on full-time equivalent counts of staff. Universities report on staff members 
from individual unit records. Staff members that work around a 40 hour ‘normal’ working week constitute 1.0 FTE staff. Staff 
members that work part-time hours are defined as ‘fractural full-time’ but these are usually represented/counted as 1.0 full-time 
equivalent unit. The data provides headcounts and FTE of university staff in full-time and fractural full-time employment. The FTE 
of casuals is unlike the other two categories reported by universities in estimated and actual numbers of hours worked and not on 
individual unit records. More information on reporting requirements: 
http://heimshelp.education.gov.au/sites/heimshelp/#Elements 
 91 
Table 5.1: Australia: Full-time equivalent employment (FTE) in academia by academic, non-
academic and casual, 1994–2013  
Year Academic FTE 
Non-Academic 
– FTE 
All- FTE 
Casual (non- 
academic and 
academic) FTE 
1996 31,256 41,447 72,703 10,185 
1997 30,717 39,964 70,681 10,723 
1998 30,148 39,426 69,574 10,711 
1999 29,748 39,504 69,252 11,580 
2000 29,893 39,649 69,542 12,760 
2001 30,299 40,324 70,623 13,162 
2002 30,997 41,943 72,940 13,401 
2003 31,904 43,651 75,555 13,815 
2004 33,043 45,146 78,189 13,716 
2005 34,277 46,188 80,465 14,231 
2006 35,151 46,630 81,781 14,298 
2007 36,592 47,202 83,794 14,661 
2008 37,522 49,102 86,624 14,851 
2009 38,965 51,334 90,299 15,544 
2010 40,100 52,850 92,950 17,401 
2011 41,090 54,783 95,873 18,398 
2012 42,643 56,745 99,388 19,558 
2013 43,182 57,686 100,868 22,958 
Source: Department of Industry, Innovation, Science, Research and Tertiary Education (2013), Selected Higher Education 
Staff Statistics 1997-2007, Appendix 1.5, various years. 
 
Figure 5.1 displays the growth in student numbers together with the growth of employment in 
higher education between 1996 and 2013. The figure shows that employment growth aligned with 
student growth in three phases, from 1996 to 2000, to 2008 and to 2013. During the first phase, 
academic and non-academic staff declined slightly while casual employment increased slightly. At 
the same time, the number of students only grew slightly. This indicates that student staff ratio 
roughly remained the same despite the increase of student fees. The second phase shows steady but 
slow academic and non-academic employment growth from 80,000 to 100,000 employees. During 
the same time, student numbers grew significantly from 700,000 to 1 million, particularly due to 
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growth in international students (Figure 5.1). This indicates a growing student-staff ratio. The third 
phase displays a substantial increase in academic and non-academic employment in higher 
education within five years from 2008 to 2013. This growth in employment during the period of 
persistent marketisation and reviving of public funding indicates that the increasing investments to 
higher education translated to increased employment. During this phase student numbers increased 
significantly from 1 million to 1.3 million, indicating a further rise in the student-staff ratio. This 
indicates that marketisation has led to an increase in student numbers per class, which has most 
likely improved the income in contrast to expenses for staff in higher education institutions. 
Figure 5.1: Australia: Academic and non-academic staff (FTE) and student numbers, 1996–2013 
 
Source: Department of Industry, Innovation, Science, Research and Tertiary Education (2012, 2014), own calculations and 
graph.  
Table 5.2 shows the changing composition of the higher education labor market. The share of 
academic and non-academic personnel as well as casuals demonstrates that the share of non-
academic was higher than the share of academic employment. In addition, the share of each group 
declined between 1996 and 2013 by 4 and 3 percentage points respectively, while the share of 
casual full-time equivalent employment rose significantly by 7 percentage points. Casual FTE 
employment has significantly increased from 12 percent in 1996 to 19 percent in 2013. This 
development reflects the increasing segmentation of academic labour markets.  
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Table 5.2: Australia: Share of employment category (FTE) in universities, 1996 and 2013 
Year 
Share of 
academic 
employment 
Share of non-
academic 
employment 
Share of casual 
employment 
Total 
employment 
1996 38% 50% 12% 82,888 
2013 35% 46% 19% 123,826 
Source: Department of Industry, Innovation, Science, Research and Tertiary Education (2012, 2014), own calculations. 
Note: Casual staff is employed on an hourly basis and have no entitlement to annual leave or sick leave. 
 
Excluding casual employees from the all employees in higher education reveals that about 40 
percent of staff are employed on non-permanent contracts. While in 2000 nearly 70 percent of the 
academic and non-academic workforce was in permanent employment, in 2013 it had declined to 62 
percent. Between 1998 and 2005 the Higher Education Contract and Employment Award (HECE) 
restricted the employment of fixed term employees in academic and non-academic staff, excluding 
English language teaching staff (Andrews et al. 2016, 12). Following its implementation through 
importation into enterprise agreements the share of limited term employees visibly declined by 10 
percentage point to 30 percent (Figure 5.2). 
Figure 5.2: Australia: Proportion of permanent and non-permanent employment (academic and 
non-academic excluding casuals), 1996–2013 
 
Source: Department of Industry, Innovation, Science, Research and Tertiary Education (2012, 2014), own calculations and 
graph. 
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The HECE Award restricted the employment of fixed term staff to: 
 specific tasks or projects with anticipated timeframe,  
 externally funded positions (but not student fees or operating grants from government),  
 research only functions,  
 replacement of employees,  
 employment where curriculum requires vocational professional practice,  
 pre-retirement contract,  
 student doing work related to study, and  
 apprentice or trainee (National Tertiary Employment Union 2012, 9). 
 
The restriction of fixed term staff to certain academic duties and responsibilities was both a 
commitment to permanent academic employment and measure to prevent the establishment of 
fixed-term employment in academia. The restrictions were withdrawn in 2005 and the share of 
fixed-term employment increased again. 
 
The growth of limited term FTE in academic and non-academic roles is displayed in Figure 5.3.  From 
2005, the number of employees on fixed term contract increased from 21,000 to 37,700 FTE 
employees in 2012. This development is largely explained by the removal of the restrictions to fixed 
term contracts and the overriding the HECE Award by the Commonwealth Higher Education 
Workplace Relations Requirements (HEWRRs), under the Howard government and thus restrictions 
were also removed from enterprise agreements (O’Brien 2015). In practice, the new requirements 
meant that any restrictions on the use of fixed term employment by universities were illegal. 
Furthermore, in conceptual terms this change in a liberal welfare state is a deregulation of academic 
labour markets under marketisation. In 2008, under the Rudd Labor government, the HEWRR were 
removed, which reopened the possibility to restrict fixed term employment in enterprise bargaining 
agreements. 
 
At the same time, permanent academic and non-academic employment grew progressively, from 
around 40,000 in 1998 to 62,927 FTE in 2013.  Significant growth in permanent employment can be 
observed between 1999 and 2005, when the restrictions on fixed term employment were in place.  
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Figure 5.3: Australia: Growth of academic and non-academic employment (excluding casuals) by 
work contract type, 1996–2013 
 
Source: Department of Industry, Innovation, Science, Research and Tertiary Education (2012, 2014), own calculations and 
graph. 
Figure 5.4 shows annual growth rates of tenurial12, limited term and casual employment 
demonstrating consistent growth in all three categories. The data show consistent growth in 
permanent employment. Fixed term employment grew particularly from 2002 and stronger from 
2005. The growth in casual employment is volatile and peaks during 1999, 2000 and from 2010 
onwards. The periods of high growth rates in casual employment parallel the periods of strong 
growth in student numbers between 1999 and 2003 and from 2008 onwards (Figure 5.1). This 
reflects the prediction of labour market segmentation theory, arguing that the growth of a sector is 
linked to increases in labour market segmentation. 
                                                          
12 The Department of Education and Training uses the term tenure to classify continuous employment; as such ‘tenurial term’ is defined 
as continuous employment and does not relate to the tenure career advancement system in the academic employment system. The 
category ‘limited term’ contains staff that has contracts with an end date. The category ‘others’ contains relatively few staff and is referred 
to as cases where reporting data is missing etc. 
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Figure 5.4: Australia: FTE annual employment changes in tenurial, limited term and casual 
employment, 1997–2013  
 
Source: Department of Industry, Innovation, Science, Research and Tertiary Education (2012, 2014), own calculations and 
graph. 
The data on casual employees is not a headcount but an estimate based on the full-time equivalent, 
which means that the absolute number of individuals working in casual contracts is most likely 
significantly higher. Casual employment contracts are by nature not linked to a specific number of 
hours but vary with each individual.  Coates and Goedegebuure (2010) have estimated that 40 
percent of all university staff are casual employees, while May et al. (2013b) estimate using 
superannuation data that over 50 percent of the total workforce in higher education is casually 
employed. To provide a comparison, data from the Workplace Gender Equality Agency shows that in 
2014-15, 41.8 percent of all employees and in 2016-17, 43.0 percent of the total tertiary workforce 
was employed on casual contracts (Workplace Gender Equality Agency 2018). Comparable industries 
in Australia from 2016-17 with such a high proportion of casual employees are largely from the 
lower skilled sector, such as Administrative and Support Services (55.0%), Arts and Recreational 
Services (48.0%), Accommodation and Food Services (50.5%) and Retail Trade (34.4%) (Workplace 
Gender Equality Agency 2018). In high skilled sectors, the rates of the casually employed are 
significantly lower: Finance and Insurance Services (1.8%), Information, Media and 
Telecommunications (10.7%) and Professional, Scientific and Technical Services (11. 3%) (Workplace 
Gender Equality Agency 2018). This means that casual employment is common in most low-skilled 
sectors in Australia, rather than high-skilled sectors, with the exception of the tertiary education 
sector.  
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Applying the labour segmentation framework established in Chapter 3 to the available higher 
education employment data means that all permanent employees can be placed in one group and all 
non-permanent employees in another group. Adding limited term employment and casual 
employment together contrasted with the number of permanent employment reveals the scope of 
the secondary labour market in higher education (Figure 5.5). The figure shows that the size of the 
secondary higher education labour market (displayed in bars) has consistently increased since 1998 
and arrived almost at the size of the primary labour market (displayed in the line) in 2013. The trend 
suggests that the size of the secondary labour market will soon be larger than the primary labour 
market.  
Figure 5.5: Australia: The primary and secondary higher education labour market (FTE), 1996–2013 
 
Source: Department of Industry, Innovation, Science, Research and Tertiary Education (2012, 2014), own calculations and 
graph. 
To understand how academic labour market segmentation can be causally attributed to the 
mechanisms of higher education regulation under marketisation, the next section focuses on 
changes in academic employment conditions before examining each academic labour market 
segment.  
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5.4 Changes in academic employment functions  
Academic employees are broadly engaged in 'teaching and research'. In the Australian system 
employees can also be employed according to the specific functions of the academic labour process, 
in ‘research only’ and ‘teaching only’ positions.  
 
Figure 5.6 displays the development of academic employment by functional classification between 
1996 and 2013 and shows growth in all employment functions. ‘Research only’ employment has 
grown the strongest from 7,757 FTE to over 15,602 FTE employees (7,845 additional FTE positions), 
while ‘teaching only’ has grown marginally from 1,398 to 2,309 FTE, (additional 911 positions). In 
contrast, ‘research and teaching’ roles have grown slower from 24,904 to 27,387 FTE employees 
(2,483 additional FTE positions).  
Figure 5.6: Australia: Academic staff functions including permanent and limited term contract 
employees in FTE (excluding casuals), 1996–2013 
 
Source: Department of Industry, Innovation, Science, Research and Tertiary Education (2012, 2014), own graph. 
Table 5.3 shows that the share of ‘research and teaching’ staff to all academic staff has significantly 
declined from 73.1 percent 1996 to 60.5 percent in 2013. In contrast, the proportion of ‘research 
only’ staff has increased significantly from 22.8 percent in 1996 to 34.4 percent in 2013 and the 
share of 'teaching only' roles has also increased, albeit more marginally.   
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Table 5.3: Australia: Academic staff function as percentage of total academic employment 
(excluding casuals), 1996–2013 
Year 
Teaching 
Only 
% 
of total 
academic 
employme
nt 
Research 
Only 
% 
of total 
academic 
employme
nt 
Teaching 
and 
Research 
% 
of total 
academic 
employme
nt 
1996 1,398 4.1 7,757 22.8 24,904 73.1 
1997 1,162 3.5 7,849 23.8 24,006 72.7 
1998 781 2.4 7,619 23.7 23,757 73.9 
1999 751 2.4 7,757 24.3 23,365 73.3 
2000 844 2.7 7,866 24.7 23,138 72.7 
2001 814 2.5 8,116 25.1 23,413 72.4 
2002 842 2.6 8,654 26.3 23,457 71.2 
2003 860 2.5 9,306 27.5 23,685 70.0 
2004 922 2.6 9,866 28.1 24,336 69.3 
2005 755 2.1 10,358 28.5 25,204 69.4 
2006 851 2.3 11,140 30.0 25,204 67.8 
2007 1,012 2.6 11,924 31.0 25,584 66.4 
2008 979 2.5 12,455 31.5 26,114 66.0 
2009 1,163 2.8 13,093 32.0 26,610 65.1 
2010 1,465 3.5 13,506 32.3 26,840 64.2 
2011 2,228 5.2 14,045 32.7 26,741 62.2 
2012 2,452 5.5 14,573 32.8 27,357 61.6 
2013 2,309 5.1 15,602 34.4 27,387 60.5 
Source: Department of Industry, Innovation, Science, Research and Tertiary Education (2012, 2014). 
The data confirms a trend towards the diversification of academic employment that link to academic 
functions. Labour market segmentation theory associates diversification of labour process with a 
growing industry as outlined in chapter 3. The growth in ‘research only’ roles, particularly since 
2000, also associates with major policy changes towards the implementation of quasi-markets and 
the allocation of public funding through competitive limited term project grants. The nature of 
temporary project research funding means that it is likely that ‘research only’ positions are fixed 
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term for the duration of the research project, rather than permanent. Similarly, the growth in 
'teaching only' positions correlates with the introduction of a demand driven student funding system 
from 2000. 
 
The data evidence shows significant growth in 'research-only' staff. The next section focuses on the 
developments, correlations and links to higher education regulation in the primary academic labour 
market before examining the secondary academic labour market.  
5.5 The primary academic labour market  
The primary academic labour market consists of academic employees in permanent employment, 
regardless of function. Since 1970s full-time equivalent (FTE) academic staff increased significantly 
and more than doubled from 7,367 staff in 1970 to 19,649 staff 1980, then grew to 27,570 FTE staff 
in 1990 (Hugo 2008, 11). Data that are more recent show substantial growth in all academic 
employment categories between 1996 and 2013.   
 
Academic staff in Australia are grouped into different five different levels, ranging from the lowest to 
the highest level: ‘associate lecturer’, ‘lecturer’, ‘senior lecturer’ then ‘associate professor’ and lastly 
the full ‘professor’ at the top of the level pyramid. Universities can employ ‘research only’ or 
‘teaching only’ staff as well as ‘research and teaching’ staff at each of these academic staff levels.  
 
Section 5.3 established that permanent employment indeed grew between 1996 and 2012, from 
roughly 31,000 to 43,000 FTE. Disaggregated employment data in Figure 5.7 shows that between 
1996 and 2013 the strongest growth has been in the top-level positions, in the group of associate 
professors and professors. In fact, professorial employment has nearly doubled in 17 years from 
6,000 to 12,000 positions, overtaking the number of FTE at the senior lecturer level in 2007.  
Positions at the Lecturer level have also increased substantially from 10,000 in 2000 to over 14,000 
in 2013. 
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Figure 5.7: Australia: Academic employment by category (including limited term), 1996–2013 
 
Source: Department of Industry, Innovation, Science, Research and Tertiary Education (2012, 2014), own graph. 
 
Figure 5.8 shows that the proportion of the professoriate in academic employment has increased 
from 19 percent in 1996 to 26 percent in 2013. While employment in the lecturer level (Level B 
category) has grown as well during this timeframe by around 4.000 new positions, the share of 
‘lecturer’ positions as proportion of the total academic workforce has declined from 36 percent in 
1996 to 33 percent in 2013 (Figure 5.8). Likewise, while the number of senior lecturers increased, 
the proportion has also declined, from 25 percent in 1996 to 23 percent in 2013.  
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Figure 5.8: Australia: Share of academic level of employment on total academic employment 
(excluding casuals) 
 
Source: Department of Industry, Innovation, Science, Research and Tertiary Education (2012, 2014), own calculations and 
graph. 
The increase in the professoriate is indicative of different developments: first, a productive academic 
workforce; second, an aging academic profession; and third, increasing external professorial 
employment. Career advancement into the professoriate depends on publications, teaching and 
supervision experience as well as international community engagement. As universities in Australia 
do not place caps on the appointment of professors, performance achievements and career 
advancement are likely. The professorial title itself is unregulated in Australia. Each university 
describes slightly different pathways that lead to the title and the title is not for life but has an 
expiration date with retirement, resignation or termination (Farrell 2009, 1). Thus, a professorial title 
implies seniority, expertise and international recognition.  
 
Second, the increase in the professoriate is indicative of an aging academic workforce, as the career 
structure implies that academics are reaching career peak at older ages. Academic employment rose 
significantly during the 1970s and this cohort of employees will reach retirement age starting from 
2010 (Bexley et al. 2011, Coates et al. 2009a, Hugo 2008).  Bexley et al. (2011) show that the 
academic workforce is older than the general workforce, with 40 percent of the academic workforce 
over 50 years and 32 percent are between 40 and 49 years of age (Bexley et al. 2011, 3-4). The only 
age group that has been increasing since 2000 is the 50 years and up, while the percentage of other 
age groups has remained stable (Bexley et al. 2011, 3-4). Such shifts in age groups and seniority 
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levels have consequences for university budgets, as wages are much higher in the higher 
employment levels. This might affect the capacity to employ at lower levels. 
 
Third, international migration has been a source of academic staff at all levels to meet increasing 
demand and Hugo (2008, 10) reports that 40.5 percent of academic staff in Australia were born 
overseas. It is likely that some of these appointments were made in the associate or full professor 
levels. Professorial appointments were made during the phase of peak marketisation of higher 
education between 1996 and 2007. While marketisation policies encouraged universities to diversify 
their income, sources a significant number of academics were promoted to higher positions with 
higher pay.  
 
Eligibility for public research funding through the Australian Research Councils is dependent on 
employment with a university, whether permanent or fixed term. It is common practice in most 
Australian universities that academics in permanent employment, with a research grant are exempt 
from teaching duties. The research grants are used for ‘buying out of teaching’ duties and fully 
concentrate on research (Smith and Smith 2012), rather than employing additional staff to conduct 
the research. This means that most academics in permanent employment will not undertake 
teaching duties for the time of the research grant, opening employment possibilities for temporary 
teaching staff. The following section examines developments in the secondary academic labour 
market.  
5.6 The secondary academic labour market  
The following section analyses of the developments, correlations and links between higher 
education liberalization and the secondary academic labour market. The secondary labour market is 
conceptualized as including all non-permanent employment, particularly fixed term contract 
employment and casual (by the hour) employment, engaged in teaching, research. In addition, 
casual employees are also engaged in administrative roles. This section examines the growth of fixed 
or limited term employment and casual employment. 
 
Figure 5.9 shows the steady growth in limited term employment between 2001 and 2012. The 
category ‘limited term’ contains staff that has contracts with an end date. Limited term contracts are 
historically not uncommon in academia. In the 1960s and 1970s, about half of the employees in 
higher education were employed part-time and casual, particularly for teaching (Hugo 2008, 11). The 
literature and data (Figure 5.6) suggests that limited term employment is linked to research duties, 
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and it is estimated that 85 percent of research only staff are fixed term (Andrews et al. 2016, 12). 
Research only positions include post-doctoral positions or research fellows as well as research 
assistant positions, roles typically under the supervision of an academic in permanent employment 
(Broadbent et al. 2013, 5). This substantial growth in 'research only' limited term positions is 
unprecedented in Australia. Employment growth from 2002 correlates with the growth in university 
research income (Figure 4.3) and the introduction of a new formula for the allocation of research 
grants (IGS), during the period of peak marketisation (Section 4.5.2).  
Figure 5.9: Australia: Limited term employment in FTE, 1996–2014 
 
 
Source: Department of Industry, Innovation, Science, Research and Tertiary Education (2013), own graph. 
The available data does not capture the contract length of limited term employment. However, 
employment in 'research only' positions is usually linked to the allocated time of a research grant, 
which is generally between one to three years (Bexley et al. 2011, 2, Dobson 2010). Employees on 
fixed term contracts between one and three years are in precarious, uncertain about future 
employment. The insecure attachment to the workforce is often referred to as precarious, which 
describes a multi-dimensional concept of work arrangements, covering job insecurity, the 
uncertainty of tenure, a lack of employment rights, a lack of control over working conditions, 
including hours and relatively low wages (e.g. Campell and Burgess 1997, Vosko 2006, 2010, 
Standing 2010). A research study confirms that fixed term employees have restricted access to 
career development programs and internal research grants, describing their career prospects as 
poor (Broadbent et al. 2012). The study was based on a survey with 2 488 research only staff in 
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Australian universities on limited term contracts. This confirms that employment conditions of 
limited-term employees in the secondary labour market are precarious, provide limited 
opportunities for their own career advancement and are uncertain about job continuation.  
 
The rise of the casual workforce in higher education is a relatively new phenomenon and 
unprecedented in Australia. The rise in casual employment is grounded in a legal framework 
emerging from the need for teaching staff because of the rise in student demand during the 1970s, 
when higher education was ‘free’. The Academic Salaries Tribunal created a legal basis for hourly 
employment in 1980 with the aim to employ ‘industry professionals’ and provide postgraduate 
students with work opportunities or an “academic apprenticeship” (Academic Salaries Tribunal 1980, 
25). In 1998 the Higher Education Contract of Employment Award defined casual employment as: “a 
person engaged by the hour and paid on an hourly basis that includes a loading related to award 
based benefits for which a casual employee is not eligible” (Fair Work Ombudsman 2010 [12]). This 
means casual staff members are not eligible for social benefits, neither conversion to permanent 
employment, unless stated in enterprise bargaining agreements, as by definition casual is irregular 
or indefinite (Fair Work Ombudsman 2010). The hourly pay rates for casual employees align with 
full-time rates for academics and include a loading of up to 25 percent as substitute for annual or 
sick leave payments (Fair Work Ombudsman 2010). While hourly pay rates are relatively high, hourly 
contracts are usually limited to a certain number of hours per week for a certain number of weeks, 
usually covering the length of a semester.  
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Figure 5.10 displays the rise of casual employment between 1996 and 2013. Between 1990 and 2013 
the proportion of casual FTE employment as a proportion of all FTE employees in the higher 
education sector grew by 11 percentage points, from 11 percent to 22 percent (May et al. 2013b, 
DET 2018).  
 
Figure 5.10: Australia: Academic and non-academic casual FTE staff, 1996–2013 
 
Source: Department of Industry, Innovation, Science, Research and Tertiary Education (2014), own graph. 
Table 5.4 shows that the casual workforce is largely engaged in ‘teaching only’ positions with strong 
employment growth between 2000 and 2012. In 2012, 53 percent of all casual FTE were employees 
for 'teaching only', 38 percent in non-academic roles administrative roles, and only 7 percent of the 
total casual workforce are in ‘research only’ positions.  
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Table 5.4: Actual casual staff (FTE) by function 2000 - 2013  
 Actual Casual 
Teaching Only 
Research 
Only 
Teaching and 
Research 
Non-
academic 
Total 
2000 6,412 878 331 4,826 12,447 
2001 6,766 917 246 4,862 12,790 
2002 7,033 996 280 5,051 13,360 
2003 7,224 995 14 5,054 13,287 
2004 7,307 1,085 45 5,114 13,552 
2005 7,362 1,106 35 5,026 13,530 
2006 7,715 1,122 67 5,069 13,972 
2007 7,598 1,170 163 5,565 14,496 
2008 8,007 1,484 159 5,997 15,646 
2009 8,953 1,307 147 6,515 16,922 
2010 9,380 1,431 234 6,935 17,979 
2011 10,244 1,264 237 7,265 19,009 
2012 10,000 1,303 260 7,281 18,844 
2013 10,287 1,314 265 7,621 19,487 
Source: Department of Industry, Innovation, Science, Research and Tertiary Education (2014), own calculations. 
Table 5.5 shows the casual workforce disaggregated by function and reveals that the casual FTE 
employment is common at the bottom of the academic hierarchy. This means that casual employees 
are engaged in conducting tutorials, rather than lectures or seminars. The table also shows that level 
A and non-academic employment has increased significantly between 2000 and 2012. The rise in 
casual employment correlates with the rise in student numbers, particularly also with the 
abolishment of caps on student places and the introduction of a demand driven degree model in 
2007 (Section 4.6). This suggests that the rise in student numbers results in the rise in casual 
teaching employment.  
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Table 5.5: Australia: Casual FTE employment by category, 2000–2012 
Year 
Above 
Senior 
Lecturer 
Senior 
Lecturer 
(Level C) 
Lecturer 
(Level B) 
Below 
Lecturer 
(Level A) 
Non-Academic 
Classification 
Total 
2000 147 128 2,142 4,690 5,341 12,447 
2001 168 115 2,265 4,856 5,387 12,790 
2002 232 215 2,259 5,142 5,513 13,360 
2003 195 226 2,051 5,377 5,439 13,287 
2004 174 152 2,130 5,669 5,427 13,552 
2005 305 136 1,940 5,598 5,551 13,530 
2006 289 135 1,998 5,943 5,608 13,972 
2007 260 137 2,054 6,039 6,006 14,496 
2008 284 146 2,032 6,623 6,561 15,646 
2009 297 178 2,281 7,212 6,954 16,922 
2010 330 183 2,279 7,899 7,288 17,979 
2011 334 121 2,388 8,586 7,581 19,009 
2012 356 136 2,075 8,617 7,660 18,844 
Source: Department of Industry, Innovation, Science, Research and Tertiary Education (2014) 
The majority of the casual academic workforce is also engaged in higher degree research, including 
Master and Doctorate. Research shows that the casual workforce consists of higher degree research 
students, academics (with PhD), retirees or university graduates, and people with a main job outside 
of academia (categories modified from National Tertiary Education Union 2012). Four major studies 
conducted by different organisations have investigated the characteristics of the casual workforce at 
Australian universities. Table 5.6 summarises the findings of these studies, showing that indeed in all 
four studies the majority of the casual workforce is also engaged in higher degree research. It also 
shows that the share of casual employees holding a PhD degree is highest in the 2012 study, 
conducted by the National Tertiary Education Union and lowest in the study conducted by the 
University of NSW in 2001/2002, which is likely to be due to their specific membership base.  
 
 
The Work and Careers study from 2011 found that 33 percent of employees in permanent 
employment were previously in casual employment for about two years (Bexley et al. 2011).  
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Table 5.6: Australia: Characteristics of the casual workforce: results from four studies  
 
SPIRT – UNSW 
Industrial Relations 
Research Centre 
Study (2001/2002) 
Work and Careers in 
Australian 
Universities (2011) 
DEEWR – 
Career intentions of 
Australia’s 
academics (2011) 
NTEU – Casual 
Teaching and 
research staff (2012) 
Higher Degree 
Research Students 
33% 37% 49% 44% 
Academics (PhD) 7% 16% 23% 
 
33% 
 
Retirees and 
graduates 
   13% 
Main job outside of 
academia 
36%   
 
10% 
 
Total number of 
responses from 
casuals and short 
term employees 
2,491 
(non-academic and 
academic casuals) 
3,160 803 1,243 
 
Notes: 
The Industrial Relations Research Centre conducted a survey into the casual academic workforce at five universities in 2001/02 (Junor 
2004). 
The Work and Careers in Australian Universities survey (WCAU) conducted by the Centre for Work and Organization and Wellbeing at 
Griffiths University in 2011 (2011)  
The Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (DEEWR) conducted a survey on career intentions of Australia’s 
academics (Bexley, James and Arkoudis 2011). 
The National Tertiary Union  (NTEU) conducted a survey of casual academic staff amongst members and non-members (2012)  
 
While during the 1980s, the workforce on the secondary labour market was conceptualised as 
invisible (Gappa and Leslie 1993); the availability of data has led to its visibility. The rise in precarious 
work is often referred to as 'casualisation' or 'Australia’s ‘casual’ approach to higher education' 
(Klopper and Power 2014, May 2012, May et al. 2013a/b). Several scholars have also shown that the 
academic precarious labour force on the secondary labour market moves between different jobs at 
different universities as well as between different employment tasks (Campbell and Burges 2001, 
Junor 2004, Kimber 2003, May 2012).  
 
Volatile working conditions, such as insecurity and uncertainty, are the central characteristics for 
employees in the secondary academic labour market in Australia. Overall, the analysis in this section 
reinforces the theoretical premises established in Chapter 3, that the employment on the secondary 
academic labour market is precarious and employees are mobile and the sector has various entry 
points, including teaching, research and admin roles. However, the analysis shows that this sector is 
divided between limited-term and casual employees. The former employment category is linked to 
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research related work and has better employment conditions, such as sick and annual leave, while 
the latter is linked to teaching duties with no sick or annual leave provisions.  
 
The rise of the secondary academic labour market is evident in the data showing growth in limited-
term and casual employment by function. This section has demonstrated how specific mechanisms 
within marketisation policies, outlined in Chapter 4, caused the rise in limited -term research 
employment, while others caused the rise in casual employment. Generally, the marketisation of 
research contributed to the growth in limited-term employment while the marketisation of teaching 
contributed to the rise casual employment. 
5.7 Conclusion 
The evidence in the chapter shows the increasing segmentation of the academic labour market in 
Australia between 1980 and 2012, albeit continuous employment growth in both labour markets. 
While all employment categories have grown between 1980 and 2012, employment in the 
secondary labour market has grown strongest.  
 
This chapter established that the academic labour market is confronted with two different 
challenges caused by marketisation policies in higher education regulation. First, the size of the 
secondary academic labour market is nearly the size of the primary academic labour market 
(academic and non-academic), a development that is unprecedented in higher education in 
Australia. Second, there is also an emerging division of the academic labour market according to 
function. The data evidence shows that non-academic employment is growing and academic 
employment is divided in 'research and teaching' positions, which tend to be permanent, and the 
non-permanent roles of 'research-only' positions, which tend to be in limited-term and 'teaching-
only' positions, which tend to be casual. While research suggests relative mobility between the 
secondary and the primary academic labour market, the sector is increasingly depended on a 
specialised academic workforce in the secondary labour market. 
 
Substantial structural alterations, particularly the requirements emerging from the linkage between, 
performance, evaluation and choice in the allocation of public funding for research and teaching 
have transformed the academic labour markets in Australia. In fact, several alterations and 
mechanisms have partially dismantled the once unique and strong academic employment protection 
regime of the Australian liberal welfare state. This includes not only the legal changes, such as the 
removal of the Higher Education Contract and Employment Award in 2005 (Section 5.3) and the 
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strengthening of the legal basis for casual employment in 1998 (Section 5.6). It also includes the 
transformation in the allocation of public research and teaching funding, such as time-restrictions 
for research funding and the introduction of the 'demand driven education system' which abolished 
caps on student places (Section 4.6). These alterations to the employment protection have increased 
the ability for higher education institutions to adapt and respond to changing conditions. Labour 
market flexibility has led to a specification of the academic workforce, specialised in 'teaching' or in 
'research', suggesting this workforce works across fields and disciplines. While a majority of 
academic employees are in permanent employment, several modifications under marketisation have 
led to the advancement of labour market flexibility on the secondary labour market. This means that 
marketisation policies affected the primary and the secondary academic labour markets differently. 
Together, these changes to legislation and regulation suggest that the current academic 
employment protection regime can partially be explained by the theoretical predictions about liberal 
welfare states, established in Chapter 2. 
 
Before the comparative analysis in Chapter 8, the next two chapters, Chapter 6 and 7, analyse the 
developments in higher education regulation and on academic labour markets in the German 
corporatist welfare state.  
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6 Germany - The marketisation of higher education policy (1980-
2012) 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters established that the marketisation of higher education in the liberal welfare 
state of Australia is a continuous process that started during the 1980s and argued that the 
Australian government facilitated this process with substantial consequences for the academic 
labour market. This chapter demonstrates that the corporatist welfare state of Germany is also 
implementing marketisation mechanisms and policies in higher education regulation. Traditionally 
the role of labour in the decision-making process is strong in corporatist welfare states and a reason 
to argue that market strategies are difficult to implement (Jessop 2003, 21). Evidence suggests that 
academic labour organisations in the German higher education system are not a strong opponent of 
marketisation policies. The evidence from Germany demonstrates that in comparison to Australia, 
mechanisms and implementation processes of marketisation differ but the outcomes for the 
academic labour markets are similar. Overall, these findings from the corporatist welfare state 
challenge the premises of the welfare state theory.  
 
The evidence from Germany shows that, in contrast to Australia, marketisation in higher education 
teaching provision is not as explicit, as there is no tuition fee for students. Then again, market 
mechanisms and practices are a central feature in the allocation of research funding. The 
chronological policy analysis from 1980 to 2012 demonstrates that indeed Germany established 
market oriented policies in higher education. These policies manifest in state regulation and state 
steering towards the market, in extending the scope of organisational autonomy rather than 
professorial autonomy, in targeted research funding processes, and in the strengthening of 
competitive structures and processes across employees and institutions. In contrast to Australia, 
where marketisation manifests largely in teaching services, marketisation in Germany manifests in 
the competition over research funding resources. 
 
The chapter provides evidence of marketisation in Germany using data, committee reports, policy 
statements and legislation on the key actors in the national governance network, including the 16 
state ministers for cultural affairs, the standing committee of state ministers, the federal ministry for 
education and research (Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung – BMBF), the science council 
(Wissenschaftsrat), the most important research funding agency (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft 
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– DFG), and the national association of rectors and presidents of German higher education 
institutions (Hochschulrektorenkonferenz – HRK).  
This chapter examines the policy developments between 1980 and 2012 according to key periods 
that align with different chancellors and parties in power. Each period is presented in terms of the 
socio-economic drivers of policy reform before engaging with the major policy changes and their 
structural effects in higher education. A brief historical overview covering the timeframe after World 
War II (Section 6.2) and the 1970s (Section 6.3) sets the baseline for higher education policy making 
in Germany. Section 6.4, covering the period from 1982 to 1998 under Chancellor Helmut Kohl, 
outlines the beginning of marketisation policies, including the introduction of early signs for a New 
Public Management regime. The next section covers the period from 1999 to 2005 under Chancellor 
Gerhard Schröder, analysing the advancement of marketisation policies through the Bologna reform, 
project-based funding and the research excellence initiative. The following section 6.6 shows 
developments from 2006 to 2010 with a focus on how the specific governance system for higher 
education has strengthened marketisation, rather than blocking its advancement, arguing that 
regional disparities and increasing institutional differences are a likely future scenario. To assess how 
the incremental change process towards marketisation in science and research impacts on the 
academic labour market the following chapter, Chapter 7, chronologically investigates the 
transformation of the academic labour market in Germany. 
6.2 Post World War II (1949–1972): A complex higher education system 
evolved 
Germany’s traditional research focused ‘chair system’ was the world leading higher education 
system before the two world wars. A small elite group of professors with many subordinated 
assistants is still the basic structure of this system (Clark 1983) although their influence declined in 
the nation building process and during the Nazi regime from 1933-45 (Ringer, 1969). The German 
higher education system was infiltrated with Nazi ideas, which meant that academics either adopted 
Nazi ideologies or immigrated to other countries. As a result, the post-world war period from 1949 
to 1974 was devoted to shifting the majority of higher education competences and authorities to the 
16 federal states. In addition, the establishment of a regulatory system for higher education required 
the coordination of several actors from industry and science sectors as a precondition to foster the 
German ‘Wirtschaftswunder’ or economic ‘miracle’. This corporatist structure created the conditions 
for the expansion of higher education and it acted as a framework that enabled the implementation 
of marketisation policies.  
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In the 1950s the higher education system was reestablished in line with the Humboldtian tradition 
and the governing principles of traditional federalism where the general responsibility for higher 
education rests within the 16 federal states, rather than the central state. The German constitution 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2018) limits political influence in higher education because “research and 
teaching shall be free” (Article 5). The federal system limits the role of the central state to “the 
regulation of educational and training grants and the promotion of research” (Article 74). General 
responsibility for teaching, education and culture rests within each federal state rather than the 
central state. This means that the professoriate is employed and remunerated by federal states and 
in civil servant status to ensure independence (Bartz 2007, 18). This principal structure is based on 
the rule of constitutional or basic law established by the allied forces after the Second World War, to 
limit the power of the central state and safeguard the democratic values of the Federal Republic of 
Germany. German federalism relies on the idea of homogenous rather than competing federal 
states and has in this way constituted a homogenous higher education system. The professoriate at 
the time of establishment and still supports this federal governing structure because a central 
governing structure could potentially neglect or limit the funding of certain disciplinary fields to few 
regions and institutions (Bartz 2007, 19). A regular standing committee of the cultural and education 
ministers of all federal states (Ständige Konferenz der Kultusmininster der Länder) was established 
to coordinate the decentralised German higher education system. Later, in 1955 the central state 
established a ministry of education and science.  
 
Parallel to the establishment of the standing committee of cultural and education ministers, other 
central institutions in the corporatist regulation of higher education science and research were 
established. In 1949/51 the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft – 
DFG) was founded, the main self-governing organisation of the Sciences.13 The DFG consists of 
members from research universities, research institutions, scientific associations and the Academies 
of Science and Humanities (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft 2015b). This organisation administers 
research funding from the federal and the central state to researchers. In 1957 the Council of 
Science and Humanities (Wissenschaftsrat) was founded as an advisory body at the interface 
between the academic system, federal states and the central state. Its members are professors from 
universities across all federal states as well as representatives from federal states and the central 
state. Article 2 of its charter summarises its key role “to coordinate the science between the states, 
to advise the use of federal state finances in accordance with priorities in science” (Wissenschaftsrat 
                                                          
13 The German term “Wissenschaft” includes all sciences and humanities as well as research and teaching. The 
Humboldtian tradition in using this term, emphasisesthe unity of teaching, research and all knowledge in one 
institution.    
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2008). The Wissenschaftsrat remains a highly influential committee. It develops policy 
recommendations on quality, structural and functional developments in the higher education sector 
and ensures dialogue between the scientific community and the state apparatus.   
 
In addition, independent research institutes were founded parallel to science and research at 
universities. These institutes receive funding from the central state but also from private entities, 
such as institutes of the ‘Helmholtz’, ‘Fraunhofer’, ‘Leibnitz’ or ‘Max-Planck Gesellschaft’. Some 
funding agencies were established from the sale of state owned industries, such as Volkswagen or 
Thyssen Stiftung. This shows that industry involvement in science and research has a long tradition 
in the corporatist welfare state of Germany not only in the funding of non-university and applied 
research institutes but also for higher education basic research.14 
 
From the mid-1960s, the higher education system grew in size, new universities were established, 
professors and other academic personnel increased, and student numbers doubled, developing from 
an elite to a mass tertiary system. The initiatives to expand the higher education sector can be 
largely seen as a reaction to increasing awareness about the importance of higher education for 
economic and technological advantage after the so-called sputnik-shock. An essay which described 
the German higher education system as ‘educational catastrophe’ (Picht 1965) was also highly 
influential. The education expansion led to a diverging university landscape across the country as 
federal states had different ideas about the extent of expansion.  
 
Consequently, in 1969 the German parliament led by the Social Democratic Party under Erhard, 
approved constitutional changes in Article 91b (1) of the German Constitution, which legislated that 
higher education governance was a common task between states and the national state 
(Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz 2018). In recognising the importance of 
higher education and science as a central issue of the German state, this change was a renunciation 
of the principle of federalism. This constitutional change was justified as a measure to protect and 
re-establish the principle of equality in living conditions across Germany. In practice this meant that 
student funding support, the Federal Training Assistance (Bundesausbildungsförderung - BAFÖG) 
and infrastructure funding was transferred to the responsibility of the German state, providing 
equality measures for student living and study conditions, a core aim of the ruling party, the social 
                                                          
14 In Germany, private industry funding for science and research traces to the Weimarer Republic (1918 – 1933), when the research and 
science sector was under financial constraints and researchers approached industry and other private entities. Financial difficulty led to 
the establishment of a foundation, the ‘community of hardship of German science’ (‘Stifterverband der Notgemeinschaft der deutschen 
Wissenschaft’) in 1920. It is a donors’ association from the private sector and corporations, such as Deutsche Bank and Bosch, promoting 
and providing financial support for research and development as well as teaching. In 1949 this foundation became the ‘Stifterverband’ 
promoting and funding research and science and cooperating with other government or private organisations (Stifterverband 2015).  
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democrats. The constitutional change enabled the German state to frame higher education 
regulation and the principles of diversity under federalism became subordinated to the state 
interests and principles of equality and prosperity. 
 
In addition, universities of applied sciences and vocational training known as Fachhochschulen were 
established in 1969 as a result of increased demand for a skilled workforce in the manufacturing and 
processing sectors. Fachhochschulen are generally less research active and cannot offer doctoral 
degrees but offer vocational, skill-based education in cooperation with the private sector (Turner 
2001, 21). The establishment of Fachhochschulen increased the size of the professoriate, yet also 
reinforced a hierarchical structure across institutions with the professoriate with research 
universities and professors at the top (Ellwein 1992, 245, Führ 1997).  
 
The period from World War II to 1972 is firstly characterised by reestablishment and expansion of 
the higher education system. Complex governing and funding systems encompassing various 
organisations from industry and other bodies strengthened with the governance and financial 
support of universities and research institutions. In addition, during this period higher education 
governance and regulation shifted substantially between the federal states and the central state. It 
was legally recognised that the organisation of higher education is a core responsibility of the central 
state, rather than solely embedded within the federal states. The political motivation behind this 
restructure was a need to develop technological and economic advantage in the Post War and early 
Cold War period. Consequently, the central state provided additional funding for students and 
university institutions.  
6.3 Post-higher education expansion (1972–1982)  
Compared to the 1960s, the decade between 1972 and 1982 under the Social Democratic 
government with Chancellor Helmut Schmidt was a period of standstill in higher education policy. 
Economically, this period was characterised by global stagflation: high unemployment, high inflation 
and low or negative economic growth. The economic situation meant that public funding and the 
expansion of higher education stagnated across all German states. The science policy studies 
literature demonstrates the negative impact of stagnating investments on breakthrough research 
and the establishment of new scientific fields (Heinze and Münch 2016, Whitley and Gläser 2014). 
However, in the wake of a stagnating economy and higher education system, the German central 
state reformed higher education legislation. 
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A central element in higher education policy was the establishment of a unified higher education 
system for research and teaching because the traditional structures of the system were seen as 
problematic for productivity and growth but also for equality (Bartz 2007, 159). In 1976, after six 
years of parliamentary debate and decision-making processes, the Higher Education Federal 
Framework Act (Hochschulrahmengesetz – HRG) was established as a unified regulatory framework 
for higher education across federal states. It regulated the organisation of higher education, 
employment structures, enrolment conditions and curriculum reform (Bartz 2007, 159). Führ (1996, 
206) argues that the legislation effectively ensured greater influence of the central state on federal 
states’ higher education policy and the professoriate. The HRG was targeted to confine the 
oligarchical structure and the power of the professoriate but also to introduce a stronger orientation 
towards the market. A key change was that the legislation introduced different employee status 
groups, the ‘assistants in science and research’, with rights in decision-making processes. In line with 
premises of the corporatist welfare state type, the HRG addressed the organisational self-
government of university institutions and established higher education committees as well as 
decision-making among members from four status groups: the professoriate, the scientific 
assistants, students and other employee groups. The professoriate has secured its dominant role 
within these more democratic structures of the so-called group university (“Gruppenuniversität”). 
While decisions are based on majority votes, the professoriate holds absolute majority 
(Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz 2018b, Art. 36-38). 
The marketisation policy discourse also became a central issue during this time. For example, in a 
speech to parliament the then federal Minister for Economy Affairs, Otto Graf Lambsdorff, argued 
for “less state and more market” stressing the need to break the entitlement mentality in Germany 
which is a result of the strong welfare state (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 2002). Lambsdorff 
was a member of the Free Democrats (Freie Demokratische Partei – FDP), a liberal party that 
strongly aligns with the values of economic liberalism, promoting free markets and privatisation. In 
higher education governance, the Wissenschaftsrat was proposing reforms to assess and evaluate 
the quality of higher education, to improve efficiency and competition (Bartz 2007, 132ff). Bartz 
(2007, 132) argues that this marketisation discourse is a result of the financial crisis and the 
stagnation of public higher education funding. This signals that the marketisation discourse is not 
only a reaction to the economic situation but general ideology for German policy makers. 
Student numbers continued to grow during the 1970s supported by the federal government’s 
decision to legislate access to higher education for each qualified person (Peisert and Framhein 
1990, 10, Teichler 1999b). At the same time university funding stagnated largely due to declining 
 118 
federal state budgets in the wake of the oil crisis in 1973 (Peisert and Framhein 1990, 10). These 
developments led to a decline in the funding ratio per student and in fact the chronic ‘under-
funding’ of higher education (Teichler 1999a). This funding situation encouraged universities to 
search for other funding opportunities. 
While the HRG legislation from 1976 was a significant step in addressing some of the problems the 
traditional structures largely prevailed while student numbers grew. In addition, a chronically under-
funded system sparked the start of the marketisation discourse in higher education. 
6.4 A slow ascendance of marketisation (1982–1998) 
The Conservative Democratic government with Chancellor Helmut Kohl was in office between 1982 
and 1998. Under Chancellor Kohl, former East and West Germany unified and the overall 
institutional restructuring towards the market and away from state regulation, including the 
privatisation of state assets, eventually led to a partial consolidation of the budget deficit 
(Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 2012). The marketisation of higher education was introduced 
in the 1990s after a relatively long decision-making processes, common in the German 
heterogeneous regulatory system between 16 federal and the central state. Marketisation primarily 
takes the form of strengthening competition within and across institutions and federal states.   
From the start of the 1980s, government actors as well as actors from industry and the private 
sector increasingly demanded further higher education reforms. This interest was not only due to 
the globalisation discourse, stressing the transformative effects of such process, but also due to 
economic reasons and the quest to achieve competitive advantage through knowledge in 
information technologies (Stucke 2001, 124). In 1983, the federal Ministry of Education and Science 
published a set of guidelines for a new higher education policy. These guidelines were published 
with the headline ‘Competition over bureaucracy’ and outlined a paradigm change for the 
organisation of higher education as they introduced New Public Management guidelines (Winter 
2012, 17). In order for marketisation policies to flourish, the organisational structure of universities 
should transform from a harbour for independent academics to organisational actors with their own 
interests and aims (Hüther 2010, Meier 2009, Winter 2012, Wissel 2007).  
The higher education legislation (HRG) was amended in 1985. First, one amendment ensured that 
universities as organisations had greater autonomy in decision-making processes (Bundesgesetzblatt 
1985, Turner 2001, 188). The greater institutional autonomy meant that university management was 
enabled to make decisions in areas that were previously dominated by the professoriate. This 
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change marked a deviation from the traditional German governance structure or the academic 
oligarchy, which combined state control with professorial self-governance (Clark 1983, 140). The 
change in the HRG also increased the distinction and salary differences between professors at 
universities and other higher education institutions (Turner 2001, 188). These amendments of the 
HRG are crucial because they enabled higher education institutions to act as players within the 
market and to offer academics different employment conditions. The developments that led to the 
change of higher education legislation demonstrate that marketisation policy discourse and the 
subsequent change to legislation was mainly led by political actors from the federal states and 
central state (Schimank & Lange 2009, 56-80, Stucke 2001).  
During the 1990s, two major events changed the German higher education landscape, re-unification 
of West and East Germany and the Bologna reforms, a major supra-national reform framework for 
higher education in the European Union. 
The two different higher education systems of former East and West Germany unified, which meant 
that the West German system applied to the whole system. This unification process has been 
described and analysed in great detail (e.g. Ertl 2013, Fuehr 1997, Pritchard 1999, Wissenschaftsrat 
1992). As a result of the unification process, which included a thorough evaluation of the East 
German academics and universities, external evaluation processes were introduced as part of the 
overall higher education governance (Kehm 1999). External evaluations are a process of external 
assessment, accounting and steering using other industries and markets as models. Higher education 
institutions and academics are primarily viewed as competitors on markets for publication, funding 
or ideas. Success on these academic quasi-markets can be measured and compared, and the 
resulting rankingregularly informs funding decisions. External evaluations are therefore a central 
element of marketisation (Ball and Youdell 2008). The public and the private sector strongly 
supported these external evaluations arguing that the process could uncover solutions to the 
chronically underfunded situation of higher education institutions, because scarce resources can be 
directed to promising research fields and institutions (Kehm and Lanzendorf 2005).  
6.4.1 The introduction of New Public Management 
The marketisation discourse and ideas led to the creation and implementation of a new higher 
education strategy, widely described as the New Public Management regime (Schimank and Lange 
2009, 56-80). The pressures to reform were largely based on economic requirements and the need 
to meet future requirements for a highly qualified and mobile labour force (Führ 1996, 211, Oehler 
1998, 425). In 1993, the influential Wissenschaftsrat proposed the further expansion of the higher 
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education system to address future labour market demands (Wissenschaftsrat 1993). It was argued 
that the success of higher education reforms depends on the ability of higher education institutions 
to act autonomously, particularly in budget autonomy (Wissenschaftsrat 1993). Following these 
debates, the German government as well as the federal states legislated several reforms. 
The federal states’ Hochschulsonderprogramm III from 1996 provided universities with additional 
funding to combat the chronic underfunding that had characterised the period from 1974 to 1982. 
These funds could be used to support study conditions in general and to upgrade degrees (Führ 
1996, 215). Research funding increased and the regulation of the competitive selection process for 
scarce resources were strengthened. In addition, the Wissenschaftsrat received additional funding to 
provide external guidance to universities and to evaluate university programs and functions (Bartz 
2007, 204). Alongside these policy amendments, the discourse towards further management in 
higher education was supported by university organisations themselves. Along with other 
statements two influential publications by the university dean of Kassel, Brinckmann (1998) and by 
the director of the Centre for Higher Education Development (CHE), Müller-Böling (2000) proposed 
the introduction of further management structures, further deregulation, less state and more 
market in higher education. These public statements by university management demonstrate that 
higher education institutions have become autonomous organisations, as the dean and director 
were acting in the interests of the organisation, rather than the professoriate. 
The fourth amendment of the higher education legislation (HRG) in 1998, still under Chancellor Kohl, 
responded to the widespread discourse in favour of New Public Management and was a path 
breaking decision for the future higher education system towards further marketisation. This 
amendment removed some tight university regulations and bureaucracies, opening the pathway to 
change management structures (Deutscher Bundestag 1998, Pritchard 2006). This change followed 
intensive lobbying by representatives from industry and states to support university institutions 
through more autonomy and self-governance. Greater autonomy for university organisations was 
attached to external guidance and evaluation as the legislation states: “the work at higher education 
institutions will be evaluated on a regular basis and … the students have to take part in the 
evaluation of teaching. The results of the evaluation process have to be published" (Deutscher 
Bundestag 1998, article 6). Furthermore, the reforms enabled the appointment of university deans 
or chancellors by the Ministry of Education, the university president or the university senate. This 
introduced a hierarchical organisational model to university governance and abolished the 
traditional collegial appointment model for university leaders. This change also assigned greater 
decision-making power to the management and leadership of higher education institutions, 
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implementing a hierarchical rather than collegial model in which deans had the same voting power 
as other members of the professoriate (Kehm 2015). The decision-making processes in collegial 
structures are comparatively slow and often linked to compromise. Thus the aim of these policy 
changes was to increase efficiency by replacing the collegial with managerial top down decision-
making structures and by assigning more autonomy to university organisations. Hüther (2010) 
argues that in practice this change in the decision-making process at the central state level has little 
impact on the federal state level, because the professoriate has veto power enabling them to block 
changes or appointments. Recent studies show that university leaders do not necessarily use their 
increased formal power due to the persistence of norms of collegiality (Bieletzki 2017, Flink and 
Simon 2015, Kleimann 2015).  
Together, the external regulation and evaluation of universities by the Wissenschaftsrat and the 
changes in the legislation HRG in 1998 align with core marketisation principles to make university 
organisations business-like, to create semi-autonomous organisations with hierarchical leadership 
structures, including continuous evaluation accountability instruments, and to increase efficiency.  
The changing governance structures emerging from the fourth amendment of the HRG can be 
described as a general decline in tight state control over higher education while establishing and 
strengthening outcome-related external evaluation mechanisms, including evaluation and 
accountability instruments.  
6.4.2 The changing structure of higher education funding 
The German higher education research literature regularly refers to a chronic underfunding of the 
higher education system, holding back the advancement of research and teaching. Several funding 
programs have been established to provide additional funds to higher education institutions. This 
shift in funds results in a changing ratio between state funding and third-party project funding as 
proportions of overall income. Project funding is a form of marketisation as it supports business-like 
processes and competition between academics linking economic success with academic merit.  
As the responsible body for higher education, the federal states provide the base funding to 
institutions. Additional funding, so-called third-party funding (Drittmittel) is sourced from a 
comprehensive and encompassing funding landscape in Germany, including industry funding and 
private sponsors as well as the central state government. This funding is allocated via a competitive 
selection process, while distinct decision-making structures mean that the professoriate and the 
academics are part of the grant decision-making process. Funding  data analysed below show that-
 122 
third party funding has been increasing and arguably compensating for chronic underfunding in base 
funding while pushing the market principles of competition between academics for resources. 
Figure 6.1 shows the development of funding for higher education institutions across all federal 
states between 1980 and 2012. Higher education data collection is the responsibility of the 16 
federal states and aggregated at the central state level. The selected data on higher education 
reflects income towards staff, including professorial and non-professorial staff. 
Figure 6.1 shows the total higher education income, covering all higher education institutions in 
Germany, divided by base funding for professorial salaries, base funding for ‘operations’ and third-
party funding, generally dedicated towards research and research staff. The funding increase 
between 1990 and 1995 is largely due to the unification of the German higher education system. 
Overall higher education funding covered around 30 billion euros between 1995 and 2007. During 
this time third-party funding increased, while base funding stagnated. The data suggest that 
competitive third party funding was becoming an essential part in higher education income. From 
2008 onwards higher education income, particularly base funding increased as well as third-party 
funding.  
Figure 6.1: Germany: Total higher education income, 1980 - 2012 
 
Source: Deutsches Statistisches Bundesamt (2006, 2010, 2012), Monetäre hochschulstatistische Kennzahlen 2014 – Fachserie 11, Reihe 
4.3.2, own graph 
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Figure 6.2 shows the share of each funding category as a proportion of overall university income. 
The share of third party funding increased by small but steady increments during the 1990s and then 
from 10 percent in 2006 to 14 percent in 2012. At the same time the share of base funding as a 
proportion of all funding declined, particularly base funding for non-salary.  
Figure 6.2: Germany: Proportion of all higher education income by source, 1992–2011  
 
Source: Deutsches Statistisches Bundesamt (2006, 2010, 2012), Monetäre hochschulstatistische Kennzahlen 2014 – Fachserie 11, Reihe 
4.3.2, own graph 
The data evidence reveals that university income from third party funds increased particularly from 
2001 and with even greater annual increases from 2005 while federal states’ base funding 
stagnated. This suggests the increasing reliance of universities on third-party funding. As third-party 
funding is linked to a competitive selection process, the shift to third-party funding over state base 
funding also created competition amongst academics and higher education institutions.  
 
Both third-part funding and base funding are primarily financing salaries of junior academics known 
as Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiter (Konsortium Bundesbericht Wissenschaftlicher Nachwuchs 2017, 
51-52). The development of base funding as well as third-party funding in Figure 6.3 shows a 
substantial increase, particularly from 2008. Overall, the significance of third party funding has 
increased from 20 percent in 2001 to almost 30 percent in 2012.  
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Figure 6.3 Third party income and base funding 1980-2012, in 1.000 Euro 
 
Source: Deutsches Statistisches Bundesamt (2006, 2010, 2012), Monetäre hochschulstatistische Kennzahlen 2014 – Fachserie 11, Reihe 
4.3.2, own graph 
Third-party funding describes targeted funding from various sources (Table 6.1), including private 
industry funding and research funding from foundations and the German Research Foundation 
(DFG). The German higher education system has traditionally had a close relationship with industry 
to advance innovation through research.  
Table 6.1 Higher education third party income by source 2012 
 DFG Federal state Industry 
European 
Union 
Foundations Other 
2012 32.8% 25.5% 19.9% 9.6% 6.3% 5.9% 
Source: Deutsches Statistisches Bundesamt (2012), Monetäre hochschulstatistische Kennzahlen 2014 – Fachserie 11, Reihe 4.3.2, own 
graph 
From the outside, industry funding is often disguised because the state, the DFG or other 
foundations act as a mediator between university and industry. For instance, an additional buffer 
organisation between industry and higher education is the ‘Stifterverband für die Deutsche 
Wissenschaft’, a non-profit association representing German industry. The organisation administers 
funds, received as donations from the private sector, from business and from private persons. The 
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organisation was founded in 1920 and re-established after World War II with the aim to promote 
science and research in Germany performing ‘charitable duties and responsibilities’ (Stifterverband 
2018). Since 1985 the organisation funds professors at universities usually for a 5-year term and 
after the unification 22 professors were funded. It is difficult to measure the extent of private 
industry funding for universities because data sets are not transparent. Hence, the interconnection 
between business and scientific research is evident but further details are hidden. Ultimately, these 
relationships raise questions about the influence of industry in determining research content of 
academics working in collaboration with industry or foundations. 
The DFG is the main funding body and is an administrative “self-governing organisation for science 
and research” over research funding from the central state and federal states as well as donations 
(Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft 2015b). This organisation administers fixed-term research 
funding according to merit in a competitive multi-layered and strictly peer-reviewed decision-making 
processes. Funds can be spent on research personnel and equipment and include a fixed proportion 
for administration costs. Additional areas of fixed term funding are PhD scholarships, research and 
research training groups or large-scale collaborative research centres. The DFG also accepts 90 
percent of the financial responsibility for the acquisition of patents (Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft 2000, 23). DFG funding doubled between 1985 and 1997 as a result of 
substantial additional funding from the central state in 1989 (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft 
2000, 13). This trend is reflected in university income in Table 6.2. After the funding increase, there 
was a substantial increase in funding applications with the rate of approval for DFG funding declining 
from 80 to 60 percent, indicating a tighter and more competitive system for research funding 
(Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft 2000, 17). In the German multiple tier science and research 
structure, the DFG is one mediating organisation between the state and the higher education sector, 
its funding philosophies are guided by principles of competition on scientific merit. The agency 
guarantees scientific merit through a multi-layered peer review process and review committees led 
by specialist reviewers (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft 2015a). 
The development of funding in Germany shows a changing proportion between base funding and 
third party funding. Competitive third party research funding has been increasing since 1990 which 
means that business-like processes and the influence of markets are growing in higher education. As 
the funding is targeted towards fixed term research projects, rather than teaching, the development 
can be described as a ‘projectification’ (Torka 2009) process because projects and project processes 
are institutionalised in higher education funding. While this also means that research activities are 
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increasingly funded, the stagnation of base funding leads to the question of how universities meet 
student demand.  
6.4.3 The growth in student numbers  
Figure 6.4 shows that student numbers in Germany increased slowly but continuously between 1980 
and 2013. There was a strong increase in student enrolments between 1980 and 1989, and the large 
increase between 1989 and 1990 is due the unification of the higher education systems. Between 
1982 and 1998, student numbers increased from 1.1 to 1.8 million. 
Figure 6.4: Germany: Total student numbers, domestic and international, 1975–2014 
 
 
Source: Deutsches Statistische Bundesamt (2017), Studierende, own graph 
 
In 1999 the higher education system, including universities and universities of applied sciences, 
consisted of 350 institutions, 97 universities, 6 education colleges, 16 theology colleges, 49 art 
colleges, 28 colleges for administration and 154 general universities of applied sciences. The system 
had 1.8 million students in 1999, which grew to 2 million in 2009 and to 2.5 million in 2013. While 
higher education expansion was continuous, the data confirms a greater growth in student numbers 
since 2009. International students do not drive the growth in student numbers, as the share of 
international students was 9 percent in 1999 increasing to 11 percent in 2013 and 13 percent in 
2016 (Figure 6.5). There are no fees for domestic or international students in higher education in 
Germany which means that there is no market for fee paying students.  
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Figure 6.5: Germany: Student numbers by domestic and international, 1999–2016 
 
Source: Deutsches Statistisches Bundesamt (2017), own graph 
 
The growth in student numbers raises the question of how universities coped with rising student 
numbers and stagnating state base funding, questions, that would have had implications for staffing 
policies. 
6.4.4 The beginning of marketisation  
Under the conservative government marketisation policies entered the policy discourse as well as 
higher education policy. Marketisation and business-like policies, including competition and 
evaluation measures, were implemented into higher education policy and often such instruments 
were introduced as a condition of research funding. Hödl and Zegelin (1999, 190) argue that 
competition was an acceptable and politically enforceable instrument from the 1980s in Germany. 
However, the policy evidence in this section demonstrates that competitive research grants funding 
allocated by DFG and other foundations were established and became accepted practice. The 
income evidence shows that third party funding increased, filling the funding shortage emerging 
from the stagnation of federal base funding for higher education. 
During the 1980s and 90s the role of the central government in higher education shifted from a 
strong state-centred mode to a steering mode. Oehler (1998, 419) argues that the rise of markets 
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and business-like mechanisms for the provision of education have in fact intensified rather than 
declinined the role of the state particularly as a coordinator. This change is particularly due to the 
HRG reform, which assigned greater autonomy to higher education institutions, enabling them to 
establish distinct university profiles. The fourth amendment to the higher education legislation 
(HDR) in 1998 fulfilled a double purpose, providing organisational autonomy as a foundation for 
further marketisation mechanisms, while ensuring regulatory decision-making power of the central 
state through the inclusion of accountability and evaluation mechanisms.  
6.5 Enduring ascendance of marketisation (1999–2005)  
From late 1998, the Social Democrats (SPD) took over government with Chancellor Gerhard 
Schröder. This government continued the path of reforming higher education policy by introducing 
additional marketisation policies. Major changes occurred in three key areas: the restructuring of the 
university degree structure under the Bologna process; the Fifth Amendment to the legal framework 
for higher education, sparking disagreement between state and federal state over higher education 
governance; and the introduction of the central government’s so-called excellence initiative for 
universities.  
6.5.1 The Bologna reform  
In June 1999, the Bologna Declaration, named after the Italian city home to Europe’s oldest 
university, was signed by 29 European states, establishing the European Higher Education Area 
(EHEA). The political process to harmonise the European higher education systems had been well 
under way since the early 1990s. The aims of a harmonised higher education system were to 
facilitate labour market demand across the European Economic Community as well as to strengthen 
the European identity and academic mobility across countries with different political, cultural and 
academic traditions. The Ministry of Education in Germany stresses that a harmonised higher 
education system and comparable university degree structure across the European Union was 
particularly important to accommodate labour market demands. A harmonised higher education 
system also facilitates student and academic mobility across higher education systems in Europe 
contributing to socio-economic success (Konsortium Bundesbericht Wissenschaftlicher Nachwuchs 
2013).  
 
The EHEA involved a number of components, which together build the foundation for the 
introduction of business-like principles into the German higher education system. The three key 
components are the standardisation of university degrees, the promotion of European co-operation 
in quality assurance in the creation of a quality framework of learning outcomes and the European 
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Credit Transfer System (ECTS) (European Higher Education Area 2009). European countries agreed 
on a three-tier degree structure in a three-year undergraduate and two-year graduate degree 
(Bachelor/Master) followed by the Doctoral degree, with all degrees providing a lawful occupational 
qualification.  
 
In Germany the implementation of the Bologna reform meant a short-cycle Bachelor university 
degree with full occupational qualification was introduced as well as a two-year Master degree. This 
replaced the traditional five-year Diploma and Magister degree structure. In addition, the degree 
structure was implemented across universities and universities of applied sciences, which effectively 
meant that degrees were unified. Previously, the different tertiary institutions also had different 
degrees. Münch (2011, 328) argues that this structural change is a cultural revolution in Germany 
because the Bachelor and Master structure resembles an educational market model with access to 
the Master degree not guaranteed but on merit, which replaced the traditional five-year 
professional education model. The new short-cycle degree structure means that students are 
‘employable’ in the labour market after three years instead of five, which resembles an 
economisation process as time and educational expense was limited.  
 
The second component is the European Qualifications Framework, describing the essential learning 
outcomes and enabling the harmonisation and comparability of national qualification systems. The 
qualifications are broad levels of learning, including ‘knowledge and understanding’, ‘knowledge and 
understanding in field of study and broad contexts’, and ‘comprehensive knowledge and 
understanding involving critical understanding’ (European Higher Education Area 2009). The 
structure and contents by which these outcomes are achieved is the responsibility of the national 
higher education institution.  
 
The third key component of the Bologna reform introduced the European Credit Transfer System. 
The assignment of credits for all university courses is based on student workload, learning outcomes 
and grades. Mostly credits link to the average time students use to achieve the desired learning 
outcomes. An essential element for the harmonisation and student mobility of the European higher 
education area is the recognition of course modules. Course modules are parcels of the overall study 
curriculum or categories that entail various study tasks linked to precise learning outcomes and 
activities, which translate to the credit system (Adeiman 2008, 52-61).  
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In Germany a study module links to the European Credit Transfer System and may include seminars, 
lectures and laboratory classes. A certain number of successfully completed modules qualify for the 
award of a degree. The focus of these modules and the new degree structure exemplifies an 
educational shift from an input to an output focus or from a teaching focus to the focus on 
predefined learning outcomes. Seminars were originally conceptualised from the perspective of the 
lecturer or professor rather than the student perspective (Winter 2012, 38). This pedagogical shift 
from a provider to a consumer persepective was breaking with the Humboldtian tradition of 
research based learning in higher education because academics taught in outcome oriented modules 
rather than their own specific topics. Münch (2011, 332) argues that the Bachelor and Master 
degrees are leading to the uncoupling of education and the academic profession, under the 
guidelines of a neoliberal policy agenda.  
 
Indeed the harmonisation of the European higher education landscape fosters the learning of 
general knowledge because of the rationales of modularisation. Modularisation is a critical element 
for the success of the EHEA and it links to the premises of marketisation and business-like principles 
in four ways. First, a modular study structure gives the student and academic flexibility and mobility 
thereby creating a competitive higher education area. Second, it provides greater leeway for 
students to choose their study modules and institutions. Third, the module structure enables a 
relatively fast response to employers’ needs because the modules are a confined learning structure, 
rather than the degree as a whole, enabling fast changes, which increases student employability. 
Lastly in combination, the short-cycle study mode and course modularisation reduce costs and 
maximise resources and efficiency as modules can be shared across faculties and can be more easily 
adapted to changing needs.  
 
Industry and politics, as well as the Wissenschaftsrat, welcomed the EHEA restructuring process 
because it meant harmonisation with the Anglo-American degree system (Bartz 2007, 213). This 
shows that the Bologna principles link to the premises of a global higher education market. The 
EHEA also strongly aligns with the broader economic restructure towards a more competitive 
Europe, in which education is incorporated into the economic strategies emphasised in the Lisbon 
declaration (European Parliament 2000): 
The Union has today set itself a new strategic goal for the next decade: to become the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable 
economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion. 
In 2002 the Bologna process was formally established through the fifth amendment of HRG 
strengthening the wording from the fourth amendment of the HRG that had already enabled the 
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voluntary establishment of the Bachelor and Master degrees and provided universities with the 
necessary autonomy to implement the Bologna reforms. In 2003, the 16 federal states agreed to the 
common accreditation processes of Bachelor and Master degrees as summarised in common 
structural guidelines (Kultusministerkonferenz 2005). The Bologna reform changed the structure of 
university degrees and created business-like processes. 
6.5.2 Amendments to higher education regulation 
The fifth amendment of the HRG by the central state triggered new disagreements over rights and 
responsibilities in higher education governance. A new employment category known as junior 
professorships was introduced, formally abolishing the habilitation (the highest postdoctoral 
academic qualification) as a prerequisite to obtaining a professorship and introduced a ban on the 
introduction of student fees for the first degree (Bundesministerium der Justiz und für 
Verbraucherschutz 2018b). Some federal states argued that the amendments to the introduction of 
the employee category of the junior professor were beyond the authority of the central state under 
federalism. Following a high court decision in 2004, the central state amended the legal conditions 
for the new employment category, which essentially provided increased creative leeway for federal 
states in the design of a new professorial employment category (Deutscher Bundestag 2004). 
Consequently, several federal states amended their legislation and introduced the employment 
category ‘junior professor’. 
 
While students in Germany have always paid an administrative fee of around 150 euros per 
semester, the system is largely funded through taxes. This amendment prompted a lawsuit by 
several federal states, arguing that this clause would impede the principles of federalism and the 
federal states’ right to regulate higher education funding and employment. In 2004 and in early 2005 
the constitutional court decided in favour of the federal states arguing that the higher education 
legislation (HRG) amendment indeed posed an act of ultra vires, an act that is beyond the authority 
of the federal state to perform (Bundesverfassungsgericht 2015). From 2006, seven federal states 
introduced student fees of between 500 and 1,000 euros per semester. The use and amount of 
student fees is rather restricted because otherwise it would interfere with the right of free 
education. In practice, student fees were high in administrative effort and low in return. The 
changing political landscape and student boycott consequently led to the abolishment of student 
fees from 2012 and since 2014 in all federal states.  
 
These developments demonstrate the struggle over legislative authority over higher education 
between the central state and the federal states. It also shows that the concept of student fees was 
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present throughout, however different requirements across the federal states as well as the 
constitutional right to free education restricted successful implementation. To date competition and 
markets in teaching are limited in Germany. However, to date, student fees and markets in teaching 
are not enforceable. For this reason research funding is the main gateway of German marketization 
policies. 
6.5.3 Marketisation in research governance – the ‘Excellence Initiative’ 
Marketisation in research and across universities was advanced during this period. To increase 
international competitiveness of German research and as reaction to the Lisbon declaration from 
2000 the Schröder government proposed new funding for research and graduate colleges linked to 
the creation of ‘elite universities’. After the federal states initially blocked the initiative, the new 
program for research funding was launched in 2004. State entities agreed on the conditions for the 
allocation of 2 billion euros over 4 years in 2005 and the ‘Excellence Initiative’ (Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft and Wissenschaftsrat 2008). The central state funding is 75 percent and the 
federal state 25 percent but only if a university in that federal state receives a grant (Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft and Wissenschaftsrat 2008). The aim of the initiative is to support German 
research institutions, graduate training and research projects to improve scientific credibility, and 
increase the international competitiveness through increased performance as well as the visibility of 
German universities and research.   
 
The excellence initiative links temporary funding to the building of research structures and research 
projects, rather than unconditional base funding. By focusing on research, rather than teaching, the 
initiative also further separates the higher education system into research focused and teaching 
focused institutions (Hartmann 2006, 449). Unlike other competitive research funding, this initiative 
specifically promotes research structures, such as laboratories or innovative ideas that promote 
research and innovation, such as graduate schools in university institutions. In a competitive process 
higher education institutions, rather than individual academics, apply for funding in three different 
categories: graduate schools, excellence cluster and future concepts (Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft 2018). The DFG and the Wissenschaftsrat are appointed to oversee the 
application as well as the peer review process. In a competitive process and from more than 600 
applications approximately 37 higher education institutions received temporary funding as well as 
the title ‘Excellence Institution’ in 2006 (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft & Wissenschaftsrat  
2008). The excellence initiative breaks with the traditional principle of a homogenous higher 
education system by providing a selected group of universities with special funding and status and 
not others. It was noticed by the then president of the German research council, Ernst-Ludwig 
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Winnacker that the excellence program will change the German research landscape forever, as it 
focuses on competition between university institutions rather than between ideas or people 
(Winnacker 2006). Teichler points out that only the academic scholar can be excellent, never an 
entire institution or faculty (2005, 338). The excellence initiative advances marketisation in higher 
education by creating competition at the institutional level and establishing a two-tier higher 
education system of so-called excellent and non-excellent universities. 
 
During the social democratic government under Chancellor Schröder marketisation and business 
principles were particularly advanced in higher education research, rather than in teaching. 
Nevertheless, some reforms are potentially the foundation for marketisation in teaching as shorter 
degrees and modularisation are the building blocks of a teaching market. Marketisation in research 
was advanced by the central state at the institutional level. The establishment of elite universities 
created winners and losers in the higher education landscape. Overall, during this period the central 
state government, while constrained by the legal regulatory federal decision-making system, found 
creative leeway to steer the higher education system further towards market principles. 
6.6 Marketisation and federalism in higher education (2006–2010) 
In 2005, the Christian Democratic Union party took over government with Chancellor Angela Merkel. 
During this period the global financial crisis hit, negatively affecting economic activity. A key priority 
of the new government was the modernisation of federalism, including the division of decision-
making powers between the two levels of government. This modernisation meant that the central 
state largely withdrew from detailed regulation of higher education. At the same time the central 
state increased steering and reach in science and research through targeted investment. 
 
Under federalism in German higher education, the central state regulates the framework and each 
of the 16 federal states, which regulate the details of higher education. Since the most recent 
amendment of the higher education legislation (HRG) in 2002 there had been agreement among 
states and unease over the increased authority of the central state over the federal states’ power 
over higher education. With the amendments to the framework, the decision-making power of 
federal governments was reaffirmed while the central governing authority discontinued legislative 
powers over educational planning, the structure of higher education institutions, the remuneration 
of higher education employees, higher education building infrastructure and funding of large 
equipment (Deutscher Bundestag 2006, Pasternack 2011). The central state continued to have 
decision-making power over four key areas: the student support regulation (BAFOEG), regulation 
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about level of university entrance qualifications, regulation over limitation and termination of 
employment contracts of scientific assistants and the advancement of science and research 
(Pasternack 2011, 37ff).  
This legislative change means increasing decision-making power as well as responsibility for funding 
of higher education institutions for the federal states. Regional disparities in economic power and 
taxation income as well as higher education policies across federal states indicate increasing 
engagement in a self-imposed competition of higher education quality (Pasternack 2011, 16). This 
includes competition over academic personnel as remuneration differs across states (Deutscher 
Hochschulverband 2017). Some federal states have greater means than others to invest in higher 
education infrastructure and funding of large equipment, which potentially determines student 
demand. The evidence suggests that the increase of federal state decision-making power over higher 
education fosters market mechanisms, particularly competition over academics and students, rather 
than providing boundaries for market expansion.  
 
The central state’s scope of responsibility over higher education reduced yet it continued to be a 
significant provider of funding, particularly for science and research.  First, science and research 
received additional funding following the global financial crisis, including investment in large 
innovative research projects and the excellence initiative as well as general research funding to the 
DFG (Deutscher Forschungsgemeinschaft 2016, Mahner and Wolf 2010, 393). Second, in 2007 the 
‘Hochschulpakt I’ (2007–2010) was created as a joint funding program by the central state and the 
federal states to support infrastructure and higher education hospitals and other expenses to 
accommodate an expected 91,000 additional students as a result of earlier high school reform 
(Hochschulrektorenkonferenz 2015). Third, the central state government substantially increased 
student living support payment (BAFÖG) in 2008 and invested in a scholarship scheme for excellent 
students (Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung (2018b). The funding schemes, including 
the excellence initiative, are based on a competitive merit process fostering market mechanisms in 
science and research. Finally, the government legislated the conditions for employment contracts for 
non-tenured academic staff. In 2007, the ‘Act on academic fixed-term contracts’, known as the 
Wissenschaftszeitvertragsgesetz (WissZeitVG), came into force. This act limits employment after 
obtaining the doctorate in a higher education institution to 6 years (Bundesministerium für Bildung 
und Forschung 2016). Non-professorial academic cannot engage in a contract with the higher 
education institution unless obtaining a professorial position or unless the position is funded by 
third-party funding. This act epitomises the increasing dependency of the German higher education 
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system on third-party funding and is crucial to understand the rise of precarious academic 
employment in the secondary market (see 7.6). 
 
German higher education policy focuses on research funding and supports the conditions of funding 
agencies. Not surprisingly, Chancellor Angela Merkel described the most important funding agency 
DFG as promoting “excellence, competition and internationality” which summarises the major policy 
direction in higher education of the coalition government well (Merkel 2006, 1). On the one side, the 
federalism reform has provided the federal states with increasing autonomy while also fostering 
competition across the higher education sector. On the other side, the central state continues to 
exercise substantial influence and steering power over science and research through substantial 
funding initiatives. As these science and research funding initiatives are linked to market 
mechanisms, such as competition, the central state strengthens marketisation while bypassing 
federal law. Mahner and Wolf describe the structure a ‘golden rein’, exemplifying how the steering 
and affluent central state executes power over financially suffering federal states (2010, 396). This 
means that marketisation policies contribute to the growth of regional differences in higher 
education.  
6.7 Conclusion   
The chronological presentation of major policy changes in higher education in Germany 
demonstrates the role of the state in facilitating market mechanisms in the allocation of competitive 
public funding, particularly towards research.  
The policy evidence showed that the central state was the key actor in strengthening competition 
and marketisation policies in higher education. Marketisation policies were established in line with 
existing structures and regulations of higher education created after the Second World War, 
including the regulative and funding allocation system. The evidence suggests that marketisation 
policies in Germany are foremost used as a strategy to foster economic growth through science and 
research, rather than changing the regulations around higher education teaching. Marketisation 
policies strengthened the competitive allocation of short-term third party research funding on the 
individual and institutional level. To enhance competition amongst institutions, more institutional 
autonomy and new institutional differences were created. The emerging differences are further 
exaggerated by the central state’s priority towards the advancement of science and research evident 
in the excellence initiative. Finally, employment conditions were adjusted to the needs of short-term 
project funding.  
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This evidence of marketisation in the provision of a public service partially contradicts some of the 
theoretical premises of the welfare state literature (Esping-Andersen 1999, Hall and Soskice 2001). 
The welfare state literature argues that the influence of various actors, including trade unions or in 
this case the academic profession, poses a substantial opposition to the implementation of 
marketisation policies. This chapter showed that this was the case for the introduction of tuition 
fees, but not for the introduction of NPM or the strengthening of competitive third-party funding. 
This means that marketisation policies and practices incrementally entered policy, legislation and 
practice. The continuous amendments and modifications to higher education regulation, particularly 
in the allocation of public funding and the changes to higher education governance, reflect a gradual 
and continuous process of change under marketisation (Streeck and Thelen 2005a).  
The expansion of marketisation policies in higher education teaching and in research regulation 
produces challenges for academic labour markets. While the German higher education system has 
experienced significant growth in student numbers, policy changes under marketisation have led to 
increasing requirements for academics emerging from the linkage between performance evaluation 
and funding allocation.  To assess the structural effects of these policy changes, the next chapter 
chronically investigates and analysis the changing academic labour markets in Germany. 
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7 Germany’s academic labour market under marketisation 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter established that marketisation policies and practices flourished in the German 
higher education system between 1980 and 2012. These policies generated the increase in 
competitive short-term third party funding for academics and institutions alike and strengthened 
institutional autonomy and other NPM initiatives. The regulatory policies and mechanisms are not 
only shaping individual behaviour but academic labour market structures as a whole.   
 
This chapter demonstrates the increasing segmentation of academic labour markets. Using the 
analytical framework of labour segmentation theory established in chapter 3, academic labour 
markets are categorised into a permanent primary and a non-permanent secondary labour market. 
Indeed, the evidence shows an amplification of the traditionally segmented academic labour market 
in the German corporatist welfare state between 1980 and 2012. This chapter argues that the 
increasing segmentation of academic labour markets correlates with the marketisation of higher 
education regulation. It shows how specific mechanisms under marketisation produce a growing 
secondary labour market within the traditional structures of the German academic labour market. 
On the one side, the evidence contradicts the theoretical premises of the comparative political 
economy literature, which predict employment security and reluctance to implement liberalisation 
policies within corporatist welfare states. On the other side, the fact that academic labour market 
structures are not changing confirms the theoretical premises.  
 
The focus of this chapter is on an analysis of changes, correlations and links between academic 
labour markets, higher education institutions and regulation. After a brief overview of the German 
academic labour market and its governance, section 7.3 analyses the developments in academic 
employment between 1980 and 2012. Section 7.4 investigates the primary academic labour market 
and reveals the structures that support the rigid traditional employment conditions of the 
professoriate. Then section 7.5 examines the 'gate keeping' mechanisms protecting the primary 
labour market in the Germany 'chair system'. Section 7.6 analyses the trends and developments on 
the secondary academic labour market by linking the growth of employment to particular 
marketisation policies and practices. This chapter demonstrates that the academic labour markets in 
the corporatist welfare state of Germany are advancing in the direction of employment protection 
regime ascribed to liberal welfare states. This can be causally attributed to the mechanisms of higher 
education regulation under marketisation.  
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7.2 The German academic labour market  
In its organisational form, the German academic labour market is a chair system, rather than a 
departmental system (Clark 1983, Neave and Rhoades 1987). The chair system is hierarchical 
because positions at the university are subordinate to the professoriate, as the highest entity. This 
hierarchical structure is reinforced by formal employment conditions, because the professor is, by 
statute a lifelong civil servant, employed by the state. This means that the professoriate enjoys high 
status and benefits, including nonredeemable job security, autonomy and considerable financial 
resources to fund research and teaching. Academic employment below the professoriate is 
traditionally non-permanent and employees are largely subordinate to a professor. This means that 
according to labour segmentation theory outlined in Chapter 3, the professoriate categorise in the 
primary academic labour market and the non-professorial and non-permanent employees categorise 
in the secondary academic labour market. This employment contract inequality between a core 
workforce and a subordinated workforce is historically embedded in the organisational form of the 
chair system.  
 
The origins of the chair structure can be traced to the mediaeval guilds, associations of artisans in 
control of their craft or skills. The early European universities in Bologna originated as guilds of 
students and later became guilds of masters (Weber 2002, 21-35). In many European countries 
professors are state employees with power over the direction of research and over a considerable 
budget as well as over facilities and resources such as junior academic staff (Kreckel 2008, Musselin 
2009a, Neave and Rhoades 1987). Perkin argues that the professoriate is “the arm of state 
bureaucracy in most European countries, wholly supported by the government and protected in the 
western democracies by a well understood Humboldtian tradition of Lehrfreiheit and Lernfreiheit” 
[translation: freedom to teach and freedom to learn] (in Clark 1987, 44). The chair systems, while 
prevalent in many European states, do differ in their dependency from state. In some countries the 
institution rather than the state employs the professoriate. In general though, the structure of the 
academic chair system assigns formal authority to the professoriate only. The authority of the 
professoriate stretches from the research agenda to course and degree content to the employment 
of scientific assistants as well as new professorial appointments. Professors have considerable 
autonomy over their work and over their research institute; they have no superiors within the 
university institution, a formal superior is the state ministry (Stölting and Schimank 2001, Schimank 
and Lange 2009). For instance, in Germany newly appointed professors are subject to formal 
approval by the federal state ministries of education, indicating that the state governs the primary 
academic labour market.  
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The roots of the German chair system can be traced to the Humboldtian university reforms in the 
nineteenth century. A key characteristic of the German academic labour market is the deep division 
between a relatively small group of the professoriate in permanent employment and a large group 
of non-permanent academic employees (Enders 1996, Kreckel 2008). Despite a changing 
environment the traditional features that uphold this division endure, particularly the unity of 
teaching and research, the public status of universities and the prominent role of the professoriate 
(Schimank and Winnes 2001). In this system the professoriate has proxy-employer powers because 
individual professors select and employ the non-professorial assistants and academics, yet formally 
employed by the university.  
 
The professoriate in Germany is sub-divided into three different groups: teaching focused professors 
at universities of applied sciences, research and teaching professors at universities and research 
focussed professors at non-university research institutes i.e. of the Max-Planck-Society. The last two 
are the most independent and influential academics with higher financial budgets and greater 
responsibilities (Enders and Teichler 1997). In addition, in 2002 the German legislation introduced 
the junior professor, with legally similar duties and responsibilities as university professors, but the 
employment is non-permanent with limited term civil servant status (Bundesministerium der Justiz 
und für Verbraucherschutz 2018b, Enders 2001).  
 
The non-professorial academic employees in the secondary labour market are formally subordinated 
to the professoriate and have a non-permanent employment status in common (with the exception 
of a few). The non-professoriate employees group into six specific categories (Enders 1996, 112-
116): first, research assistants (wissenschaftliche Hilfskraft); second, lecturers funded by university 
budget (wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiter); third, research associates (wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiter) 
funded by external third-party funding; fourth, doctoral students funded by scholarships; fifth, 
scientific assistants (wissenschaftliche Assistenten) funded by the university and holding a doctorate; 
and sixth, academic assistants (Dozenten) or scientific collaborators with permanent contracts. In 
general, all non-professorial positions are engaged to some extent in institutional teaching and 
research projects while also working on individual research, such as a PhD thesis or post-doctoral 
research. However, for the purpose of anaysing the segmentation of academic labour markets, the 
non-professoriate will be categorised according to their non-permanent employment status as the 
secondary academic labour market.  
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The following section analyses the developments on the primary and secondary academic labour 
markets between 1980 and 2012 and links the trends and expansion to marketisation policies 
established in Chapter 6. 
 
7.3 Higher education labour market developments 1980–2012 
The data demonstrates substantial growth in employment in higher education between 1980 and 
2012. The higher education labour market consists of non-academic employees, professorial and 
non-professorial academic employees. Non-academic employment is defined as engaging in 
administration, technical support and other support roles and professorial as well as non-
professorial employees are engaging in teaching and research with different responsibilities and 
employment conditions (Deutsches Statisitsches Bundesamt 2013). 
 
Figure 7.1 shows the growth in academic and non-academic employment in higher education 
between 1980 and 2012. During this time all employment has doubled from approximately 300,000 
to over 600,000 employees (full-time and part-time). At the same time, student numbers doubled 
from 1.1 million to 2.2 million. The growth in overall academic employment links with the growth in 
student numbers, which means that the student-staff ratio was largely constant during this time. 
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Figure 7.1: Germany: Employees (full-time and part-time) in tertiary education, 1980–2012 
 
 
Source: Deutsches Statistisches Bundesamt (2013b) Fachserie 11, Reihe 4.4 Personal an Hochschulen (sowie 
Habilitationen), own calculations and graphs. 
 
Figure 7.2 displays four phases of employment growth. In the first phase between 1980 and 1989 
academic and non-academic staff numbers increased slowly and steadily while student numbers 
increased 50 percent, from 1 million to 1.5 million. The 1980s are conceptualised as the slow 
ascendance of marketisation policies in higher education, when marketisation discourse entered 
debates and competitive research funding increased. During this time the number of non-academic 
staff was considerably higher than the number of academic staff, yet the increase in academic 
employment, suggests this was a result of increasing student numbers and research funding.  
 
The second phase of employment growth, between 1990 and 1996, correlates with the ascendance 
of marketisation policies. The growth in employment and the increase in student numbers between 
1990 and 1992 are primarily caused by the unification of the higher education systems of former 
East and West Germany. Academic employment continued to increase during the 1990s until 1996 
after which academic staff numbers declined significantly. This decline in academic employment is 
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associated with stagnating funding towards higher education between 1994 and 1997 (Figure 6.1). In 
1996 the central state government responded to this shortage by granting additional funding 
through the introduction of a new funding program, the 'Hochschulsonderrahmenprogramm III', as 
outlined in Section 6.4. 
 
The third phase from 1997 to 2005 shows a slow but continuous increase in academic employment 
after a stark decline between 1996 and 1997, while non-academic staff declined slightly. This 
development is associated with the policy phase of enduring ascendance of marketisation, when the 
Bologna process substantially transformed higher education, third-party research funding increased 
and the excellence initiative was introduced (Section 6.5). This suggests that the policy changes that 
led to the increase in competitive research funding correlate with the increase in academic 
employment.  
 
The fourth phase from 2006 to 2012 shows consistent employment growth in higher education, 
mainly in academic employment. In 2008 the number of academic employees even exceeded the 
number of non-academic employees, evident in Figure 7.1. This employment growth correlates with 
the increase in competitive third-party funding, including the excellence initiative (Section 6.6). This 
development suggests that the growth in academic employment is a result of the growing funding 
towards the higher education system. In addition, during this phase legislation reaffirmed 
responsibility of the 16 federal states for higher education while the central state further increased 
funding towards science and research. This suggests that the growth in academic employment is 
associated with increasing funding for higher education science and research. Project funding for 
science and research is likely to trigger academic, rather than non-academic employment, explaining 
the rise of the former. This also means that academic employment growth is a result of the increase 
of funding for science and research, rather than funding for teaching.   
 
An in-depth investigation of academic employment categories shows a growing imbalance between 
professorial and non-professorial employees. Figure 7.2 shows the substantial growth of the non-
professorial academic workforce (junior staff) in contrast to a stagnating growth trend of the 
professoriate. Between 1980 and 2012, non-professorial academic staff quadrupled from 40,000 to 
over 160,000 employees, an annual increase of 10,000 employees between 2004 and 2011 alone. In 
contrast, employment growth in the permanent professorial level employees was comparatively 
low. The professoriate grew from 28,220 in 1980 to 43,860 employees in 2012. The growth in the 
professoriate can partially be explained by the unification process between 1990 and 1992 as well as 
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by the introduction of the junior professor positions in 2002. This development in academic  
employment growth means that the ratio between professors and non-professorial academic 
employees increased from 1:1.3 in 1980 to 1:3.8 in 2012. In 2012 on average four non-professorial 
academics were subordinated to one professor, while in 1980 one professor employed one non-
professorial employee. This demonstrates that the growth of academic employment was due to the 
growth of non-permanent employment in the secondary labour market.  
Figure 7.2: Germany: Number of academic staff by category, 1980–2012  
 
Source: Deutsches Statistisches Bundesamt (2013b) Fachserie 11, Reihe 4.4 Personal an Hochschulen (sowie 
Habilitationen), own calculation and graph. 
Figure 7.3 shows the relative decline in professorial employment and the growth in non-professorial 
employment. The proportion of professors in overall academic employment has declined from over 
30 percent in 1980 to just below 20 percent in 2010. The new employment category of ‘junior 
professor’ did not stop the trend in the decreasing proportion of the professoriate.  
At the same time the proportion of non-professorial academics (junior staff) has increased from 44 
percent in 1980 to 74 percent in 2010, an increase of 30 percentage points in 30 years or an increase 
of 68 percent. The German non-professorial group categories into academic staff employment and 
paid through higher education institutions, and staff employed and paid through funds from third-
party projects. In addition, data evidence shows the latter category more than doubled from 19 
percent in 1992 to 39 percent in 2009 (Deutsches Statistisches Bundesamt 2013, 28). Overall, the 
data in Figure 7.3 demonstrates that, as a proportion of overall academic employment, employment 
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in the primary academic labour market has declined while employment in the secondary academic 
labour market has grown significantly from 65 percent in 1992 to 83 percent in 2009 (Deutsches 
Statistisches Bundesamt 2013, 28). Permanent employment includes the professoriate as well as 
some employees in the category of ‘other professionals’, such as Dozenten. 
 
The employment category of ‘casuals' (including assistant lecturers, laboratory assistants and 
language teachers) declined from over 20 percent in 1980 to 5 percent in 2010. The significant 
decline between 1980 and 1985 suggests a phasing out of this employment category while the 
increase between 1990 and 1992 suggests that the re-unification between former East and West 
Germany accounts for the increase in this employment category. From 1992 ‘other professionals’ 
and therefore permanent employment below the professoriate was being phased out again and  
removed from employment law in 2004 (Section 7.2). 
Figure 7.3: Germany: Share of academic employment categories to all academic employment 
permanent and temporary, 1980–2010 
 
Sources: Deutsches Statistisches Bundesamt (2013b) Fachserie 11, Reihe 4.4 Personal an Hochschulen (sowie 
Habilitationen), own calculations and graphs. 
Overall, since the 1980s, permanent employment in academia has declined continuously while non-
permanent employment increased. In 2010, only one fifth of the academic workforce in Germany 
was in permanent employment.  
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In addition to the non-professoriate employed in fixed-term contracts, the higher education system 
increasingly employed a workforce on casual contracts. The casual workforce in Germany is 
employed by the hour, at low pay and over the course of a semester, usually to conduct seminars 
and lectures or supervision. The available data for casual employment shows significant variations in 
the number of employees when compared to all academic employees on permanent and non-
permanent contracts (Figure 7.4). This volatility of casual employment between 1980 and 2012 is 
indicative of a ‘work at call’ structure. It is likely that assistants on research projects also undertake 
teaching which would explain the decline in casuals before 1998. Since 1999, the share of casual 
employment as a proportion of all academic employment increased from 29.7 percent in 1998 to 
35.4 percent in 2012. This increase in casual employment correlated with both the establishment of 
the Bachelor and Master degrees in 1998 and with increasing student numbers. These developments 
mirror the rise of casual employment in Australia. When considering the increase in the casual 
workforce employed on a semester basis to conduct specific teaching of seminars or lectures, the 
proportional gap between permanently employed and non-permanently employed staff increases 
further.  
 
Conceptualising the academic labour market in a non-permanent and a non-permanent academic 
labour market reveals that significant increase of the secondary academic labour market. Figure 7.4 
shows a decline in the absolute number of permanent employment (the line in Figure 7.4) resulting 
in the decline in the proportion of all permanent employees, from 52 percent in 1980 to 27.3 
percent in 2012. The substantial growth of the secondary academic labour market (the bar in Figure 
7.4) means that the proportion of the permanently employed professoriate to all subordinated 
academic employees declined from 22.2 percent in 1980 to 12.4 percent in 2012. This means that in 
Germany the secondary academic labour market is six times the size of the primary academic labour 
market.  
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Figure 7.4: Germany: Primary and secondary academic labour market, 1980–2012 
Source: Deutsches Statistisches Bundesamt (2013b) Fachserie 11, Reihe 4.4 Personal an Hochschulen (sowie 
Habilitationen), own graphs and calculations. 
To understand the factors associated with the progressive growth of academic labour markets in 
Germany, the following section examines the developments in the primary academic labour market 
before investigating the gate keeping mechanisms and the rise of employment on the secondary 
academic labour market.  
7.4 The primary academic labour market: the professoriate  
The professoriate is the greatest occupational group in the primary academic labour market in 
permanent employment. As established in the previous section the professoriate is roughly on fifth 
the size of the total academic workforce, relatively small but most prestigious employment group. 
This section examines the employment conditions of the professoriate further and analyses 
developments in the primary academic labour market. The data and policy framework exposes a 
resistance to change particularly with regards to opening the group to more employees. 
  
Despite considerable changes over the last three decades in various areas of higher education, the 
employment conditions for civil servants remain prestigious and tight. The term civil servant 
(Beamter) links to a special legal status, which differs from the status of public servants who are 
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subject to the same body of laws as employees in the private sector. In contrast, civil servant law 
from 1919 outlines employees’ responsibilities as they serve society and the state not any party, 
while under the right to freedom of opinion (Bundesministerterium des Innern 2018). This status 
enables the conduct of science and research in pursuit of true knowledge but it also acts as a 
protection from misconduct and undertaking research favors. In comparison to other workers, the 
civil servant status also means a high degree of loyalty towards the state and a special duty of 
service, such as no right to strike, while the state in return commits to special welfare provisions and 
privileges, such as high retirement income. In contrast to the Anglo-Saxon primary academic labour 
market, the German primary academic labour market is embedded in a federal structure, the 
professors are state civil servants and the academic labour market system does not have a career 
management authority or promotion system (Musselin 2009, 22). In exchange for the state loyalty 
required of a civil servant, the professoriate receives financial and non-financial benefits, such as 
substantial tax benefits, reward payments, lifelong job security, a comparatively high lifelong 
pension payment and a transfer to another higher education institution only possible by agreement 
(Konsortium Bundesbericht Wissenschaftlicher Nachwuchs 2013, Farnham 2009, 202). The public 
service law states that academics are independent and autonomous professionals, responsible for 
their own duties and responsibilities in public employment (Konsortium Bundesbericht 
Wissenschaftlicher Nachwuchs 2013). Teaching hours are regulated in public service law so 
professors at universities are required to teach a minimum of 8 hours and professors at universities 
of applied science required to teach up to 18 hours (Enders and Teichler 1997, 361). The special 
provisions of the professoriate in Germany are legally embedded in the industrial relations, fostering 
hierarchies and reinforcing traditional employment structures. These provisions have not changed 
since the Second World War. 
  
The organisational structure of the higher education system assigns specific responsibilities to the 
professoriate or chair holder. A professor is responsible for running the discipline or sub discipline in 
its entirety, which includes deciding on and managing academic and non-academic staff, managing 
teaching and research and overseeing the departmental budget. The principle of one professor per 
discipline is a central feature of the German university structure and it implies that additional 
professorial employment occurs only through the creation of new fields or disciplines (Musselin 
2009a, 22). The number of the professorial positions increases through the creation of new sub 
disciplines. The final ruling on new professorial positions at universities rests with the professoriate 
on one side as well as with the state ministry on the other, which is responsible for facilitating and 
allocating professorial financial and non-financial budgets.  
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The data evidence in Table 7.1 displays the number of professors as well as the employment growth 
rate between 1980 and 2012. Apart from the growing number of professors as a result of the 
unification, there was no significant growth in permanent employment between 1995 and 2005, at a 
time when foremost temporary research funding increased and the Bologna reform was established. 
But there was growth in professorial employment between 2005 and 2012, with the appointment of 
approximately 6,000 new professors. This increase was associated with increasing funding for higher 
education science and research, for instance through the excellence initiative (Chapter 6). In 
addition, in 2008 the central and federal states established the Professorinnenprogramm, a policy 
initiative aimed at promoting new women and thus gender equality in tertiary institutions 
(Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung 2017). Under this program university institutions 
received additional funding by highlighting their equal opportunity programs, policies or incentives. 
Successful university institutions were granted funding for up to three female professors over a five-
year period (Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung 2017). This time-limited program has 
partially led to an increase in professorial employment between 2008 and 2012. The 
Professorinnnenprogramm initiative and the excellence initiative demonstrate how targeted state 
policies and programs are effective steering mechanisms in a traditional higher education 
environment. 
Table 7.1: Germany: Number and growth of professorial positions, 1980–2012 
Year Professors 
Change 
(% growth) 
1980 28 220  
1985 30 265 7.3% 
1990 30 838 1.9% 
1995 37 672 22.2% 
2000 37 794 0.3% 
2005 37 865 0.2% 
2010 41 462 9.5% 
2012 43 862 5.8% 
Source: Deutsches Statistisches Bundesamt (2013b) Fachserie 11, Reihe 4.4 Personal an Hochschulen (sowie 
Habilitationen), own calculations. 
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There are two professorial subgroups in the primary academic labour market: the university 
professor and the professor of applied science (Fachhochschulen). There are three levels in the 
professorial status hierarchy, reflected in the salary level and remuneration rate (Besoldungsstufen’. 
Until 2005 professors were divided into three sub-groups: the C2, C3 and C4 categories (with C1 for 
non-professorial scientific assistants). C4 represented the highest remuneration and status category 
as outlined in state civil service law (ordinaries). Since 2005 the remuneration rate framework was 
amended (Deutscher Hochschulverband 2016b) so that the federal states and university institutions 
were granted leverage to determine remuneration packages on top of a base salary which suggests 
that remuneration levels vary across different states and universities as well as disciplines. The W-
remuneration scale includes W1, W2 and W3. W2 (Associate Professor) and W3 (Professor) are 
generally in permanent employment while W1 is the salary category for the ‘junior professor’, 
generally in non-permanent employment. The W-salary system is a combination of a base salary and 
bonus or merit payments for professorial call or stay negotiations with the university, achievements 
in teaching and research, administrative tasks within university governance and successful grant 
applications (Biester 2013, 9). The amendment of the remuneration framework means that 
professors are subject to performance evaluation by the university management as well as by the 
state ministry (Handel 2005, Schimank 2005). The inclusion of a performance evaluation into the 
remuneration framework reflects a discursive and policy shift towards managerialism (Chapter 6) 
because it deviates from the traditional remuneration principles of the civil service status. The new 
remuneration system includes a competitive bonus payment element and is conceptualised as a 
reward payment for undertaking research and academic work, rather than as a protective 
employment instrument, reflecting some of the principles of New Public Management, including 
business mechanisms such as competition and incentive scheme payments (Chapter 6). 
 
Professorial career advancement structures are unique to the German system. While the 
professorial salary system contains three levels (W1, W2 and W3), institutional or internal career 
advancement is unlikely in the German system. Career advancement occurs by obtaining an offer 
from a different university institution and ensures salary increase as well as improved conditions 
necessary for teaching and research such as a laboratory or additional staff (Musselin 2009a). In 
addition, a professor may always apply for another post at another university, which seems 
attractive because the appointee might be in a powerful negotiation position over working 
conditions across two universities. This means that professorial career advancement is linked to the 
enhancement in non-monetary incentive as well as responsibilities and duties, rather than only 
monetary remuneration. 
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Overall employment growth in the primary labour market has been relatively low, albeit with some 
growth from 2007, which is correlated with the implementation of marketisation policies 
incentivised by the central state. The primary academic labour market is internally stratified 
between different professorial levels and while a revised remuneration concept was meant to 
reward high achieving professors, the effects have so far been insignificant. The exclusivity of the 
professoriate in the primary labour market has been further reinforced through the decline of 
permanent employment in the category of ‘other occupations’. Interestingly, the evidence shows 
that the professorial roles are always undertaking research and teaching, rather than research or 
teaching, positions increasingly common in Australia for instance. In addition, employment 
conditions as well as remuneration of the professoriate, such as the number of teaching hours, are 
regulated by state law, rather than by university management or enterprise bargaining agreement as 
evident in Australia. This suggests that not only secure employment but also the traditional nexus 
between research and teaching remains strong throughout the professoriate, reflecting the enduring 
Humboldtian principle of academic work. 
7.5 The ‘gatekeeping’ mechanism for access to the primary academic labour 
market 
The gatekeeping mechanism in German higher education describes the control mechanisms that 
limit the access to the primary academic labour market. Traditionally, only academics with a second 
major research work after the PhD, the ‘Habilitation’, qualified for the professoriate. The 
‘Habilitation’ requires taking up academic service work under professorial supervision, while also 
conducting autonomous research. The timeframe for this additional period of apprenticeship is on 
average six years or more. The long traditional qualification process for the professoriate, via the 
habilitation, means academics only get a permanent position very late in life, at an average age of 42 
years (Mayer 2002, Musselin 2009a, 23).  Compared to other countries academics obtain a secure 
lifelong job relatively late in life (Musselin 2009a, 23).  
 
In an attempt to reduce this long qualification process and to enhance the career prospects for 
junior academics, state law was amended in 2002 by introducing the ‘junior professor’ as a new 
employment category and by removing the requirement of a habilitation (Bundesministerium der 
Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz 2018b). This was seen as necessary to increase autonomy, 
competitiveness and productivity amongst early career academics internationally and nationally 
(Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz 2018b). Formally, the junior professor is 
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an independent and autonomous academic, responsible for 6 hours of face-to-face teaching. 
Nevertheless, employment is non-permanent and for a maximum period of six years, similar to the 
employment conditions of the professor.  
 
Public service law amendments meant the opening of different pathways to the professorship, 
including the right to apply with a range of qualifications such as experience from employment as 
junior assistant within or outside university, with qualifications from abroad, occupational expertise 
and a suitable record of accomplishment of employment (Konsortium Bundesbericht 
Wissenschaftlicher Nachwuchs 2013). Despite legal changes to the pathways, the norm of a long 
qualification period remains, on average around ten years.  
 
These changes in legal requirements improve employment possibilities and future prospects for 
junior academics. But while formally junior professors possess similar if not the same rights as a 
professor, the status of this employment category is comparatively low, exemplified by the title 
‘junior’. This title still suggests an ‘informal apprenticeship status’ to the professoriate. While these 
formal amendments are significant, the strong traditional career pathways structures prevail.  
 
Another informal gatekeeping mechanism is the traditional Hausberufungsverbot15, stating that 
universities should not appoint their ‘own’ workforce into the professoriate. This ban on internal 
appointments and promotion particularly applies to professors but often extends to postdocs 
(Kreckel 2008, 45, Wissenschaftsrat 2005, 11). This instrument was initially established to prevent 
preferential treatment of internal candidates, given the long periods of apprentice-master 
relationships during the PhD and Habilitation (Wissenschafsrat 2005, 12). However, this mechanism 
also encourages academic mobility, autonomy from the institution, creates pressure to build an 
external academic community, and aims to increase cross-institutional competitiveness.  
 
The roots of academic mobility enforcement are in the traditions of the profession itself and are 
grounded in the belief that mobility fosters innovation and enforces a strong affiliation with the 
discipline rather than the university institution. It is argued that the traditional concept to prevent 
internal university careers and promotions requires a non-permanent employment status of 
scientific assistants because permanent employment would undermine the advantages of mobility 
enforcement (Kreckel 2008, 51). Kreckel (2008, 49) argues that if academic mobility increases the 
quality of research and teaching it increases competitiveness. There are no legal provisions for the 
                                                          
15 The legislation states that an inner-institutional appointment could only be made in exceptional cases and with specific reasons   
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Hausberufungsverbot but federal legislations specify different requirements for the appointment of 
internal candidates, making internal career advancement possible (Deutscher Hochschulverband 
2015).  
 
When there is an opening for a professorial chair, the so-called ‘Berufungsverfahren’ or application 
process starts. This procedure can take up to two years and is described as tedious due to special 
legal procedures set by different states and universities. A selection committee oversees the process 
at the university with a diverse range of members from the professoriate, the non-professorial 
academics and students. The appointment decision is likely to be heavily influenced by the group of 
professors, as the number of professors is always larger than the sum of other members (Musselin 
2009a). Selected academics are then invited to convene a seminar. After that external referee 
reports from each of the usually three listed candidates inform the committee. Before a final 
decision is announced, not only the university needs to agree to the candidate but also the state’s 
ministry of education (Wissenschaftsrat 2005). Formally, the state, external referees, the university 
dean and individual members of the selection committee are able to overturn the decision of the 
selection committee providing an additional control instrument for potential unprofessional collegial 
favours.  
 
Traditionally, the long period of training for non-professorial academics was seen as necessary to 
advance into the non-redeemable civil service status of the professoriate. The gatekeeping 
mechanism is upheld by academic traditions and norms, policies and the legal civil service 
framework. In combination, the qualitative conditions of entry to the primary labour market and the 
evidence of the increasing non-permanent academic workforce point to a tight bottleneck between 
the primary and secondary labour market. In contrast to the Australian primary academic labour 
market, the chances of advancement into permanent academic employment in Germany are 
relatively low. 
7.6 The secondary academic labour market: the non-professoriate 
The majority of academic employees in the German higher education system work in non-
professorial roles on the secondary academic labour market. All non-professorial employees are 
employed in non-permanent positions, are formally and informally dependent on the professoriate, 
have a relatively low salary and often work part-time. These conditions are reason to conceptualise 
the non-professorial workforce into the secondary labour market. In addition, the employment 
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category ‘junior professor’ falls into the secondary labour market due to its employment status as 
non-permanent qualification positions to apply for tenures professorial positions.  
 
Non-professorial employees are formally under the supervision of the professoriate, working in 
research, teaching, continuing education and student supervision (Konsortium Bundesbericht 
Wissenschaftlicher Nachwuchs 2013, 65). The professoriate has sole decision-making power over the 
employment of non-professorial assistant staff. Historically, the non-professorial positions are part 
of the traditional Humboldtian “academic disciplinary mode of apprenticeship training” (Enders 
2005, 119) and positions tend to be filled by people known to the professoriate. While law regulates 
the salary of non-professorial positions, the number of positions and the employment conditions 
depend on the individual professorial budget.  
 
The working conditions of non-professorial staff are only partially legislated. Significantly, the federal 
states law requires that the employment contracts of non-professorial assistants include the 
allocation of a specific amount of time for autonomous research work, expressed in contracts as  
‘opportunity’ or for individual research work (Konsortium Bundesbericht Wissenschaftlicher 
Nachwuchs 2013, 67). This demonstrates the value of research for individual career development.  
 
Non-professorial employees are funded by different sources. They are remunerated either from the 
higher education base funding or from specific third-party research project funding. The 
remuneration level for non-professorial employees is also regulated in public service agreements; a 
full-time annual average salary is about 30,000 Euros after tax (Öffentlicher Dienst 2013) which is 
equivalent to the average annual income in 2013 (Deutsches Statistisches Bundesamt 2017).  
In 2007, 81 percent of the non-professorial workforce at universities was on non-permanent 
contracts (Konsortium Bundesbericht Wissenschaftlicher Nachwuchs 2013). 
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Figure 7.5: Germany: Proportion of primary and secondary academic labour market, 1980–2012 
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Source: Deutsches Statistisches Bundesamt (2013b) Fachserie 11, Reihe 4.4 Personal an Hochschulen (sowie 
Habilitationen), own graphs and calculations. 
 
The continuous increase in non-professorial employment (Figure 7.5) correlates with the increase in 
competitive third-party funding (Figure 6.3). The number of non-professorial assistants funded by 
third-party funds increased consistently between 1992 and 2012. Third-party research funding 
enables academics to employ research assistants and pay for other research related expenses. In 
2009, an estimated 40 percent of scientific assistants in non-professorial employment were funded 
by third party funding (Konsortium Bundesbericht Wissenschaftlicher Nachwuchs 2013). This means 
that increase in targeted and time-limited project funding correlates with the stark increase in the 
non-professorial workforce, particularly from 2000 onwards (Section 6.5). 
 
In a study examining personnel data from 14 higher education institutions from 2009/10, Jongmanns 
(2011, 73) shows that 53 percent of all non-professorial employees are employed on contracts up to 
one year, 36 percent are on contracts of between one to two years and only 11 percent are on 
contracts lasting two years or more. This indicates that the contract length for the non-professorial 
workforce has changed substantially over the last decades, from traditionally 6 years for scientific 
assistants to under 3 years (Konsortium Bundesbericht Wissenschaftlicher Nachwuchs 2013, 260, 
Consortium for the National Report on Junior Scholars 2017, 10). This means that third party project 
funding is a cause for the increase in this type of employment. Project staff is often paid from 
different overlapping grants leading to a series of short-term contracts.   
 155 
 
Specific to the German secondary academic labour market is the regulation of temporary contracts 
for non-professorial employees in the ‘academic fixed-term contract act’, known as the 
Wissenschaftszeitvertraggesetz (WissZeitVG). This act came into force in 2007, it prohibits academic 
institutions to employ non-permanent staff for more than six years before and after the completion 
of their PhD (Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz 2018c). This means that 
employment below the professoriate level at a university or research institution is by law limited to 
a total of 12 years. After a 12-year period in employment, the non-professorial academic cannot 
engage in a contract with the higher education institution unless obtaining a professorial position or 
unless the position is funded by third-party funding, rather than public base funding 
(Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz 2018c). This regulation aims to disrupt the 
chain of continuous temporary contracts. However, this objective can hardly be achieved without 
the creation of new permanent academic positions if academics are forced to either work on 
temporary funded projects or leave the system. In fact, the evidence (Figure 7.4 and 7.5) shows 
continuous growth of the number and the share of the non-permanent workforce.  
 
The continuous growth of the non-professorial workforce correlates with increasing marketisation 
policies, particularly with the increase in competitive fixed-term third party research funding. This 
indicates that, similar to Australia, research funding leads to limited-term employment. The next 
section will examine the growth of the new position of the junior professor Germany demonstrating 
that precarious employment conditions extend to the professoriate.  
7.6.1 The Junior Professors and assistants  
In 2002, the central state government introduced and partially funded a new employment category 
in the higher education system, the ‘Junior Professor’, aiming to provide a different and more secure 
pathway into secure permanent employment. These roles are non-permanent and thus part of the 
secondary academic labour market.  
 
The junior professoriate fills a gap between the full professor and the non-professorial assistants as 
the role combines elements of both. The central state Ministry for Education and Research (BMBF) 
established the junior professoriate recognising the insecure employment and the complex pathway 
into secure professorial employment (Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz 
2018b). These positions are designed to provide junior academics with independent and 
autonomous status. Legally, the new roles have similar responsibilities and rights as a professor and 
after three years in a junior professoriate positions, academics qualify for the professoriate 
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(Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz 2018b, § 48, Keller et al. 2013). As these 
positions qualify for a full professorship, they do break with the traditional career pathway via the 
habilitation (Burkhardt et al., 2016, 4). The establishment of these positions was also an attempt to 
harmonise the German academic system with other international systems and career pathways from 
assistant to associate to full professorship (Federkeil and Buch 2007, 7). However, as the name 
‘junior’ suggests, these are still qualification positions and usually without tenure-track.  
 
The positions are non-permanent and the initial contract length does not exceed three years but can 
be extended by three years after a successful evaluation (Bundesministerium der Justiz und für 
Verbraucherschutz 2018b, §47, §48). The performance evaluation by external examiners after three 
years is central to the contract extension. This means that the role does not guarantee a permanent 
position and it is questionable that it achieves the goal of a faster path into the professoriate. 
 
Two years after its establishment, in July 2004 the highest court declared the junior professoriate 
non- consistent with constitutional law as they were in breach of federal state sovereignty over 
higher education as outlined in Article 70, 75 and 72 Abs. 2 (Bundesverfassungsgericht 2005). By the 
end of 2004 the central German state withdrew funding for these positions and the amended 
legislation provided the federal states with the power to design the conditions for the junior 
professoriate. By 2013, all 16 states had the employment category of the junior professoriate 
established within their higher education legislation, yet with different employment conditions.  
 
However, even though the introduction of this new employment category has been met with 
obstacles, data confirms some success. While the numbers in new appointments for the junior 
professoriate plunged, following the high court decision in 2004, the numbers have been increasing 
since 2009. Table 7.2 shows that the number of junior professors between 2005 and 2012.  
Table 7.2: Germany: Number of junior professors 2005, 2010 and 2012 
Year Junior professors 
2005 617 
2010 1,236 
2012 1,439 
Source: Deutsches Statistisches Bundesamt (2015) Fachserie 11, Reihe 4.4 Personal an Hochschulen (sowie Habilitationen), 
own graphs and calculations. 
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In 2012, the junior professor positions accounted for 1,400 employees, equal to 5 percent of the 
total university professoriate (Deutsches Statistisches Bundesamt 2013). In the German statistical 
data collection, the junior professoriate is part of the professoriate although they can be considered 
as upgraded scientific assistants. Assistant positions are positions on six-year fixed-term contracts, 
held by non-professorial academics working on a habilitation under the supervision of the 
professoriate. Figure 7.6 indicates that the introduction of the junior professoriate parallels the 
abolition and decline of ‘assistants’ (Lecturer, Assistant Professor of Scientific Assistants) particularly 
since 2005.  
Figure 7.6: Germany: Number of professoriate and assistants, 2001–2012 
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Source: Deutsches Statistisches Bundesamt (2013b) Fachserie 11, Reihe 4.4 Personal an Hochschulen (sowie 
Habilitationen), own graphs and calculations. 
 
The decline in assistant positions suggests that dependent positions have given way to the rise of 
autonomous junior profseeion positions. This means that the introduction of the junior professor 
was successful in providing more autonomous positions but not in addressing the structural 
problems of the insecure labour market.  
 
In fact, the endeavour to create more secure employment pathways to the professoriate through 
the establishment of the junior professoriate was unsuccessful as the secondary academic labour 
market lost a significant number of medium term (six year) assistant positions. This suggests that the 
increase in research autonomy has come at the cost of relative employment security. In addition, 
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these developments demonstrate the relative power of the professoriate and the traditional 
academic labour market system. By blocking or not supporting the increase of secure employment in 
academia, the professoriate in fact also strengthened the marketisation principles of efficiency and 
productivity through temporary employment.  The next section investigates the casual academic 
workforce. 
7.6.2 Casual employees 
Casual employees or the so-called Lehrbeauftragte (assistant lecturer assigned for specific teaching 
task) are largely non-professorial academics, engaged in teaching over the course of one semester 
and on an hourly basis. This employment group formally categorised into a group assumed to be 
employed in a ‘second job’, assuming they have a primary job somewhere else. It is common for the 
non-permanent academics to take these teaching opportunities, while employed in a research 
assistant position for instance. While figure 7.5 shows the growing share of casual employment 
between 1980 and 2012, Figure 7.7 shows the absolute number of casual employees. The increase 
between 1998 and 2012 correlated with the increase in student numbers (Figure 6.4) and foremost 
with the expansion of the Bachelor and Master degrees and the modular teaching structure, as 
univerisites are moving towards standardised modules rather than individually designed seminars 
(Section 6.5). 
Figure 7.7: Germany: Number of casual academic (Lehrbeauftragte), 1980–2012 
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While the data does not reveal how many hours a casual employee is teaching it is common that one 
employee conducts one seminar, equivalent to 30 face-to-face hours per semester. It is not very 
likely that the non-professoriate would take these casual roles for financial reasons, as the 
compensation for this work is very low. The hourly casual salary rate differs between the 16 federal 
states as well as between career stages, but ranges roughly between 21 and 40 Euros (Humboldt 
University Berlin 2016). This is the hourly rate for 30 face-to-face teaching hours adding up to 1,000 
Euros over one semester. Casual employees in Germany do not receive additional financial 
compensation for teaching preparation, supervision or marking. In contrast to Australia, there are no 
financial incentives to engage in casual teaching at a university but there is a career development 
incentive because teaching experience is a necessary selection criterion for university posts.  
 
As many non-professorial academics are employed in research focused positions it is argued that 
they should engage in teaching although this is not part of their contract. In general, third-party 
funding only covers costs relevant to project aims, including the salaries for the project staff that 
actually provides teaching as a second job. This exemplifies again that the German higher education 
system increasingly relies on competitive third-party project funding. These developments suggest 
that the higher education system is increasingly dependent on third-party funding including for the 
provision of higher education teaching. 
7.7 Conclusion  
This chapter showed the increasing segmentation of academic labour markets in Germany between 
1980 and 2012. The division between a few secure powerful professors on the primary and many 
insecure dependent assistants on the secondary academic labour market has always been endemic 
to the traditional German ‘chair system’. However, the evidence demonstrated the growth of the 
secondary labour market and of the gap between both market segments. At the same time the 
German state has implemented and strengthened marketisation policies. For this reason it can be 
argued that marketisation policies in Germany trigger precarious academic employment and in fact 
foreground, rather than reform the chair system. This development underpins traditional academic 
labour markets and challenges comparative political economy theory.     
The academic labour market is confronted with two challenges. First, the size of the secondary 
academic labour market has proliferated between 1980 and 2012 leading to the share of the primary 
academic labour market falling to below 20 percent. Several alterations and mechanisms under 
marketisation have led to the rise of the secondary, rather than the primary academic labour 
market. The evidence confirms that the rise of precarious employment correlates with the rise in 
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third-party funding in the research-focused German university system. Competitive fixed-term 
project led to the increase of fixed-term employees, rather than permanent employees. The 
expansion of the workforce on the secondary academic labour market was further supported by 
additional competitive state funding in the Excellence Initiative as well as the 'Academic Fixed-term 
Contract Act' from 2007. In fact, the decline in the public allocation of base funding means that all 
major German academic institutions have to support precarious non-professorial employment 
because professors and other time limited research projects rely on a flexible workforce (Allianz der 
Wissenschaftsorganisationen 2015, Torka 2018).  
Second, the traditional structures of German academic labour markets are rigid and resistant to 
change. Particularly, attempts to create secure positions below or a more secure pathway to the 
professoriate failed. The rigid structure and powerful position of academic associations partly 
confirm characteristics of corporatist welfare states as well as comparative political economy 
assumptions that change is path dependent, incremental and often slow or resistant. The evidence 
that the professoriate, despite its relative decline, has secured its power, particularly over 
employment, is also compatible with labour segmentation theory. Reich et al. (1973) argue that 
labour market segmentation ensures the hegemony and power of the primary labour market. 
This evidence also confirms that marketisation polices are affecting the primary and secondary 
labour markets differently. Institutional regulatory policy changes are particularly affecting labour 
contract regimes in the secondary labour market, rather than the primary labour market. 
 
Academic labour market developments in the liberal Australian as well as in the German corporatist 
welfare state both contradict the central premises of comparative political economy frameworks. 
Indeed, the large proportion of precarious academic employment in German higher education 
contradicts with the assumption that employment security is higher in corporatist than in liberal 
welfare states (Chapter 2). How is it possible that corporatist welfare states create even more 
employment insecurity than liberal welfare states and what are the theoretical implications of this 
contradiction? The next chapter compares the German and the Australian case in order to solve this 
puzzle.  
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Part III Towards a synthesis of the comparative political economy 
and labour segmentation theory 
 
The previous chapters have shown that marketisation practices and mechanisms are key reference 
points in the German and Australian higher education policy trajectories and that increasing 
temporary employment is the central feature in academic labour markets in the two different higher 
education systems. The central question is how and to what extent marketisation policies shape and 
influence labour market segmentation. In order to demonstrate that marketisation policies foster 
temporary employment in two different welfare state regimes, the following chapter, Chapter 8, 
begins with a comparative analysis of the key findings.  
The final chapter, Chapter 9, argues that the key focus on institutional differences in the 
comparative political economy leads to the neglect of the policy outcome for labour markets. This 
thesis then argues that labour segmentation theory can contribute to the comparative political 
economy with its analysis on the characteristics and drivers of segmented labour markets. At the 
same time labour segmentation theory benefits from the linkage to comparative political economy, 
particularly from its understanding of systematic institutional differences. In combination these 
theories help explain how and why external forces and regulations in higher education shape 
employment conditions and academic labour markets. 
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8 Comparing Australia and Germany 
8.1 Introduction  
Previous chapters have analysed policy and academic labour market developments between 1980 
and 2012 in the liberal market economy of Australia and the corporatist market economy of 
Germany. This chapter compares the developments in higher education policy and academic labour 
markets in the Australian and German higher education systems. The comparison follows the 
structural framework of the four key findings across the two cases: first, the predominance of 
marketisation; second, the role of the states as advancing marketisation in higher education; third, 
diverging academic labour market segments; and last, states’ marketisation policies as a key driver 
of labour market segmentation. The next sections follow the structural framework of four key 
findings across the both cases. Key developments and results across the two cases are outlined and 
analysed before examining central differences and discussing theoretical implications.  
 
In this comparative analysis, the role of the state as a sponsor of marketisation stands out in both 
cases. The states in a liberal market economy and a corporatist market economy are the key 
drivers of temporary employment in academia by establishing marketisation policies and practices 
in the allocation of public higher education resources. The findings contradict assumptions of the 
predominance of the regulatory market in public service provision of liberal market economies. On 
the other side, it also contradicts the assumption that corporatist market economies display 
reluctance to use markets for the delivery of social services. The substantial increase in temporary 
academic employment in both cases stands out. This finding contradicts the assumption that 
faculty structures of academic labour markets in liberal market economies areprotecting academic 
employment. On the other side, this finding suggests a break in the corporatist market economy 
tradition of faculty structures, that academic labour markets protect academic conditions. In the 
following sections, the similarities and differences from the findings are further elucidated in the 
four overarching comparative categories. 
8.2 The predominance of marketisation policies  
A comparative analysis of higher education policies between 1980 and 2012 suggests that 
marketisation policies proliferated in the two different welfare states. Trajectories of change in 
higher education policy demonstrate that the policies of marketisation gained significant strength in 
the liberal welfare state of Australia but also in the corporatist welfare state of Germany. In both 
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cases such policies have prompted institutions and academics to amend and modify their role in the 
public higher education services.  
 
Marketisation policies and practices were established across research and teaching in both higher 
education systems, yet the extent of coverage differed. The policy shifts included private business 
practices, competition and market based allocation of resources. The focus in both countries was on 
establishing competitive quasi-markets for the allocation of public resources in various areas linked 
to research and teaching and across various levels, from students to academics and institutions. In 
both states, competition through quasi-markets was justified as a mechanism to increase productive 
and allocative efficiency as well as to enhance innovation. To achieve these goals, key market 
policies and measures were adapted to suit key and distinct structures in established national higher 
education systems, rather than a ‘one size fits all policy approach’. The evidence shows that 
marketisation policies in Australia’s teaching focused system were primarily implemented in the 
provision of educational teaching services. The creation of quasi-markets for education services 
means that public funding was allocated to university institutions via student fees. Increasing 
enrolment thresholds and increasing fees for domestic and international students continuously 
strengthened quasi-markets for educational services. In Germany’s research focused system 
marketisation policies were channeled into research, rather than teaching services. Public funding 
for time-limited project research strengthened quasi-markets for research. This means that state 
authorities induce competition over resources in higher education, alongside forms of intellectual 
competition. These competitive mechanisms contribute to inequalities within the academic labour 
market. 
 
 The timing and pace of policy implementation differed across the two cases. In Australia after the 
initial and abrupt process of policy change under the Dawkins reforms in 1988, an incremental 
process of change under marketisation policies followed until 2012. In Germany, marketisation 
policies were implemented in a relatively slow and incremental process from the late 1990s. The 
sequence of policy changes in the two countries is consistent with the theoretical assumptions that 
liberal market economies are adapting to change relatively fast and corporatist market economies 
are resisting change and thus processes of change are relatively slow. However, regardless of timing 
and pace in the implementation process of marketisation, both countries have persisted with such 
interventions. 
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The developments confirm that principles and approaches to marketisation are similar across 
different welfare states while supporting Streeck and Thelen’s (2005b) suggestion that the timing 
and pace and therefore scope of change differ across welfare states. The evidence demonstrates 
that marketisation policies are predominant in higher education, yet in different areas and with dual 
effects on institutions. Institutional structures in the corporatist market economy are both 
transformed through marketisation, evident in the increase of market principles towards research, 
and are also resistant such as the refusal to implement market principles in educational services. The 
findings are also important because scholars are in disagreement over the question of institutional 
stability in different welfare states. Scholars of the varieties of capitalism literature expect 
institutional stability and institutional resilience to change in the corporatist market economy 
(Esping-Andersen 1999, Hall and Soskice 2001). The evidence from the higher education sector 
contradicts institutional stability and suggests that institutions evolve over time.   
8.3 State-sponsored marketisation  
The evidence suggests that marketisation policies are advanced by states, the key stakeholder in the 
provision of higher education in the liberal market economy and corporatist market economy. This 
practice suggests that marketisation in higher education does not mean the retreat of the state over 
the realisation of markets; rather it means state authorities are key sponsors of marketisation.  
 
In Germany and Australia, the state authorities for higher education regulation are key stakeholders 
in advancing marketisation. In both cases, evidence throughout the investigated period of 1980 to 
2012 links to state policies. It means that all governments, conservative parties as well as social 
democratic and labour parties, contributed to this development regardless of party direction. 
Marketisation practices and mechanisms were introduced in periods of austerity and justified based 
on the alleged need to reduce high budget deficits and to retain competitive advantage in the global 
higher education market. The evidence from higher education policy change in Australia and 
Germany confirms that marketisation policies are intentionally designed by states as suggested by 
Polanyi (2001 [1944]) or the "fundamental role of state power itself in the (re)production of 
neoliberalism" as argued by Peck and Tickel (2002, 401). In fact, the evidence suggests that markets 
in higher education have led to re-regulation, rather than deregulation of higher education, 
confirming the argument by Vogel that “we have freer markets and more rules” (1996, 3). Overall, 
this suggests that liberal market economy and corporatist market economy states are advancing 
marketisation combined with reregulation as the next sections exemplify. 
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8.3.1 Allocation of public research funding  
The evidence from Germany and Australia reveals that state authorities are managing marketisation 
in higher education research across both cases. Both states have implemented quasi-markets and 
market based mechanisms and subordinated the management of resources to regulatory state 
agencies, such as research councils. Germany has a long tradition, going back to the Weimar 
Republic, of allocating research funding through research councils and similar, whereas Australia 
introduced research councils much later. In Germany, competition in the allocation of research 
resources tightened over the investigated period. Australia introduced competitive market based 
allocation of research resources, including time-limited research funding in 1988. As Table 8.1 and 
the evidence in Chapters 4 and 6 show, public state expenditure for targeted research funding has 
increased considerably over the investigated time period in Germany and Australia. The increase in 
expenditure towards research also covers non-higher education research services, confirming that 
research and knowledge production is crucial in enhancing a country’s economic wellbeing.   
Table 8.1: Higher education expenditure on R&D: Germany and Australia 
 Gross Domestic expenditure on R&D as 
percentage of GDP 
Higher education expenditure on R&D 
as percentage of GDP 
2000 2006 2010 2000 2006 2010 
Germany 2.5% 2.5% 2.9% 0.4% 0.4% 0.5% 
Australia 1.5% 2.0% 2.2% 0.4% 0.5% 0.6% 
OECD average 2.2% 2.2% 2.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 
Source: OECD.Stats (2014)  
Allocating public resources to higher education through market mechanisms requires extensive 
coordination and regulation. These regulations affect the work of higher education institutions as 
well as academics, who are often left with little choice but to participate in the marketised allocation 
of funding or lose the opportunity. Missing out on publically allocated research funding means that 
academics are restricted in the amount and type of research they are able to undertake.  
8.3.3 Targeted approach to marketisation policies  
The evidence reveals that a key difference across the two countries is the target for marketisation 
policies. In Germany, marketisation was targeted mainly to the allocation of research funding, while 
in Australia the key focus was to marketise the allocation mechanisms of funding for core teaching 
services.  
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In Australia’s teaching focused higher education system, student fees and enrolment regulations set 
by the state fostered competitive behaviour across higher education institutions. Institutions 
compete for the best and brightest students as well as for lucrative international fee-paying 
students. To attract students, higher education institutions use business-like marketing techniques 
at the national and international level. Over the investigated period both tuition fees and student 
numbers increased significantly. Consequently, institutions achieved significant economic success, 
mainly from international students. The evidence shows the significance of this success as revenue 
from teaching services could be channeled into more prestigious research activities. This 
development has consequences for the amount and level of educational services, as the increase in 
international student demand triggers an increase in university supply of courses, seminars and 
tutorials, and also triggers the supply of specific English language and academic writing courses for 
instance. Consequently, such developments trigger the demand for educators and thus impact 
academic labour markets.  
 
In Germany’s research focused higher education system, governments established marketisation 
mainly around the existing national structures of research funding, rather than teaching. The state 
increased expenditure for market based allocation of public resources for research projects by 
diversifying the channels and addressees, as non-university research institutions are eligible, within 
the science sub-system. Through research funding the German state influences the strategic 
direction of higher education while funding responsibilities for core educational services are the 
responsibility of the 16 federal states. Similarly, the German state channeled funding to higher 
education through regulation, allowing the state to fund university infrastructure and university 
wide research related programs through the competitive excellence initiative.  
 
Quasi-markets that are targeted to different areas also differ in the type of competition as well as in 
the consequences. In the two expanding higher education systems, the major focus area of markets 
can be summarised as competition for students in Australia and competition for research resources 
in Germany. Both quasi-markets have in common inherent funding uncertainty and thus generate 
inequalities not only between institutions but also between academics. Uncertainty in funding 
provision generates uncertainty in employment relations. While quasi-markets for students require 
mainly teaching staff, quasi-markets in research focus on research staff. The findings confirm a 
strong increase in research staff in Germany and in teaching staff in Australia, as shown in Chapters 
5 and 7. Such developments substantiate Peck’s argument that labour markets are inherently 
spatial, embedded and shaped by social contexts (1996, 3). The developments also confirm that 
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state regulation during neoliberal restructuring practices may cause labour market segmentation, 
through both non-intervention and intervention in employment protection regimes (Peck 1996). 
Each state intervened by establishing markets in different areas of higher education causing an 
increase in temporary employment, yet both states did not intervene in academic employment 
protection regimes.   
8.3.4 Advancing New Public Management 
Marketisation policies also included reforming the governance regime of higher education 
institutions. In Australia as well as Germany, regulations were established to foster business-like 
running of the public service institutions. While these principles were realised in Australia from 1988 
onwards, they arrived in the mid 1990s in the German higher education system. However, the 
implementation of New Public Management reforms in the German higher education sector is path 
breaking considering the nature of the traditional ‘academic oligarchy’ governance regime, which 
rejects any involvement of markets in governance.  
 
From the Dawkins reforms in 1988 and onwards, universities in Australia were asked to implement 
and conform to a business-like approach to organisational functioning. The data evidence in Chapter 
5 show that the share of non-academic staff has grown higher between 1996 and 2013 relative to 
the share of academic staff. The traditional governance model in Australian higher education can be 
categorised as in between state and market regulation (Clark 1983). This means that the universities 
have traditionally been governed through some market principles. New Public Management reforms 
reflect the intensification of the traditional governance model of higher education in between state 
control and market regulation.  
 
In contrast, the changes under New Public Management in Germany are breaking with the 
traditional governance model. The German higher education model is categorised by Burton Clark 
(1986, 140) as a combination of state authority and regulation and professorial self-control through 
the chair system (or academic oligarchy). Through New Public Management, business-like 
approaches were introduced to administration and services. Increased autonomy and control over 
staff and degrees for organisational management preceded the decline of professorial self-control. 
Nevertheless, the professorial community in Germany retains considerable decision-making power. 
Various stakeholders crafted this path breaking change in higher education governance over a long 
period of time as the evidence in Chapter 6 confirms. The New Public Management reforms were 
legislated relatively late in Germany, with HRG reform in 1998, compared to Australia.  
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As part of New Public Management both states have set up agencies that employ external control 
mechanisms to assess and evaluate university and academic performance. The results and outcomes 
of the assessments provide state authorities with valuable information that might inform further 
higher education reforms, including for degree and research priorities. 
 
The control and evaluation mechanisms link to competitive allocation of public resources and are 
part of state regulations in both countries. External control is applied over the research process 
through the Excellence in Research (ERA) scheme in Australia and through the research council in 
Germany. In Australia, the evaluation of teaching and thus teachers by students has become 
common practice. These evaluations are used for several purposes including setting levels of 
performance pay, giving promotions to academics, assessing future temporary employees and in 
anonymised form for marketing. In Germany, state regulations are legislated through HDR and local 
legislation. Legislation includes the regulation in which stakeholders are members of university 
boards, influencing the decision-making process. In addition, legislation outlines processes of 
commissions to assess performance of universities and higher education as a whole. In both cases, 
control mechanisms ultimately aim to strengthen but also shape organisational performance and 
competitiveness. Thus, external control mechanisms confirm again the steering role of state 
authorities in higher education.   
 
Germany’s introduction of New Public Management much later than Australia reflects rather long 
processes in seeking consensus within the bureaucratic governance structures to be found in 
corporatist market economies. These processes of change reflect the concept of layering change as 
argued by Streeck and Thelen (2005b), where new reforms were introduced alongside old 
arrangements. In addition, the evidence from Australia and Germany confirms the theoretical 
concepts arguing that liberal market economies are more adaptive to change while institutions in 
corporatist market economies are more resistant and resilient to change.  
8.3.5 Geopolitical competition 
The advancement of marketisation into the provision of higher education teaching can also usefully 
be understood in a geopolitical context. Competition between academics and universities extends to 
the state level, because higher education underpins economic and political success.  
  
Australia created a major international market for university education, evident in the increase of 
international students throughout the investigated period. International students have also become 
a major revenue stream for the economy as a whole. In 2007, education services ranked third in 
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Australia’s major exports after coal and iron ore (Reserve Bank of Australia 2008). This means that a 
degree from an Australian higher education institution is highly competitive in international markets.  
 
Germany was part of creating the foundations for international comparability of university degrees 
agreed to in the Bologna declaration. The Bologna declaration aims to make university degree 
structures and grades across Europe comparable and competitive through the European Credit 
Transfer System. By signing the declaration, Germany introduced a modular and standardised 
teaching and value structure displacing traditional university degrees. The alignment of course 
structures and harmonisation of degree structure through the Bologna reform using a specific credit 
point system linked to standardised module structure is assumed stimulate competitive behaviour 
across higher education institutions. Competition among education providers will emerge, as 
students are encouraged to pick and choose learning modules towards their degree from different 
institutions across the European higher education area. National governments still control entry and 
exit towards their degrees as well as the pricing of degrees, including student fees. This means that 
the higher education landscape is still somewhat diverse and the main achievement of the Bologna 
process was the introduction of limited competition within the otherwise diverse European higher 
education landscape. Through the Bologna declaration, state authorities implemented market 
principles into education and teaching, rather than research. Ultimately, the Bologna reform aims to 
create one European-wide internationally competitive higher education market. 
 
In both cases higher education policy making has been at the centre of government decision-making 
and to the level of the European Union. Both Australia and Germany have advanced quasi-markets 
and increased competition into educational services, structures and institutions, yet to different 
degrees. Overall, the scope and reach of higher education policies shows expansion and increasing 
competitiveness through regional levelling, indicating it is a crucial political and economic factor in a 
country’s overall stand in the geopolitical arena.  
 
In summary, policy development between 1980 and 2012 in the liberal market economy of Australia 
and the corporatist market economy of Germany show that states are advancing and sponsoring 
marketisation in higher education. The evidence shows considerable similarities in the 
implementation approaches of states, yet state authorities used different strategies. Similarities in 
the approaches to marketisation can be found in the allocation of public resources for research, in 
the targeted implementation approach, in implementing New Public Management as well as in the 
focus on the geopolitical sphere. However, the historically evolved specific higher education 
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structures contributed to those marketisation policies being implemented in different areas and 
realised at different times. The emergence of marketisation in different traditional higher education 
systems suggests that marketisation processes as a form of neoliberalism is a manifestation of 
socially embedded as argued by Cahill (2014, 58-83). Furthermore, the thesis of the retreat of the 
state authority as argued by some scholars does not hold for the provision of higher education 
(Strange 1996). The evidence shows that state governments are a major authority in implementing 
and managing marketisation in Australia and Germany, which points to the advancement, rather 
than retreat of the state authority in higher education regulation. 
8.4 Growing divergence between primary and secondary academic labour 
markets  
The evidence from Australia and Germany demonstrates that academic labour markets are 
segmented; that the secondary labour market in Germany is larger than in Australia and that the 
increasing divergence between the primary and the secondary academic labour markets occurs in 
both countries. Marketisation policies in higher education affect labour markets in different ways. In 
this thesis, it is argued that distinct higher education systems are associated with institutionally 
mediated academic labour markets and historically unique employment structures. Data evidence 
from German and Australian academic labour markets confirms Peck’s observation that labour 
markets are socially regulated in locally distinctive ways (1996, 17). Labour segmentation theory 
contributes to the understanding of how policy change affects labour markets, because it analyses 
the role of segmented labour markets and has developed concepts to understand why and how 
labour market segments diverge.  
 
The comparison between academic labour markets in Australia and Germany reveals that the 
secondary labour market is significantly larger in Germany than in Australia. Figure 8.1 shows the 
share of academic employment categories as a percentage of the total academic labour markets in 
Australia and Germany in 2010: in Australia 17 percent of full-time equivalent employees are 
employed in the secondary academic labour market, while in Germany 75 percent of full-time 
employees are employed in the secondary academic labour market.  
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Figure 8.1: Share of employment categories as proportion of all academic employment in Germany 
and Australia, 2010 
 
Source: for Australia DIISTREE (2013) and for Germany: Deutsches Statistisches Bundesamt (2013), own graph  
 Data show that, on average, in the Australian liberal welfare state three out of four full-time 
equivalent employees are in ongoing employment in the primary labour market. In the German 
corporatist welfare state, 75 percent or two out of three academic employees are employed in non-
permanent employment in the secondary academic labour market. This evidence confirms that 
academic labour markets in Australia and Germany do not support the premises of the dominant 
welfare state type. In fact, it is a large deviation from the theoretical assumptions that corporatist 
market economies have relatively strong employment protection regimes while liberal market 
economies have weak employment protection regimes. The data also show that employees in the 
secondary labour market in Germany work in research focused positions and overwhelmingly have 
completed a PhD, while a majority of employees in the secondary labour market in Australia are PhD 
students or have other jobs.  
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This results from this study indicate that the theoretical premises of the typology of welfare state 
employment protection regimes are not equipped to explain labour markets in the high skilled 
academic labour market sector, challenging Esping-Andersen’s argument that “the labour market is 
systematically and directly shaped by the (welfare) state” (1990, 144). This raises the question of 
whether academic labour markets beyond different state boundaries converge, because the 
implementation of marketisation policies in both countries suggests an increase of employment in 
the secondary labour market over time. The evidence from 1980 to 2012 confirms a relative decline 
of permanent secure employment in the primary academic labour market and the growth of the 
secondary academic labour market in both welfare states.  
 
A comparision of Australian and German  data suggests a decline in permanent positions for 
employees in low level academic positions, which do not necessarily require a PhD, such as Level A 
positions in Australia and Assistant Instructors in Germany. At the same time, the share of the 
professoriate compared to all other permanent academic employment grew as well, particularly in 
the Australian lecturing system. The fact that low level permanent academic jobs, such as Lecturer A 
and B are in decline relative to the professoriate also suggests that the primary labour market is 
more egalitarian. This supports Reich, Gordon and Edwards’ (1973) claim that the primary labour 
market, which includes academic and non-academic workforce, holds hegemony and power over the 
employment conditions of the secondary labour market. Given that the sizes of the primary labour 
markets differ substantially between Australia and Germany, the fact that permanent employment 
has grown little in both countries has changed the relationship between the primary and secondary 
labour markets in both countries. Academic labour markets in both countries follow a similar trend: 
the growing divergence between academic labour market insiders in the primary market and labour 
market outsiders in the secondary labour market. 
 
In both countries, employment in the secondary labour market grew continuously during the 
investigated period and with increasing intensity from the 1990s. In addition various forms of non-
standard employment in the secondary academic labour markets grew, such as teaching only, 
research only and casuals. This suggests a deeper subdivision of the secondary academic labour 
markets, between hourly teaching work and temporary teaching or research employment. For 
example, hourly teaching or casual full-time equivalent employment has more than doubled 
between 1996 and 2013 in Australia, which suggests the headcount would be even higher. Similarly, 
in Germany the number of casual tutors has more than doubled during the same time. Employment 
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inequality across the academic labour market as a whole is a growing and established phenomenon 
in both countries.  
 
Concurrently, the evidence from German and Australian labour markets also suggests mobility 
between academic labour markets. This confirms the conceptualisation of the gatekeeping process 
of the primary labour market. While employment has grown considerably in Germany, the primary 
labour market remains accessible only after a considerable time in assistant jobs in the secondary 
labour market and under the condition that potential candidates need to have considerable research 
output. This confirms that, contrary to common assumptions in the Australian literature, the 
secondary labour market is also a recruitment pool for the primary labour market. Similarly, despite 
employment growth in the secondary academic labour market in Australia, the appointment to a 
permanent lecturing position from the time of PhD completion is possible on a Level B Lecturer 
position. These positions are available and growing in numbers as demonstrated in Chapter 7.  
 
Mobility between the primary and secondary academic labour markets contradicts the premises of 
segmentation theory of assuming that the mobility between markets is restricted. The data evidence 
from Australia and Germany confirms previous research conducted in Canada and the United States, 
showing significant mobility in the high skilled academic labour markets (McBrier 2003, Rosenblum 
and Rosenblum 1996). Mobility between labour markets occurs because jobs in the secondary 
labour market are associated with poor employment conditions, rather than different skill levels. On 
the contrary, the skill levels in the academic secondary labour market often equal the skill level in 
the primary academic labour market, particularly as the educational credentials in both cases are a 
PhD or similar. This means that entry points to the academic secondary labour market are restricted 
to educational credentials, unlike the secondary labour market in other sectors. Comparing the 
Australian and German segmented high skilled labour markets suggests considerable similarities in 
mobility between labour markets and the function of the secondary labour market. 
  
From the comparision of Australian and German developments, it can be argued that academic 
labour market structures are not shaped by the employment protection regimes of welfare states, 
but rather by the distinct and historically evolved regimes of higher education institutions. While in 
liberal market economies labour markets are more likely to structurally adapt to non-permanent 
work, this was only partially the case for the high skilled academic labour market. This means that 
traditional motives for employment protection in academia continue to be significant, as in liberal 
market economies permanent employment is considered as a mechanism to protect academic 
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freedom. Policing and defending academic employment protection regimes in Australia falls in part 
to the trade union (National Tertiary Education Union), which is active in enterprise bargaining. The 
developments in the academic labour markets in Germany confirm that labour markets in 
corporatist market economies are more likely to be resistant to change. This means that traditional 
structures of strong employment protection in civil service status for a relatively small group, the 
professoriate, continues to prevail. In addition, the professoriate continues to hold decision-making 
power over institutional operations as well as staff in non-continuous employment. These labour 
market structures are protected by the constitution as well as the protection structures and benefits 
of the civil servant status in Germany. While union membership in Germany is generally strong, in 
academia it is the opposite.  
 
In summary, while academic labour market regime foundations differ across Australia and Germany, 
the trend towards temporary employment manifests in both countries. On the one side, temporary 
employment is increasing in the German academic system, known for weak employment protection, 
within the relatively strong welfare state regime of a corporatist market economy. On the other side, 
temporary employment is also increasing in the Australian academic system known for its strong 
academic employment protection regime within the relatively weak welfare state regime of a liberal 
market economy. In both cases, these regulatory employment protection regimes are somewhat 
meaningless, because they were not able to prevent the substantial increase in temporary 
employment in academia. Finding solutions to the substantial rise in temporary employment 
requires understanding the drivers of academic labour market segmentation. These drivers are likely 
to be related to similar policy developments evident across higher education regulation in Australia 
and Germany.  
8.5 Academic labour market segmentation as a consequence of 
marketisation policies 
The evidence suggests that marketisation policies, rather than inevitable consequences of the 
expansion of the higher education or of public budget constraints, caused the increase of temporary 
employment in academia. This means that the states carry key responsibilities for academic labour 
market segmentation. However, secondary academic labour markets are also valuable for primary 
academic labour markets because temporary employees carry out the majority of teaching and 
research.  
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In Australia and Germany, the drivers of labour market segmentation trace back to marketisation 
policies. Marketisation policies differ in direction and target as well as in reach. Consequently, their 
impact on labour markets differs according to policy targets, such as teaching or research services.  
According to the philosopher David Hume causation means that the temporal relationship indicates 
that cause precedes effects (1975 [1738]). Evidence from policy and labour markets confirms that in 
both countries, the implementation of marketisation policies precedes the rise and spikes of 
employment in the secondary labour market.  
 
Public research funding allocated through quasi-markets increased continuously over the 
investigated time period in Germany and in Australia. The funding for project research is allocated 
for a particular timeframe and is largely targeted to permanent academic employees. However, the 
temporary nature of project funding facilitates temporary research employment. Unlike base 
funding for research, project funding poses financial risks for institutions. The evidence shows that 
limited term research only positions in Australia and assistant positions in Germany have increased 
substantially over the investigated time period. Evidence from Australia shows that the share of 
temporary research only positions increased from 22.8 percent in 1996 to 34.4 percent of total 
academic employment in 2013 (excluding casuals, Table 5.3). Research funding can be used to fund 
equipment, conferences and travel to conduct research as well as for staff. Unique to Australia is 
that permanently employed academics in Australia often use their research funds to ‘buy’ 
themselves out of teaching obligations by employing temporary or casual teaching staff. 
 
In Germany, temporary research funding, often awarded to academic staff in permanent 
employment, is largely used to employ temporary research staff, conducting research under 
supervision of the professoriate. The majority of temporary assistant staff in Germany have 
completed a PhD, and conduct research and have a limited number of teaching hours. The increase 
in third-party funding parallels the increase in assistant staff, with a slight increase in both until 2004 
and exponential increase from 2005 (Chapter 7). In both cases the temporary nature of research 
linked to temporary research funding translates into the employment of temporary staff, whether 
for research or teaching. While the allocation of public research funding in competitive quasi-
markets has grown substantially in Australia and Germany, the employment of temporary research 
staff has grown as well. In both cases funding data indicates a strong association between rising 
temporary funding and consequential temporary employment, suggesting specificity between cause 
and effect (Hill 1965).  
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Marketisation policies also targeted teaching services in both countries, yet the reach differed. In 
Australia, temporary staff increased, particularly casual teaching staff, from the 1990s and with 
especially strong growth from 2003 and correlating with the rise in domestic and international 
student demand. Simultaneously, the quasi-market for tuition also meant that higher education 
institutions faced financial risks from losing students. In 2004, about 40 percent of all higher 
education income was received from fees, exemplifying the magnitude of income from students. 
Student demand has increased and tuition fees boost students’ choice thereby also triggering the 
design of attractive new degree and course content. Employees in temporary employment largely 
conduct tutorials, rather than lectures where a PhD is often a prerequisite, yet data show an 
increasing number of casuals with a PhD (Chapter 5). In contrast to lectures, which have nearly 
unlimited spaces, also enabled through technology, tutorials are often standardised, kept at around 
20 to 25 students and student attendance is compulsory. This means that student numbers as well 
as student choice contribute to uncertainty and impact on the demand for tutorial facilitators, both 
in terms of increase and decrease. It is the combination of the course structure and the expansion of 
the student market as well as the student fees that contribute to engaging temporary and hourly 
teaching employees, rather than permanent employees. In Germany, higher education services are 
increasingly provided in a modular and standardised structure of degrees and courses (Enders and 
Musselin 2008, Willmott 1995). Such course structure deviates from the traditional seminar 
structure in German higher education, where academics have had sole autonomy over course 
content. Standardisation and modularisation means that course content is largely consistent across 
years with only minor variation, it should improve efficiency and quality and it enables repeating. 
This development then substantiates Furedi’s argument that “commodification inexorably leads to 
standardisation, calculation and formulaic teaching” (in Molesworth et al. 2010, 5). Standards enable 
measurement of outcome for benchmarking and as Bendixen and Jacobsen (2017) argue, when 
standards are linked to relevance on labour markets it indicates external market control over higher 
education. This means that standardisation and modularisation in higher education are a 
consequence of marketisation policies and practices, aiming to quantify and maximise quality. A 
consistent and structured course content that is formally acknowledged, rather than individually 
created informal content, enables the employment of teaching facilitators as knowledge workers. 
The facilitators use the available material, effectively reducing the working time. Evidence from the 
labour market confirms that since the introduction of the modular Bachelor and Master degree 
structure in Germany, the number of staff in casual teaching roles increased significantly. Also in 
Germany, a combination of increasing demand and the modular degree structure facilitates the 
employment of casual employees. The developments in the core higher education services in both 
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countries suggest that the allocation of public resources as well as the modularisation of degrees 
and courses make casual and temporary teaching employment possible. 
 
In Australia and Germany, marketisation policies affect academic labour market insiders in the 
primary labour market and outsiders in the secondary labour market differently. The secondary 
labour market grew while the primary market declined in size. It can be argued that on average the 
workforce in the primary labour market has increasing control and authority, particularly over 
temporary employees, because data show that the ratio between employees in the primary and 
secondary labour markets has increased over the investigated timeframe. This is because the 
primary labour market employs, coordinates and instructs temporary employment, their workloads 
and people responsibilities have on average increased. In addition, the evidence suggests that the 
secondary academic labour market in Australia and in Germany is sub-divided between casual and 
temporary teaching and temporary teaching or research employment. The latter category enjoys 
more secure and more prestigious employment than the former. In addition, temporary research 
and teaching only employment embodies the divide of the academic labour process (Chapter 3). Yet, 
both temporary and casually employed employees for research and teaching are under the 
supervision and coordination of employees in the primary labour market. This means that 
marketisation causes the increase of employment in the secondary labour market, and alters the 
employment conditions of employees in the primary labour market. 
 
The evidence assembled here suggests that in the two different higher education systems of 
Germany and Australia marketisation policies were shaped to suit the distinct historical structures of 
higher education systems with similar consequences for the workforce in segmented academic 
labour markets. In the teaching focused system of Australia, teaching only positions (including 
casuals) increased more strongly than research only positions, while in the research focused system 
of Germany research positions grew. Indeed, in both countries and despite different settings, the 
increase in employment in the secondary labour market occurred after marketisation policies were 
established for higher education teaching and research. Evidence confirms that the establishment of 
marketisation precedes the rise in temporary employment, and evidence demonstrates that over 
time marketisation policies covered a greater scope and depth confirming that marketisation 
policies are the causal factor of temporary employment. During the investigative timeframe 
between 1980 and 2012, the evidence confirms that marketisation policies were predominant in 
both countries, while the expansion as well as internationalisation of higher education was ongoing. 
All these factors contributed to the increase in temporary employment and, in the absence of other 
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events, there are no other key explanations for the increase in temporary employment. The findings 
are coherent with existing theory and knowledge. 
8.6 Conclusion 
In the absence of labour market regulation, both Australia and Germany, significantly contributed to 
the increase in employment in the secondary labour market by allocating public higher education 
funding through quasi-markets and effective regulatory restriction of public funding. This confirms 
Peck’s argument that state regulations as well as states’ failure to regulate labour markets are also 
causal factors for labour market segmentation (1996). The growth of short-term employment is a 
consequence of marketisation policy interventions. Marketisation transformed higher education 
funding from base to temporary and targeted funding. This occurred regardless of the welfare state 
regime. 
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9 Conclusion - Implications for theory, future research and policy 
9.1 Introduction 
This thesis investigated whether national labour markets converge in times of neoliberalism. 
Academic labour markets are a particularly interesting case for a comparative analysis because the 
academic teaching and research labour process is similar across the globe. The comparative political 
economy literature has until recently largely neglected high skilled labour markets such as the higher 
education sector. Unlike the academic labour process, higher education systems vary considerably 
across nations and have developed a high degree of institutional autonomy across welfare states. 
For these reasons, it is an interesting theoretical question to explore how higher education policies 
in different welfare states influence the academic labour market and if there are similar labour 
market effects from these policies.  
The comparative analysis of two different academic labour markets in the liberal Australian and 
German conservative welfare state reveals that similar marketisation policies emerge, institutional 
differences remain and labour market effects converge. In both cases marketisation policies trigger 
the segmentation between the secure primary and highly insecure secondary academic labour 
markets. The rise of precarious temporary work is the outcome for the academic labour market in 
both cases.  
The previous chapter discussed the major comparative results and some initial theoretical 
considerations. This concluding chapter focuses on the implications of the findings for political 
economy theory, future research and higher education policy. The concluding remarks suggest the 
need to synthesise different theoretical traditions, extend research into academic labour markets, 
and decommodify higher education policy. 
9.2 Towards a synthesis between comparative political economy and labour 
segmentation theory 
This comparative thesis builds on the comparative political economy literature. The results of this 
study clearly demonstrate some of the achievements and limits of this tradition and suggest the 
need for theory combination and synthesis with labour segmentation theory.  
One advantage of the comparative political economy literature is that it systematically links higher 
education to different types of welfare states. Esping-Andersen (1999) and others characterise the 
higher education sector in terms of public service function and provision of different welfare states 
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(Pechar and Andres 2011, Willemse and De Beer 2012). This perspective enables a political economy 
of higher education beyond the narrow view of isolated higher education systems predominant in 
higher education literature. It emphasises the leading role of states and state authorities in the 
development and organisation of the higher education sector. The evidence provided in this study 
clearly demonstrates that liberal and coordinated welfare states actively introduced marketisation 
policies and created quasi-markets to shape higher education sectors in the spirit of neoliberal 
principles. This result runs counter to the widely expressed view in orthodox as well as comparative 
political economy literature of a minimalist role of the state in liberal market economies during the 
period of the neoliberal era.   
The focus on the dynamic relation between welfare state policies and institutional structures of 
different higher education systems is the second advantage of comparative political economy 
approaches. This focus enables detailed analysis of policy processes within, and comparisons across 
welfare state types to determine divergence as well as convergence under neoliberalism. Streeck 
argues for the “superiority of a dynamic process as opposed to a static system concept of social 
order” to capture commonalities and differences across cases (2009, 102). His argument means that 
over time institutional structures evolve incrementally, rather than transform, with some converging 
and some diverging structures. Scholars argue that the impact of common international pressures on 
institutions under neoliberalism (Coates 2005, Streeck 2009, 1) lead to institutional variations within 
countries (Peck and Theodore 2007). For this reason, a majority of the comparative political 
economy literature claims that institutional change is path dependent and core features of the 
welfare states as well as institutional structures of national (higher) education systems remain 
strong (Pierson 2001, Streeck and Thelen 2005b). The case of targeted marketisation policies in the 
Australian and German higher education sector provides substantial evidence for a dynamic, 
incremental and constant process of change through which specific national systems evolve and 
adapt to new circumstances, yet remain within their national specific framework. Higher education 
has evolved in a path dependent fashion, with free study in Germany and the introduction of 
student fees in Australia. The findings are also consistent with the theory that the pace, scope and 
breadth of change under marketisation differs in different welfare states. Comparative political 
economy provides a basic framework to capture institutional variation and demonstrate how 
trajectories of change unfold within historically specific cultures, institutional frameworks and 
stakeholder constellations that shape the way marketisation policies develop.  
Although the findings confirm that level of welfare state commitment to higher education as well as 
policy process and focus link to the welfare state typology, other results of the study contradict and 
 181 
challenge the explanatory power of the comparative political economy framework. The focus on 
uniform welfare state types as prevalent in the comparative political economy literature largely 
ignores internal differences between labour markets and their specific features as well as similar 
outcomes of different marketisation policies that lead to convergence beyond institutional 
specificities. 
The findings show, against the premises of comparative political economy, particularly the varieties 
of capitalism and three world of welfare state theory, that academic labour markets are more secure 
in the Australian liberal welfare state than the German coordinated welfare state. The comparative 
welfare state theory cannot explain the distinct logic of academic labour markets. This significant 
irregularity in the relation of welfare state types and institutional structures of the higher education 
sector inevitably leads to questioning the validity of the pioneering work in the varieties and worlds 
of welfare state capitalisms by Esping-Andersen and Hall and Soskice. Furthermore, this finding calls 
for a differentiation between distinct labour market logics within welfare state economies. 
Comparative political economy has focused on particular sectors such as the vocational training 
system but overlooked the growing higher education sector and specificities of academic labour 
markets. The segmentation between a primary secure (lecturers or professors) and a rising 
secondary insecure labour market (casual academics or project workers) is evident in both countries. 
For this reason, comparative political economy needs to be extended beyond the institutional level 
to the structures of labour markets to investigate the “outcome of change for a particular group” 
(Ferrangina et al. 2015, 289). The findings demonstrate that marketisation policies are a strong 
factor driving the internal segmentation of academic labour markets. This phenomenon cannot be 
explained by the comparative welfare state literature alone. As outlined below, the study suggests 
the possibility of a fruitful synthesis between comparative political economy and labour 
segmentation theory to understand developments in academic labour markets and their relationship 
to national specific policy creation in Australia and Germany. 
Comparative political economy has focused on institutional differences under change, to the neglect 
of the outcome of change for the labour market. If national specific trajectories, challenges and 
policies lead to similar outcomes the question arises as to whether cultural particularities constitute 
"a difference which makes a difference" (Bateson 1972, 315). The institutional differences presented 
in this thesis led to different policies and temporalities of change but the structural effect seems to 
be limited. The findings from both cases, Germany and Australia, show systematic processes of 
neoliberal policy implementation through the construction of quasi-markets in the allocation of 
public resources, increasing competition to stimulate productivity and efficiency as well as 
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introducing external control and accountability mechanisms due to predominant New Public 
Management ideologies. This means that similar marketisation policies, converging processes and 
outcomes emerge beyond institutional particularities. Established welfare state institutions and 
academic labour market structures were infiltrated by common capitalist tendencies of 
accumulation, facilitated through marketisation policies. The findings from this study demonstrate 
that marketisation policies have adaptive characteristics and bypass or take advantage of welfare 
state protection regimes and academic labour market principles.  
In Germany, marketisation policies were shaped by state authorities to suit and support the 
traditional academic labour market principles of the academic apprentice model. In Australia, 
targeted marketisation policies for core services led to drastic expansion of casual employment. 
Both developments in academic labour markets provide evidence for the causal relationship 
between marketisation and growing secondary labour markets. According to the outcomes of 
change, employment structures in the high skilled sector of academia are currently converging, 
rather than diverging across two different welfare states. This means that countries undergo 
different but common developmental stages rather than develop in different types of capitalism 
with collateral effects, particularly for precarious secondary labour markets. 
The thesis advocates for a synthesis between different theoretical traditions to overcome the limits 
and build on the strengths of comparative political economy for empirical analysis. A combination 
with labour segmentation theory is one promising way to differentiate between distinct labour 
market logics within welfare state types, to analyse the outcomes of specific labour market dynamics 
in detail and to explain convergence beyond different welfare states. The focus on labour markets as 
a whole also limits the scope of segmentation theory. For this reason, this thesis and other labour 
segmentation scholars (Doellgast 2012, Hauptmeier and Vidal 2014), suggest a theoretical synthesis 
rather than replacement. Labour segmentation theory has neither developed an understanding of 
how national specific institutions shape marketisation policies nor sufficiently engaged with national 
institutional differences or comparisons between countries and cannot account adequately for 
institutional variations within the types into which nation-states are grouped (Hauptmeier and Vidal 
2014, 18).  
The findings demonstrate how a combination of comparative political economy literature and labour 
segmentation theory facilitates the comparative analysis of distinct labour markets in two 
dimensions. Labour market segmentation theory provides concepts to differentiate and to explain 
convergence across welfare states. The concept of segmented labour markets distinguishes between 
competing groups inside specific labour markets, describes their relation as well as different 
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outcomes of marketisation for each group and analyses drivers of labour market segmentation. 
Academic labour markets are divided into a primary market with relatively secure positions for 
professors or lecturers and the secondary labour market with insecure casual academics in the. Both 
groups are highly qualified and mutually dependent in the work process and in career development. 
For example, success in the increasing research funding market is relevant for career advancement 
and produces insecure project and teaching assistants at the same time. The findings demonstrate 
that core structures of segmented academic labour markets remain in both countries, yet the 
growth of the secondary labour market led to the relative decline of the primary labour market and 
increased competition for secure positions. Marketisation and expansion are key drivers of labour 
market segmentation in academia and other industries (Peck 1996).  
The detailed analysis of labour market structures and dynamics links labour segmentation theory 
directly to the micro level of specific work processes, to labour process theory as well as detailed 
studies of academic work in times of marketisation provided by higher education scholars (cf 
Musselin 2009a/b, Marginson 1997b, 2007c, 2011). For this reason, Hauptmeier and Vidal (2014) 
argue that a synthesis of comparative political economy, labour segmentation and process theory 
show “how national institutions and other wider societal structures are impacting employment 
relations without losing sight of workplace dynamics – and how the latter feed back into the former” 
(2014, 22). Moreover, labour process scholars such as Burawoy (1985) theorise work as the 
particular organisation of tasks regulated by the political apparatus around production to outline 
how marketisation will change the labour process towards work intensification, increases in the low 
skilled sector and increasing insecurity. The findings of this thesis demonstrate similar processes in 
the high skilled academic labour market. In fact, marketisation policies trigger the shift in the 
organisation of academic work from unified to specialised and task oriented modes of organisation, 
which increasingly shapes the labour market conditions. Predefined research projects as well as 
standardised teaching programs demand and produce a highly specialised academic workforce and 
are crucial prerequisites to compete for global funding as well as student markets. 
Labour market segmentation theory provides an analytical framework to investigate distinct labour 
market logics, dynamics and detailed outcomes. The theory advances an understanding of why 
academic labour markets tend to converge across welfare states worldwide. Labour market 
segmentation theory enables extension of the analytical focus of comparative political economy 
towards labour market conditions and outcomes that link to international pressures of marketisation 
policies beyond welfare states. The findings of this thesis show that liberal as well as coordinated 
welfare states adapt to neoliberal ideologies to justify and drive the mismatch between the growing 
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higher education sector in knowledge societies and the provision of permanent academic positions. 
Findings refer for example to external pressures of global higher education and research markets to 
facilitate competition between universities (i.e. rankings) as well as between academics in terms of 
publication and research funding output. Welfare states increase the competition by increasing 
research funding, constructing global student markets and facilitating temporary work. The findings 
demonstrate that insecure temporary work increases and fills the gap between work intensity and 
scarce positions.  
The analysis in this study confirms that neoliberal policies of marketisation are best understood as 
‘ideology’ (Cahill 2012) for several reasons. First, welfare states use neoliberal ideas to hide their 
own interest in austerity and externalise responsibility to external pressures. Second, marketisation 
policies in higher education are not in precise accordance with neoliberal theory but differ in pace 
and focus at large.  
Third, ‘variegated neoliberal’ (Macartney 2011) practices emerge because marketisation policies use 
historically specific higher education structures to bring neoliberal ideas to work. This is exemplified 
in the evidence from Germany, where marketisation occurs primarily around the provision of 
research in the research focused higher education system and in Australia around the provision of 
teaching within a teaching focused system. Established and remaining institutional structures 
provide a gateway, rather than indicating limits of always ideologically, institutionally and socially 
‘embedded’ (Cahill 2012, Cerny 2008) neoliberal marketisation policies. In other words, 
differentiation and infiltration rather than harmonising policies and institutional structures is the 
modus operandi at work. For this reason the thesis extends the scope of analysis from institutions to 
outcomes and shows in both countries that institutional divergence is compatible with converging 
outcomes, namely increasing academic labour market segmentation and increasing insecure 
academic work.  
Fourth, the findings further show that, in conflict with the premises of neoliberal theory, the 
influence of both welfare states increased. States have taken an active role in shaping marketisation 
policies, creating and providing quasi-markets for teaching or research. Welfare states have changed 
regulatory regimes under New Public Management doctrines and increased regulatory power by 
setting the rules for competition between more self-regulated academic organisations. This led to 
the growing power of university managers rather than an increase in academic freedom for 
individual academics. Finally, the findings add to the understanding of socially embedded neoliberal 
reforms. Labour segmentation theory provides a framework to analyse the relationship between 
different employment status groups within and across specific labour markets beyond class relations 
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(Cahill 2012). This is important to expand the view that marketisation is socially embedded in 
external conditions and relations. In the case of academic labour markets, it is not possible to 
describe the segmentation between professors or lecturers in the secure primary and casual 
academics in the insecure secondary labour market as separate classes. They share similar interests, 
skills or tasks and the segments are permeable. Scientific achievements regulate the transition from 
secondary to primary academic labour market segments as well as further career advancement. In 
order to produce achievements both employment groups intrinsically compete to secure individual 
research time and resources. For this reason, academics welcome increasing project-based funding 
markets as the predominant opportunity to buy and provide some research time. This means that 
marketisation is embedded in policies, organisational structures and everyday academic practices, 
which contribute to the increase of temporary work. 
In conclusion, the findings of the thesis suggest that segmentation theory provides a fruitful link to 
combine different approaches in political economy to instruct detailed research into labour market 
specific dynamics, drivers and outcomes of marketisation across welfare states. This 
conceptualisation has implications for future research and higher education policies. 
9.3 Future research priorities 
Four research directions are particularly important to assess and improve the validity of the study’s 
empirical findings as well as theoretical considerations. First, the variation of cases in terms of 
welfare states, higher education system and sectors is useful to test and generalise two propositions 
outlined below. Extending the scope of this study to the third social democratic welfare state type, 
such as Sweden, and other higher education systems such as the American ‘market-coordinated’ 
type would test the finding that similar marketisation policies and labour market effects emerge 
across welfare states. Such research would most likely find similar convergence between the 
American system and other liberal systems. 
The study would also benefit from comparison between sectors to assess the proposition that labour 
markets develop distinct logics within welfare states and marketisation policies use established 
labour market structures. 
Extending the database used in this thesis in terms of quality, scope and timeframes would facilitate 
the validity and further increase the differentiation of the findings. The thesis addresses the growth 
and segmentation of academic labour markets and relies on quantitative datasets provided by 
national statistics or studies. The development of a comprehensive dataset covering the temporary 
workforce at all career levels would be beneficial considering the developments highlighted in this 
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thesis as well as the impact of international mobility. For example, the findings indicate that the 
increase of casual work in Australia applies particularly to early career researchers while Germany 
facilitates temporary work at all career levels. Qualitative comparative case studies could trace the 
lived experiences of the temporary academic workforce, similar to the ‘Changing academic 
profession’ study (Teichler et al. 2013a).  
This study has focused on outcomes of marketisation policies for academic labour markets. 
However, an extension to consumers and quality of academic conduct is also desirable. Higher 
education research indicates that marketisation in the higher education sector led to a focus on high 
ranked journal articles, prestigious academic prizes and grants rather than teaching quality or 
industry collaboration. For this reason, it would be of great value to investigate unintended 
consequences of marketisation processes for teaching quality, student satisfaction and quality of 
research outcomes.  
Finally, this thesis has proposed that useful insights can be gleaned from a synthesis of different 
political economy approaches. Focusing on diverging as well as converging processes and structures 
in evolving neoliberal welfare states might be one pathway for further theoretical synthesis. While 
the thesis has focused on higher education the findings prompt consideration on whether other 
sectors of the economy and/or state might usefully be analysed through a similar conceptual lens.  
9.4 Policy implications 
The study has shown that marketisation in higher education is not a natural process of unfolding 
market pressures imposing on welfare states. Conversely, welfare states, academic managers and 
scholars take a leading role and responsibility in the creation as well as implementation of 
marketisation policies, quasi-markets and increased competition. As marketisation has collateral 
effects on academic labour markets it is time to bring back agency and responsible choice into the 
analysis.     
While the phenomenon of temporary employment is not new, neither in higher education nor in 
other industries, the contemporary scope of non-standard employment is unprecedented in 
academia. Standard employment relationships were never a universal but dependent on class, race 
and gender as women in particular have always worked predominantly in insecure employment. The 
high skilled academics and professors have had relatively high employment security, being granted 
labour market and social rights in addition to a long tradition of informal security through academic 
networks. This research demonstrates the disproportionate increase in temporary and precarious 
employment compared to permanent employment in a high skilled academic sector. This thesis 
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argues that the increase in temporary work in academia is largely an outcome of states’ higher 
education policymaking and that marketisation policies have the potential to undermine labour 
rights. While marketisation policies aim to restructure the tertiary education delivery process, they 
are in fact significantly redefining academic employment conditions. This means that by introducing 
marketisation the welfare state actively undermines its own mandate to protect and promote the 
economic and social wellbeing of welfare state citizens.  
Indeed, the rise of precarious employment has the potential to destabilise society because it may 
foster de-integration and isolation from society (Brinkmann et.al 2006, Dörre 2006) and may lead as 
Standing (2014) argues to the creation of a dangerous precarious class. Other research shows that 
secure employment is positively correlated with research productivity (Leung 2009, Pfeffer and 
Veiga 1999). This means that the rise in temporary employment has implications for the workplace 
itself, for governments and for society as a whole. In this sense, it is in the interest of the welfare 
state to reinforce, rather than dismantle, secure academic employment.  
An immediate concern is the implication of the weakness of markets in higher education. This thesis 
has progressed political economy narratives to account for the understanding of the relationship 
between marketisation policies and the emergence as well as materialisations of temporary 
employment relationships in academia. Academic non-standard employment relationships across 
both countries are not limited to hourly contracts but materialise in various forms of temporary 
employment with generally low social protection benefits, low pay, and poor protection from 
termination of employment as well as limited access to exercise rights at work. Non-standard 
employment relationships mean that workers' welfare is entirely dependent on the labour market, 
being deprived of access to social protection within the employment contract. According to Esping-
Andersen’s conceptualisation, work of academic employees is commodified (1990, 21). In this sense, 
the policies that encourage the marketisation of higher education significantly strengthen 
commodification. The state has been largely absent in supporting and regulating academic 
employment in the secondary labour market across both Germany and Australia, thus contributing 
to shaping rather than challenging the role of markets in higher education policy design. 
Several state governments in Germany and Australia realised and nurtured, rather than challenged, 
competition amongst academics and tertiary education institutions (cf. Chapters 4 and 6). In future, 
significant policy decisions need to address the problem of increasing employment in the secondary 
labour market, not limited to the restructuring of higher education funding, particularly the shift 
from guaranteed institutional base funding to non-guaranteed competitive project funding in 
research and teaching. The academic workforce is not only asked by the university organisation to 
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apply for research funding and to attract students to their university but also to undertake research 
and deliver education. The marketisation of higher education thus manifests in the academic 
workforce as the pressure to engage in competitive research funding.      
Marketisation policies and neoliberal policies in general are contingent on the active role of the 
welfare state in creating the environment for markets in higher education demonstrated in this 
thesis. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to analyse the motivations of the different agencies 
involved in government higher education decision-making processes. However, in demonstrating 
that the main driver of commodification of academic labour is the state, this thesis proposes the 
decommodification of academic labour, rather than promoting a return to the so-called ‘golden age’ 
of academic craft labour. Winter states that during the so-called “‘golden-age’ when the academic 
craft was linked to a moral value, educational need and the search for truth which, according to 
Bourdieu (1998) had its own ambivalent involvement with oppressive social and political power” 
(Winter 1995, 139). From this perspective, marketisation processes in higher education might 
appear to have or have had a liberating impact on oppressive and elite academic employment 
structures. However, the inherent condition of capitalism, the constant pursuit of profit, does in the 
long term not only destroy the educational process itself but leads to the oppression of the 
workforce through market mechanisms. Esping-Andersen argues, “de-commodification occurs when 
a service is rendered as a matter of right, and when a person can maintain a livelihood without 
reliance on the market” (Esping-Andersen 1990, 22). Decommodification of employment thus 
impacts positively on people's lives as it provides stability and enables long-term decisions, such as 
planning for a family and engaging in communal work (Brinkmann et al. 2006, Dörre 2006).  
The decommodification of academic labour strongly links to the decommodification of higher 
education, realisable primarily through restructuring of base funding as well as the reduction of 
competition related to teaching services. The structural disadvantages to more direct and secure 
funding approaches created by the market based policy paradigm are evident in the academic labour 
market. Indeed, the provision of substantial and secure funding for tertiary education is a long-term 
investment, rather than a cost, as it ensures not only substantial increase in research performance 
beneficial for society as a whole, but is significant for long-term economic growth and environmental 
sustainability providing tertiary education for the future workforce.  
The investment in higher education fosters quality education that leads to sustainable growth in 
national productivity thereby reducing precarious employment conditions and ensuring secure 
employment. It is essential to re-establish the value of higher education not only for economic 
growth, but because of the value of education and research for democratic societies as a common 
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good. From the regulatory feasibility perspective, national governments control higher education 
institutions through policy design and funding, which places governments in a strong position to 
address not only the decommodification of higher education but precarious, temporary 
employment.  
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